On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
PolygonThe UChildERC20Proxy contract serves as a standard upgradeable proxy pattern on the Polygon network.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 20, 2026
The 20 remaining pairs hold $18.9K between them and are not listed. The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x84b3…eacd0xaa55…84f00xbdb6…bc600xd0dd…6e8f0x8361…b7890x6e2f…c2a30x318e…9c500xc42c…d57d0xf881…7e470x9374…c7de0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.4% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0x84b3…eacd — holds 73.6% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them. This assessment covers the main pool, which holds 19% of the token's DEX liquidity; the other pools were not assessed.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
The verified source code was reviewed and no issue rising to Informational severity or above was identified. This is a statement about the code that was read, not a guarantee: the review covers the published source only. Fact-layer checks (holder concentration) were applied separately and feed the risk score.
Re-check after any contract upgrade or ownership change, both of which can alter behaviour without changing this page.
Acknowledged
The ten largest holders own 63.7% of supply. What remains: 9.1% in wallets, 54.6% in other contracts. 33,309 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
Listed on CoinGecko as Telcoin [OLD] (TEL). 33,309 holders.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $441K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $227K (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mint capability could not be read. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $441K of DEX liquidity across 30 pools. Launch: 2060 days of market history.
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Acknowledged
The UChildERC20Proxy contract serves as a standard upgradeable proxy pattern on the Polygon network. The architecture relies on a centralized owner to manage implementation updates and proxy ownership. No vulnerabilities were identified in the provided code map, as the logic strictly adheres to standard proxy delegation patterns.
The architecture follows a standard proxy pattern (7.1 Architecture) ensuring clear separation between proxy state and implementation logic. Code security (7.2) is maintained through simple, well-audited delegation patterns. Access control (7.3) is strictly enforced via the onlyProxyOwner modifier, ensuring that only the authorized address can trigger state-changing functions like updateImplementation.
Economic risk (7.4) is primarily tied to the centralization of the proxy owner. Governance (7.5) is currently handled by a single address, which represents a single point of failure. Operations (7.8) are straightforward, but the lack of a multi-sig or timelock for administrative actions increases the impact of a potential key compromise.
The upgrade mechanism (7.7) is robust, utilizing a standard implementation swap pattern. The updateAndCall function allows for atomic upgrades and initialization, which is a best practice for maintaining state consistency. The implementation address is validated to be a contract, preventing accidental bricking of the proxy.
The contract is well-structured for its intended purpose as a proxy.
To improve security, transition the proxy ownership from a single EOA to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to mitigate the risk of a single point of failure. Ensure that any future implementation upgrades are thoroughly tested on a testnet environment before deployment to mainnet. Maintain strict operational security regarding the private keys associated with the proxy owner role.
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