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Is SPACE ID Safe?

IDEthereum
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

This audit focused solely on the OpenZeppelin AccessControl.sol library contract, which is a dependency for the SpaceIDToken contract.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 70%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 50.2%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 70% (88.7% total → 73.5% effective; 63.4% in EOAs, 25.2% in contracts — extreme)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 50.2% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 42 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
25.2%Contracts63.4%Wallets11.3%Everyone else
25.2%Contracts63.4%Wallets11.3%
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
88.7%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking25.2%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell63.4%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply11.3%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads73.5%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$597.1K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$597.1KShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder50.2%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0xdbb2…7b8e0x375f…9491

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Low3 Info
Low

Lack of Time-Lock for Critical Operations

The AccessControl contract itself does not inherently include time-lock mechanisms for sensitive operations like grantRole or revokeRole. Without a time-lock, critical changes can be executed immediately, leaving no window for community or governance intervention in case of a compromised key or malicious action (7.5 Governance, 7.8 Operations).L-01

Issue

The AccessControl contract itself does not inherently include time-lock mechanisms for sensitive operations like grantRole or revokeRole. Without a time-lock, critical changes can be executed immediately, leaving no window for community or governance intervention in case of a compromised key or malicious action (7.5 Governance, 7.8 Operations).

Fix

For critical roles, especially the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, consider implementing a separate time-lock contract that acts as an intermediary for executing sensitive AccessControl functions. This introduces a delay, allowing for review and potential cancellation of malicious or erroneous operations.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Default Admin Role Security

The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE in AccessControl has the power to grant and revoke any other role, including itself. Compromise of an account holding this role would grant an attacker full control over the contract's access control mechanisms, potentially leading to critical system compromise (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations).I-01

Issue

The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE in AccessControl has the power to grant and revoke any other role, including itself. Compromise of an account holding this role would grant an attacker full control over the contract's access control mechanisms, potentially leading to critical system compromise (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations).

Fix

The address assigned to DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE should be a highly secured multi-signature wallet. Consider implementing a time-lock for critical operations performed by this role to provide a window for intervention.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Role Granularity and Least Privilege

While AccessControl provides a robust framework, the security of the system heavily depends on how roles are defined and assigned in the inheriting SpaceIDToken contract. Over-permissioning accounts can lead to unintended access to sensitive functions (7.3 Access Control).I-02

Issue

While AccessControl provides a robust framework, the security of the system heavily depends on how roles are defined and assigned in the inheriting SpaceIDToken contract. Over-permissioning accounts can lead to unintended access to sensitive functions (7.3 Access Control).

Fix

Adhere strictly to the principle of least privilege. Each role should have only the minimum permissions necessary to perform its designated tasks. Regularly review role assignments and revoke unnecessary permissions.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Event Monitoring for Role Changes

The AccessControl contract explicitly states that it does not allow enumerating role members except through off-chain means by accessing contract event logs. This means that active monitoring of RoleGranted, RoleRevoked, and RoleAdminChanged events is crucial for maintaining an accurate understanding of current permissions (7.8 Operations).I-03

Issue

The AccessControl contract explicitly states that it does not allow enumerating role members except through off-chain means by accessing contract event logs. This means that active monitoring of RoleGranted, RoleRevoked, and RoleAdminChanged events is crucial for maintaining an accurate understanding of current permissions (7.8 Operations).

Fix

Implement robust off-chain monitoring systems to track all role-related events. This allows for timely detection of unauthorized role changes or misconfigurations, enhancing operational security.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

This audit focused solely on the OpenZeppelin AccessControl.sol library contract, which is a dependency for the SpaceIDToken contract. No custom logic for SpaceIDToken was provided for review, thus a comprehensive security assessment of the entire protocol cannot be performed. The AccessControl library itself is well-tested and widely used.

Technical8/10Low risk

The provided code is the OpenZeppelin AccessControl library, which implements a robust role-based access control system (7.3 Access Control). It is a well-audited and widely adopted standard, enhancing code security (7.2 Code Security) by restricting sensitive functions. However, the absence of the main SpaceIDToken contract prevents a full assessment of its specific implementation and potential vulnerabilities arising from custom logic or misconfigurations.

Governance1/10High risk

A comprehensive assessment of economic (7.4 Economic) and governance (7.5 Governance) risks is not possible as the core SpaceIDToken contract logic was not provided. The AccessControl contract itself does not introduce specific economic or governance mechanisms beyond role management. Proper configuration of roles in the inheriting contract is crucial for governance.

Upgrades3/10High risk

The provided AccessControl contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades). The prefill indicates is_proxy: false for the main contract. If the SpaceIDToken were to be upgradeable, the upgrade mechanism itself would require a separate audit to ensure safety and proper state migration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Ensure that the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and other critical roles in the SpaceIDToken contract are secured with multi-signature wallets and, ideally, time-locks for sensitive operations.

Implement the principle of least privilege when assigning roles to prevent over-permissioning. Conduct a full security audit of the SpaceIDToken contract's custom logic to identify specific vulnerabilities related to its business logic, tokenomics, and interactions with other protocols.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeSpaceIDToken
NetworkEthereum
Token age8mo
Contract0x2dff…6406
Deployer0xe229…c495
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Audit History
  1. Jul 23, 202663Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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