Is Holoworld AI (HOLO) Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Findings

1 High1 Med1 Low1 Info

High

PAUSER_ROLE Self-Management Allows Privilege Escalation

H-01The `_setRoleAdmin(PAUSER_ROLE, PAUSER_ROLE)` configuration in the constructor allows any account holding the `PAUSER_ROLE` to grant or revoke `PAUSER_ROLE` to/from other addresses. This bypasses the oversight of the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` and `ADMIN_ROLE` for managing pausers. A compromised PAUSER could add more malicious PAUSERs or remove legitimate ones, effectively taking full control of the pausing mechanism without higher administrative approval (7.3 Access Control).

IssueThe `_setRoleAdmin(PAUSER_ROLE, PAUSER_ROLE)` configuration in the constructor allows any account holding the `PAUSER_ROLE` to grant or revoke `PAUSER_ROLE` to/from other addresses. This bypasses the oversight of the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` and `ADMIN_ROLE` for managing pausers. A compromised PAUSER could add more malicious PAUSERs or remove legitimate ones, effectively taking full control of the pausing mechanism without higher administrative approval (7.3 Access Control).

FixChange the admin role for `PAUSER_ROLE` to a higher-level administrative role, such as `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` or `ADMIN_ROLE`. For example, `_setRoleAdmin(PAUSER_ROLE, ADMIN_ROLE);` would ensure that only accounts with `ADMIN_ROLE` can manage the `PAUSER_ROLE`.

StatusUnresolved

Medium

High Centralization of Control

M-01The contract design relies heavily on privileged roles (`DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, `ADMIN_ROLE`, `PAUSER_ROLE`, `MINTER_ROLE`). These roles have significant power, including managing other roles, minting tokens up to the maximum supply, and controlling all token transfers (pausing/unpausing, whitelisting). If the private keys associated with these roles (especially if they are EOAs) are compromised, it could lead to severe consequences such as arbitrary minting, denial of service for transfers, or loss of funds (7.5 Governance, 7.8 Operations).

IssueThe contract design relies heavily on privileged roles (`DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, `ADMIN_ROLE`, `PAUSER_ROLE`, `MINTER_ROLE`). These roles have significant power, including managing other roles, minting tokens up to the maximum supply, and controlling all token transfers (pausing/unpausing, whitelisting). If the private keys associated with these roles (especially if they are EOAs) are compromised, it could lead to severe consequences such as arbitrary minting, denial of service for transfers, or loss of funds (7.5 Governance, 7.8 Operations).

FixFor critical roles, consider assigning them to multi-signature wallets or robust governance contracts instead of single externally owned accounts (EOAs). This distributes control and requires multiple approvals for sensitive operations, significantly reducing the risk of a single point of failure.

StatusUnresolved

Low

Initial Role Assignments to EOAs

L-01The constructor assigns `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` to `msg.sender` and `ADMIN_ROLE`/`PAUSER_ROLE` to `initialAdmin`/`initialPauser` addresses. If these are externally owned accounts (EOAs), they represent single points of failure. A compromise of any of these EOAs could lead to unauthorized control over critical contract functions (7.8 Operations).

IssueThe constructor assigns `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` to `msg.sender` and `ADMIN_ROLE`/`PAUSER_ROLE` to `initialAdmin`/`initialPauser` addresses. If these are externally owned accounts (EOAs), they represent single points of failure. A compromise of any of these EOAs could lead to unauthorized control over critical contract functions (7.8 Operations).

FixWhile common for initial deployment, it is best practice to transfer ownership of critical roles (especially `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`) to a multi-signature wallet or a well-tested governance contract immediately after deployment. This enhances security by requiring multiple approvals for sensitive actions.

StatusUnresolved

Info

Redundant `require` in `setTransfersEnabled`

I-01The `setTransfersEnabled` function includes `require(transfersEnabled != status, "HoloToken: status not changed");`. This check prevents setting the `transfersEnabled` state variable to its current value. While not harmful, this check is redundant as setting a state variable to its current value has no effect and consumes gas unnecessarily (7.2 Code Security).

IssueThe `setTransfersEnabled` function includes `require(transfersEnabled != status, "HoloToken: status not changed");`. This check prevents setting the `transfersEnabled` state variable to its current value. While not harmful, this check is redundant as setting a state variable to its current value has no effect and consumes gas unnecessarily (7.2 Code Security).

FixConsider removing this `require` statement, as setting a variable to its existing value is a no-op and does not introduce a vulnerability. Alternatively, if the intent is to provide a more specific error, the message could be improved (e.g., 'Transfers are already enabled' or 'Transfers are already disabled').

StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalMedium6/10

The contract leverages battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20 and AccessControl, enhancing code security and adherence to standards (7.2 Code Security). The `_update` override correctly implements conditional transfer logic based on `transfersEnabled` and `transferWhitelist` (7.1 Architecture). However, a significant access control misconfiguration allows any `PAUSER_ROLE` member to manage other `PAUSER_ROLE` members, bypassing higher administrative oversight (7.3 Access Control). This creates a privilege escalation risk within the pauser group.

GovernanceHigh1/10

The token implements a clear `MAX_SUPPLY` and controlled minting via the `MINTER_ROLE`, providing transparency on token issuance (7.4 Economic). However, the system exhibits high centralization, with critical functions like minting, pausing transfers, and managing roles controlled by specific privileged addresses (7.5 Governance). If these addresses are EOAs and become compromised, it poses a substantial risk to the protocol's integrity and user funds (7.8 Operations).

UpgradesHigh3/10

The contract is not designed with an upgrade mechanism (e.g., proxy pattern). Therefore, there are no upgrade-specific risks (7.7 Upgrades). Any future changes to the contract logic would require a new deployment and migration of assets.

Security Checklist

2/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership Renounced?

No Mint FunctionFail

Liquidity LockedFail

Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

95.9% in top 10

4.8% in wallets91.1% in contracts

Effective Concentration41.3%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$513.4K across 4 pairs

Pancakeswap v3WBNBanalysed$509.2K Pancakeswap v3WBNB$4.2K Pancakeswap v2TUT$2 Pancakeswap v2WBNB$0

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%

Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Key Addresses

4 addresses

Deployer

0x335b…c0dc

Unlocked LP Held By

0x9a92…b7840x6f9d…abd50x371f…2a35

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

9 factors

Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
Top-10 concentration > 30% (95.9% total → 41.3% effective; 4.8% in EOAs, 91.1% in contracts — moderate)
Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 99% of DEX liquidity)
LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 99% of DEX liquidity)
1 High finding(s) from audit
1 Medium finding(s) from audit
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Final Recommendation

AI Copilot

It is strongly recommended to address the identified access control misconfiguration for the PAUSER_ROLE to prevent potential privilege escalation.…

Read the verdictHide

Review the role hierarchy and ensure that critical role management is overseen by higher-level administrative roles, ideally secured by multi-signature wallets or robust governance mechanisms. Furthermore, consider assigning critical administrative roles to multi-signature wallets or governance contracts instead of single externally owned accounts (EOAs) to mitigate centralization risks and enhance operational security. Implement comprehensive testing, especially for access control logic, to validate the intended permissions and prevent unintended behaviors.

Contract

TypeHoloToken

Audit History

1 audit on record

Aug 1247Sep 467

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Is Holoworld AI Safe?

Security Findings

PAUSER_ROLE Self-Management Allows Privilege Escalation

High Centralization of Control

Initial Role Assignments to EOAs

Redundant `require` in `setTransfersEnabled`

Category Ratings

Security Checklist

Holder Composition

Liquidity Depth

LP Distribution

Key Addresses

What Raised This Score

Related Audits

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