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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is RUSSELL Safe?

Base
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The Erc20 token contract exhibits critical functionality gaps, including a missing internal transfer function and a truncated approve function, rendering it non-operational and non-compliant with the ERC-20 standard.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • 2 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • 2 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 45 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
14.0%Contracts8.2%77.8%Everyone else
14.0%8.2%77.8%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
22.2%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking14.0%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell8.2%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply77.8%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads13.8%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$416.7K across 7 pairs
LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$389.5KShare of depth93.5%
LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address
Unlocked LP held by
0x7cd0…2e470x9bd2…168c0x46cb…e6be0xb3ac…68a00xf2ed…6f2a0x4985…2b2b

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

2 Critical1 High1 Low1 Info
Critical

Missing _transfer Function

The transfer function, which is a core part of the ERC-20 standard, calls an internal _transfer function. However, the _transfer function is not defined anywhere in the provided contract code. This omission renders the token's fundamental transfer functionality non-operational, preventing any token movements.C-01

Issue

The transfer function, which is a core part of the ERC-20 standard, calls an internal _transfer function. However, the _transfer function is not defined anywhere in the provided contract code. This omission renders the token's fundamental transfer functionality non-operational, preventing any token movements.

Fix

Implement the _transfer internal function, ensuring it correctly handles balance updates, allowance checks (if applicable for transferFrom), and emits the Transfer event. This function should contain the core logic for moving tokens between addresses.

Status

Unresolved

Critical

Truncated approve Function

The approve function, which is essential for ERC-20 token delegation, is incomplete in the provided code snippet. The function body abruptly ends, preventing its proper execution and introducing an unknown security risk or complete malfunction.C-02

Issue

The approve function, which is essential for ERC-20 token delegation, is incomplete in the provided code snippet. The function body abruptly ends, preventing its proper execution and introducing an unknown security risk or complete malfunction.

Fix

Complete the implementation of the approve function. Ensure it correctly updates the _allowed mapping for the msg.sender and spender, handles the spender != address(0) check, and emits the Approval event. Consider implementing the recommended mitigation for the ERC-20 approve race condition (setting allowance to 0 first).

Status

Unresolved

High

Missing transferFrom Implementation

The IERC20 interface defines the transferFrom function, which allows a spender to transfer tokens on behalf of another address. However, the Erc20 contract does not implement this function. This violates the full ERC-20 standard and prevents delegated token transfers, impacting interoperability with other DeFi protocols.H-01

Issue

The IERC20 interface defines the transferFrom function, which allows a spender to transfer tokens on behalf of another address. However, the Erc20 contract does not implement this function. This violates the full ERC-20 standard and prevents delegated token transfers, impacting interoperability with other DeFi protocols.

Fix

Implement the transferFrom function as specified by the ERC-20 standard. This function should check the allowance of the spender from the from address, deduct the transferred amount from the allowance, and then perform the token transfer using the internal _transfer function.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Unused State Variables

The state variables launched (boolean) and exchanges (mapping) are declared within the Erc20 contract but are not utilized in any of the provided functions. This indicates either incomplete functionality that was planned but not implemented, or dead code that can be removed.L-01

Issue

The state variables launched (boolean) and exchanges (mapping) are declared within the Erc20 contract but are not utilized in any of the provided functions. This indicates either incomplete functionality that was planned but not implemented, or dead code that can be removed.

Fix

Review the contract's design to determine the intended purpose of launched and exchanges. If they are part of future functionality, ensure they are properly integrated. If they are no longer needed, remove them to reduce contract size and improve clarity.

Status

Unresolved

Info

totalSupply Immutability

The totalSupply variable is declared as immutable, meaning its value is set once in the constructor and cannot be changed thereafter. This design choice fixes the total supply of the token, preventing any future burning or minting capabilities.I-01

Issue

The totalSupply variable is declared as immutable, meaning its value is set once in the constructor and cannot be changed thereafter. This design choice fixes the total supply of the token, preventing any future burning or minting capabilities.

Fix

Confirm that a fixed token supply, without any possibility of future burning or minting, aligns with the project's long-term economic model. If dynamic supply management is ever desired, totalSupply should not be immutable and appropriate mint/burn functions with access control would be required.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The Erc20 token contract exhibits critical functionality gaps, including a missing internal transfer function and a truncated approve function, rendering it non-operational and non-compliant with the ERC-20 standard. The absence of the transferFrom function further limits its utility. These issues pose severe operational risks and require immediate resolution before deployment or use.

Technical5/10Medium risk

The technical architecture is based on a standard ERC-20 token with OpenZeppelin-like Ownable access control and a custom Address library. The code quality is severely impacted by critical omissions: the core _transfer function is missing (7.2 Code Security), and the approve function is truncated (7.2 Code Security). Additionally, the transferFrom function, a key part of the ERC-20 standard, is not implemented (7.2 Code Security). These issues make the token non-functional and non-compliant.

Governance7/10Low risk

The contract implements a basic Ownable pattern for access control (7.3 Access Control), allowing the owner to manage ownership. There is no complex governance mechanism or economic model beyond the standard ERC-20 token functionality. The totalSupply is immutable (7.1 Architecture), fixing the token supply at deployment. The launched and exchanges variables are declared but unused, indicating potential incomplete economic logic (7.4 Economic).

Upgrades8/10Low risk

The contract is a standard implementation contract and does not incorporate any proxy patterns or upgrade mechanisms (7.7 Upgrades). Therefore, it is not designed to be upgradeable. Any changes to the contract logic would require a new deployment and migration of assets, if applicable.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is imperative to complete the implementation of the _transfer function and the approve function to restore core token functionality.

The transferFrom function must also be implemented to ensure full ERC-20 standard compliance. Additionally, review and either implement or remove the unused launched and exchanges state variables to clarify the contract's intended design and prevent dead code. A thorough review of the complete codebase is recommended to ensure all ERC-20 functions are correctly and securely implemented.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBase
Token age1y
Contract0x0c51…ce0b
Deployer0x6368…502c
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202611Low
  2. Jul 23, 202613Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the RUSSELL contract address?

The RUSSELL contract on Base is 0x0c5142bc58f9a61ab8c3d2085dd2f4e550c5ce0b. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.

Is RUSSELL a scam?

Quantum Audit's risk score for RUSSELL is 11/100 (Low risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.

Is RUSSELL liquidity locked?

Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $416.7K.

Who holds RUSSELL?

As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 22.2% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.

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