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Is Redstone Safe?

REDEthereum
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical7/10Governance1/10Upgrades3/10Checks passed2 of 5Findings1 High · 1 Medium · 1 Low · 1 Info4
SummaryAI Copilot

The RedstoneToken contract implements a standard ERC20 token with a fixed maximum supply and a centralized minter role.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (59.5% total → 30.4% effective; 11.1% in EOAs, 48.4% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 96% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 96% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 42 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
48.4%Contracts11.1%Wallets40.5%Everyone else
48.4%Contracts11.1%40.5%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
59.5%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking48.4%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell11.1%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply40.5%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads30.4%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$515.5K across 5 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$493.6KShare of depth95.8%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0x9b81…7db9

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium1 Low1 Info
High

Centralized Minter Role with Significant Power

The minter address has exclusive control over the mint function, allowing it to create new tokens up to the MAX_SUPPLY of 1 billion tokens. This centralized control represents a single point of failure. If the minter's private key is compromised, a malicious actor could mint a large number of tokens, leading to severe inflation and dilution of existing token holders' value. While the MAX_SUPPLY is capped, the ability to mint up to this limit at will by a single entity poses a substantial economic risk.H-01

Issue

The minter address has exclusive control over the mint function, allowing it to create new tokens up to the MAX_SUPPLY of 1 billion tokens. This centralized control represents a single point of failure. If the minter's private key is compromised, a malicious actor could mint a large number of tokens, leading to severe inflation and dilution of existing token holders' value. While the MAX_SUPPLY is capped, the ability to mint up to this limit at will by a single entity poses a substantial economic risk.

Fix

Implement a multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) for the minter role to distribute control and require multiple approvals for minting operations. For very large mints, consider adding a time-lock mechanism to allow for community oversight or emergency intervention.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Minter Role Transfer Lacks Revocation/Timeout

The proposeNewMinter function allows the current minter to propose a new address to take over the role. However, there is no mechanism for the current minter to revoke this proposal once made, nor is there a time limit for the proposedMinter to accept the role. If an incorrect address is proposed, or if the proposed address becomes unresponsive, the current minter must issue a new proposal to overwrite the previous one, which could lead to operational delays or temporary uncertainty regarding the minter's succession.M-01

Issue

The proposeNewMinter function allows the current minter to propose a new address to take over the role. However, there is no mechanism for the current minter to revoke this proposal once made, nor is there a time limit for the proposedMinter to accept the role. If an incorrect address is proposed, or if the proposed address becomes unresponsive, the current minter must issue a new proposal to overwrite the previous one, which could lead to operational delays or temporary uncertainty regarding the minter's succession.

Fix

Consider adding a revokeMinterProposal function that allows the current minter to cancel an outstanding proposal. Alternatively, implement a time-based expiry for proposals, requiring the proposedMinter to accept within a certain timeframe, after which the proposal becomes invalid.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Minter Can Propose Zero Address

The proposeNewMinter function does not explicitly prevent the minter from proposing address(0) as the new minter. While acceptMinterRole would prevent address(0) from ever accepting the role (as msg.sender cannot be address(0)), this scenario would leave the proposedMinter state variable set to address(0). This is a minor operational inconvenience, as the current minter would then need to issue another valid proposal to a non-zero address.L-01

Issue

The proposeNewMinter function does not explicitly prevent the minter from proposing address(0) as the new minter. While acceptMinterRole would prevent address(0) from ever accepting the role (as msg.sender cannot be address(0)), this scenario would leave the proposedMinter state variable set to address(0). This is a minor operational inconvenience, as the current minter would then need to issue another valid proposal to a non-zero address.

Fix

Add a `require(newProposedMinter != address(0), "Cannot propose zero address") check at the beginning of the proposeNewMinter` function to prevent setting the proposed minter to the zero address.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Lack of Pausability Mechanism

The RedstoneToken contract does not include any mechanism to pause token transfers or minting operations. While not a direct vulnerability, a pausability feature can be crucial for emergency situations, such as responding to critical vulnerabilities discovered in the token contract itself or in integrated DeFi protocols. Without it, immediate action to prevent further damage might be impossible.I-01

Issue

The RedstoneToken contract does not include any mechanism to pause token transfers or minting operations. While not a direct vulnerability, a pausability feature can be crucial for emergency situations, such as responding to critical vulnerabilities discovered in the token contract itself or in integrated DeFi protocols. Without it, immediate action to prevent further damage might be impossible.

Fix

Consider integrating a pausability mechanism (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's Pausable contract) controlled by a trusted entity, such as a multi-signature wallet. This would allow for emergency halting of critical functions if unforeseen issues arise.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The RedstoneToken contract implements a standard ERC20 token with a fixed maximum supply and a centralized minter role. The contract utilizes battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries, enhancing its technical security. Key features include a two-step minter role transfer mechanism and a hard-coded maximum supply limit. The primary risks identified relate to the significant power vested in the single minter address and minor operational considerations for minter role management.

Technical7/10Low risk

The RedstoneToken contract demonstrates good technical security, leveraging OpenZeppelin's robust ERC20 implementation (7.2 Code Security). The contract correctly enforces a maximum supply limit during minting operations, preventing uncontrolled inflation. Access control for the mint function is properly restricted to the designated minter (7.3 Access Control). However, the centralized nature of the minter role, while technically sound, introduces a single point of failure if compromised, impacting 7.1 Architecture.

Governance1/10High risk

The economic model of RedstoneToken is defined by a fixed MAX_SUPPLY of 1 billion tokens, which is a positive aspect for long-term value (7.4 Economic). However, the minter role holds significant power, capable of minting up to the maximum supply, which represents a high centralization risk (7.5 Governance). While the two-step transfer mechanism for the minter role is a good practice, the lack of a revocation mechanism for a proposed minter could lead to operational delays or uncertainty.

Upgrades3/10High risk

The RedstoneToken contract is not designed to be upgradeable (7.7 Upgrades). This eliminates risks associated with proxy patterns, upgradeability logic, and potential upgrade path vulnerabilities. The contract's immutability ensures its logic remains constant post-deployment.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

To enhance the security and resilience of the RedstoneToken protocol, it is recommended to implement a multi-signature wallet for the minter role to mitigate the risks associated with a single point of control.

Additionally, consider adding a revocation mechanism or a timeout for minter role proposals to improve operational flexibility. Finally, evaluate the necessity of a pausability feature for emergency situations, controlled by a trusted entity.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeRedstoneToken
NetworkEthereum
Token age1y
Contract0xc43c…b5de
Deployer0x6f94…185b
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202662Medium
  2. Aug 16, 202664Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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