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Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis

Is TapeFour a Scam?

TAPEFOURBNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Oct 20, 2026 · 1 audit on recordNew Launch · 4d old
SummaryAI Copilot

The protocol implements a highly modular token architecture using EIP-1167 clones.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on; held by tokenmodule: Other-Contract
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by migratemodule: Other-Contract, vault: Other-Contract
  • Volume/Liquidity > 10×
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Code: Rounding Loss from Division Before Multiplication
Exact factors
  • A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on; held by tokenmodule: Other-Contract
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by migratemodule: Other-Contract, vault: Other-Contract
  • Volume/Liquidity > 10× (13.7× — possible wash trading)
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (91.0% total → 36.6% effective; 2.5% in EOAs, 85.3% in contracts; 3.2% burned, locked or in pools excluded)
  • Code: Rounding Loss from Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (4d old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Oct 206 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax1% / 1%

Holders

as of audit · Oct 20, 2026913 holders
85.3%Contracts2.5%3.2%9.0%Everyone else
85.3%Contracts3.2%9.0%
ContractsWalletsDEX poolsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
91.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking85.3%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell2.5%
  • DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity3.2%
  • Everyone else903 holders9.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads36.6%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 20, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Oct 20$51.8K across 3 pairs
LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$51.8KShare of depth100.0%
LP Burned99.8% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked99.8% · Null Address
Unlocked LP held by
0x10e4…3b2b

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium1 Low7 Info
High

Privileged Module Can Redirect Token Logic

The postInitialize function allows the tokenModule to change the addresses of critical dependencies such as the quote, shareHolderManager, and tokenHelper. Because transfers depend on these contracts, the controller of the tokenModule can effectively redirect or break token functionality.CP-03

Issue

The postInitialize function allows the tokenModule to change the addresses of critical dependencies such as the quote, shareHolderManager, and tokenHelper. Because transfers depend on these contracts, the controller of the tokenModule can effectively redirect or break token functionality.

Fix

Implement a time-lock mechanism for changing critical dependency addresses to allow users to exit if they disagree with the changes.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Dynamic Fee Manipulation

Functions like onMigrate and onBondingTrade allow privileged modules to modify fee parameters (e.g., feeBurn, feeLiquidity). This allows the protocol to change the economic impact on users without prior notice.CP-07

Issue

Functions like onMigrate and onBondingTrade allow privileged modules to modify fee parameters (e.g., feeBurn, feeLiquidity). This allows the protocol to change the economic impact on users without prior notice.

Fix

Define hard caps on fee percentages within the contract to prevent excessive taxation by privileged modules.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Rounding Loss from Division Before Multiplication

In the _doDispatchFee function, performing division before multiplication can lead to precision loss, resulting in slightly inaccurate fee calculations.CD-01

Issue

In the _doDispatchFee function, performing division before multiplication can lead to precision loss, resulting in slightly inaccurate fee calculations.

Fix

Reorder arithmetic operations to perform multiplication before division, ensuring higher precision.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Privileged Control Over Transfer Path

The 'swapping' state variable, which can be toggled by internal functions like _swapForQuoteWrapped, acts as a switch for transfer operations. Privileged modules can influence this state, potentially blocking transfers or sales. Ownership is renounced, so no one can call these functions now.CP-05

Issue

The 'swapping' state variable, which can be toggled by internal functions like _swapForQuoteWrapped, acts as a switch for transfer operations. Privileged modules can influence this state, potentially blocking transfers or sales. Ownership is renounced, so no one can call these functions now.

Fix

Restrict the ability to toggle transfer-blocking switches to a decentralized governance process rather than a single module address.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Who holds the supply

The ten largest holders own 91.0% of supply. Of that, 3.2% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 2.5% in wallets, 85.3% in other contracts. 913 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS

Issue

The ten largest holders own 91.0% of supply. Of that, 3.2% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 2.5% in wallets, 85.3% in other contracts. 913 holders in total.

Fix

Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Not listed by any independent source

913 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY

Issue

913 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.

Fix

Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Liquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn

99.8% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.8% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.2% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY

Issue

99.8% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.8% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.2% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.

Fix

Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

The market for this token

Liquidity $52K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $711K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET

Issue

Liquidity $52K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $711K (DexScreener, all pools).

Fix

Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Asset class: Project token

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 1% on sell. Market: $52K of DEX liquidity across 3 pools. Launch: 4 days of market history.QA-PROFILE

Issue

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 1% on sell. Market: $52K of DEX liquidity across 3 pools. Launch: 4 days of market history.

Fix

Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Recently launched — 4 days of market history

The token's oldest DEX pool is 4 days old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT

Issue

The token's oldest DEX pool is 4 days old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.

Fix

Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.

Status

Acknowledged

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 20
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The protocol implements a highly modular token architecture using EIP-1167 clones. While the core logic is immutable, the token relies heavily on external modules for transfer rules, fee management, and liquidity operations. The centralization of control in privileged modules presents significant trust requirements for token holders.

Technical8/10Low risk

The architecture utilizes EIP-1167 minimal clones, ensuring the implementation logic cannot be altered post-deployment. 7.1 Architecture is robust for gas efficiency but relies on complex external dependencies. 7.2 Code Security shows standard implementation patterns, though 7.3 Access Control is highly fragmented across multiple modules. 7.6 External calls are frequent, creating potential points of failure if modules are misconfigured.

Governance8/10Low risk

7.4 Economic parameters are entirely managed by external modules, allowing for dynamic fee adjustments and liquidity pool manipulation. 7.5 Governance is implicit, relying on the integrity of the addresses assigned to the tokenModule, taxVault, and migrateModule. This creates a high trust requirement for users, as these modules can effectively freeze or tax transfers at will.

Upgrades8/10Low risk

7.7 Upgrades are not supported due to the EIP-1167 clone pattern, which fixes the implementation logic permanently. 7.8 Operations are stable, as the contract state is managed through internal setters rather than proxy logic. This eliminates risks associated with storage collisions or malicious implementation swaps.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Users should exercise caution regarding the high degree of centralization inherent in the module-based design.

Ensure that the addresses controlling the tokenModule and taxVault are transparent and governed by secure, multi-signature wallets or time-locked contracts to mitigate the risk of arbitrary fee or transfer rule changes.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeTapeoutOpenFourToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age4d
Contract0xe6df…ffff
Deployer0x0f93…abb3
Audit History
  1. Oct 20, 202651Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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