Is SPACE ID (ID) Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Checklist

2/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership RenouncedUnknown

No Mint FunctionFail

Liquidity LockedFail

Not a ProxyPass

Audit History

2 audits on record

Jul 2363

Every audit run adds a dated snapshot — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Audit Summary

This audit focused solely on the OpenZeppelin `AccessControl.sol` library contract, which is a dependency for the `SpaceIDToken` contract. No custom logic for `SpaceIDToken` was provided for review, thus a comprehensive security assessment of the entire protocol cannot be performed. The `AccessControl` library itself is well-tested and widely used.

Final Recommendation: Ensure that the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` and other critical roles in the `SpaceIDToken` contract are secured with multi-signature wallets and, ideally, time-locks for sensitive operations. Implement the principle of least privilege when assigning roles to prevent over-permissioning. Conduct a full security audit of the `SpaceIDToken` contract's custom logic to identify specific vulnerabilities related to its business logic, tokenomics, and interactions with other protocols.

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow

8/10

The provided code is the OpenZeppelin `AccessControl` library, which implements a robust role-based access control system (7.3 Access Control). It is a well-audited and widely adopted standard, enhancing code security (7.2 Code Security) by restricting sensitive functions. However, the absence of th

GovernanceHigh

1/10

A comprehensive assessment of economic (7.4 Economic) and governance (7.5 Governance) risks is not possible as the core `SpaceIDToken` contract logic was not provided. The `AccessControl` contract itself does not introduce specific economic or governance mechanisms beyond role management. Proper con

UpgradesHigh

3/10

The provided `AccessControl` contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades). The prefill indicates `is_proxy: false` for the main contract. If the `SpaceIDToken` were to be upgradeable, the upgrade mechanism itself would require a separate audit to ensure safety and proper state mig

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder50.2%

Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

What Raised This Score

7 factors

Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
Top-10 concentration > 70% (89.2% total → 74.4% effective; 64.5% in EOAs, 24.7% in contracts — extreme)
Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
LP top1 unlocked holder = 50.2% (independent LP — depth risk)
LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Findings

4 total

1 Low 3 Info

L-01LowUnresolved

Lack of Time-Lock for Critical Operations

The `AccessControl` contract itself does not inherently include time-lock mechanisms for sensitive operations like `grantRole` or `revokeRole`. Without a time-lock, critical changes can be executed immediately, leaving no window for community or governance intervention in case of a compromised key or malicious action (7.5 Governance, 7.8 Operations).

Recommendation: For critical roles, especially the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, consider implementing a separate time-lock contract that acts as an intermediary for executing sensitive `AccessControl` functions. This introduces a delay, allowing for review and potential cancellation of malicious or erroneous operations.

I-01InformationalUnresolved

Default Admin Role Security

The `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` in `AccessControl` has the power to grant and revoke any other role, including itself. Compromise of an account holding this role would grant an attacker full control over the contract's access control mechanisms, potentially leading to critical system compromise (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations).

Recommendation: The address assigned to `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` should be a highly secured multi-signature wallet. Consider implementing a time-lock for critical operations performed by this role to provide a window for intervention.

I-02InformationalUnresolved

Role Granularity and Least Privilege

While `AccessControl` provides a robust framework, the security of the system heavily depends on how roles are defined and assigned in the inheriting `SpaceIDToken` contract. Over-permissioning accounts can lead to unintended access to sensitive functions (7.3 Access Control).

Recommendation: Adhere strictly to the principle of least privilege. Each role should have only the minimum permissions necessary to perform its designated tasks. Regularly review role assignments and revoke unnecessary permissions.

I-03InformationalUnresolved

Event Monitoring for Role Changes

The `AccessControl` contract explicitly states that it does not allow enumerating role members except through off-chain means by accessing contract event logs. This means that active monitoring of `RoleGranted`, `RoleRevoked`, and `RoleAdminChanged` events is crucial for maintaining an accurate understanding of current permissions (7.8 Operations).

Recommendation: Implement robust off-chain monitoring systems to track all role-related events. This allows for timely detection of unauthorized role changes or misconfigurations, enhancing operational security.

Is SPACE ID Safe? ID