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Is HarryPotterObamaSonic10Inu a Scam?

BITCOINEthereum
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The HarryPotterObamaSonic10Inu (BITCOIN) token contract exhibits severe centralization risks and potential for malicious actions by the owner.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • 3 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 2 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • 3 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 2 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Our automated scanner reviewed HarryPotterObamaSonic10Inu (BITCOIN) on Ethereum. 5 of 5 security checks passed — see the full breakdown below.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 45 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
6.4%Contracts17.4%Wallets76.2%Everyone else
6.4%17.4%Wallets76.2%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
23.8%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking6.4%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell17.4%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply76.2%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads19.9%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.76M across 9 pairs
LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$1.18MShare of depth67.2%
LP Locked99.7% · TeamFinance
Top-1 Unlocked Holder0.2%
Unlocked LP held by
0x74a7…f26e0xb52f…0af10x41ae…94550x443f…fcf70x0a6b…5286

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

3 Critical2 High1 Medium1 Low
Critical

Owner Can Set Taxes to 100% (Rug Pull Vector)

The setTaxes function allows the contract owner to set _initialBuyTax, _initialSellTax, _finalBuyTax, and _finalSellTax to arbitrary values. This includes the ability to set taxes to 100%, which would effectively prevent users from selling their tokens (100% sell tax) or buying new tokens (100% buy tax). This constitutes a direct rug pull vector, allowing the owner to drain liquidity or freeze user funds.C-01

Issue

The setTaxes function allows the contract owner to set _initialBuyTax, _initialSellTax, _finalBuyTax, and _finalSellTax to arbitrary values. This includes the ability to set taxes to 100%, which would effectively prevent users from selling their tokens (100% sell tax) or buying new tokens (100% buy tax). This constitutes a direct rug pull vector, allowing the owner to drain liquidity or freeze user funds.

Fix

Remove or significantly restrict the owner's ability to modify tax percentages. If taxes are a core part of the tokenomics, they should be immutable or subject to a decentralized governance mechanism with a timelock. If mutable, implement strict upper bounds (e.g., max 25%) to prevent malicious exploitation.

Status

Unresolved

Critical

Owner Can Blacklist/Whitelist Any Address

The setBots function allows the contract owner to add or remove any address from the bots mapping. Addresses marked as 'bots' are prevented from transferring tokens in the _transfer function. This grants the owner the power to arbitrarily blacklist any user, effectively freezing their tokens and preventing them from participating in trading. This is a severe centralization and censorship risk.C-02

Issue

The setBots function allows the contract owner to add or remove any address from the bots mapping. Addresses marked as 'bots' are prevented from transferring tokens in the _transfer function. This grants the owner the power to arbitrarily blacklist any user, effectively freezing their tokens and preventing them from participating in trading. This is a severe centralization and censorship risk.

Fix

Remove the setBots function entirely. Decentralized tokens should not have the ability to arbitrarily freeze user funds or prevent transfers. If anti-bot measures are desired, they should be implemented in a non-custodial and transparent manner, ideally without direct owner intervention on individual addresses.

Status

Unresolved

Critical

Owner Can Manipulate Trading and Liquidity

The openTrading function, callable only by the owner, initializes the Uniswap router and pair, and enables trading. This gives the owner complete control over when trading starts. Furthermore, the owner can update _maxTxAmount, _maxWalletSize, _taxSwapThreshold, and _maxTaxSwap at any time. This allows the owner to manipulate market conditions, prevent large transactions, or even halt trading by setting prohibitive limits, leading to potential market manipulation and denial of service for users.C-03

Issue

The openTrading function, callable only by the owner, initializes the Uniswap router and pair, and enables trading. This gives the owner complete control over when trading starts. Furthermore, the owner can update _maxTxAmount, _maxWalletSize, _taxSwapThreshold, and _maxTaxSwap at any time. This allows the owner to manipulate market conditions, prevent large transactions, or even halt trading by setting prohibitive limits, leading to potential market manipulation and denial of service for users.

Fix

Decentralize or remove the openTrading function. Once trading is enabled, critical parameters like transaction limits and swap thresholds should be immutable or controlled by a decentralized governance mechanism with a timelock. If mutable, implement reasonable bounds and timelocks for changes.

Status

Unresolved

High

Centralized Control Over Fee Exclusions

The excludeFromFee function allows the owner to exempt any address from paying transaction fees. While the owner, contract, and tax wallet are initially excluded, the ability to add arbitrary addresses to this exclusion list introduces a significant centralization risk. The owner could exclude favored addresses or even themselves from all taxes, creating an unfair advantage or enabling further manipulation.H-01

Issue

The excludeFromFee function allows the owner to exempt any address from paying transaction fees. While the owner, contract, and tax wallet are initially excluded, the ability to add arbitrary addresses to this exclusion list introduces a significant centralization risk. The owner could exclude favored addresses or even themselves from all taxes, creating an unfair advantage or enabling further manipulation.

Fix

Limit fee exclusion to essential protocol addresses (e.g., the contract itself, the liquidity pair). If other exclusions are necessary, they should be immutable or subject to a transparent, decentralized governance process.

Status

Unresolved

High

Transfer Delay Can Be Arbitrarily Enabled/Disabled

The setTransferDelayEnabled function allows the owner to enable or disable the transferDelayEnabled mechanism at will. This mechanism, when active, prevents holders from transferring tokens within a certain timeframe after their last transfer. While intended as an anti-dump measure, the owner's unilateral control over its activation/deactivation can be used to selectively hinder trading for certain periods, potentially impacting market stability or user liquidity without warning.H-02

Issue

The setTransferDelayEnabled function allows the owner to enable or disable the transferDelayEnabled mechanism at will. This mechanism, when active, prevents holders from transferring tokens within a certain timeframe after their last transfer. While intended as an anti-dump measure, the owner's unilateral control over its activation/deactivation can be used to selectively hinder trading for certain periods, potentially impacting market stability or user liquidity without warning.

Fix

If a transfer delay is a core feature, its activation and deactivation should be immutable or controlled by a decentralized governance mechanism with a timelock. Arbitrary owner control over such a significant trading restriction is a high risk.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Potential for Stuck ETH in swapAndLiquify

In the swapAndLiquify function, after swapTokensForEth is called, the contract attempts to add liquidity and then transfer the remaining ETH to _taxWallet. If the addLiquidity call fails (e.g., due to slippage, insufficient ETH, or external router issues), the remaining ETH might not be fully utilized for liquidity. While _taxWallet.transfer attempts to send the remaining balance, if _taxWallet is a contract that rejects ETH, or if there's an unexpected revert, some ETH could become stuck in the contract, requiring manual rescueETH by the owner.M-01

Issue

In the swapAndLiquify function, after swapTokensForEth is called, the contract attempts to add liquidity and then transfer the remaining ETH to _taxWallet. If the addLiquidity call fails (e.g., due to slippage, insufficient ETH, or external router issues), the remaining ETH might not be fully utilized for liquidity. While _taxWallet.transfer attempts to send the remaining balance, if _taxWallet is a contract that rejects ETH, or if there's an unexpected revert, some ETH could become stuck in the contract, requiring manual rescueETH by the owner.

Fix

Implement more robust error handling or fallback mechanisms within swapAndLiquify. Consider adding checks for successful liquidity addition and potentially a retry mechanism or a more explicit way to handle leftover ETH if addLiquidity fails. Ensure _taxWallet is capable of receiving ETH or add a fallback for rejected transfers.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Missing SPDX License Identifier

The contract uses // SPDX-License-Identifier: NONE. While technically valid, it's generally recommended to use a standard SPDX license identifier (e.g., MIT, GPL-3.0) to clarify the licensing terms of the code. Using 'NONE' can lead to ambiguity regarding intellectual property rights and usage permissions.L-01

Issue

The contract uses // SPDX-License-Identifier: NONE. While technically valid, it's generally recommended to use a standard SPDX license identifier (e.g., MIT, GPL-3.0) to clarify the licensing terms of the code. Using 'NONE' can lead to ambiguity regarding intellectual property rights and usage permissions.

Fix

Replace // SPDX-License-Identifier: NONE with a standard and appropriate SPDX license identifier, such as // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The HarryPotterObamaSonic10Inu (BITCOIN) token contract exhibits severe centralization risks and potential for malicious actions by the owner. While standard ERC-20 functionality is present, the extensive administrative control over taxes, trading, and user blacklisting poses critical security and economic threats to token holders. The contract is not upgradeable, making these risks permanent.

Technical2/10High risk

The contract implements a standard ERC-20 token with additional features like transaction taxes, anti-whale limits, and anti-bot mechanisms (7.2 Code Security). It utilizes SafeMath for arithmetic operations, mitigating basic integer overflow/underflow risks. A reentrancy guard (lockTheSwap) is present for the swapAndLiquify function, which is a good practice. However, the extensive use of owner-controlled parameters, such as the ability to set arbitrary taxes and blacklist users, introduces significant technical risks (7.3 Access Control). The swapAndLiquify mechanism, while common, could face issues if external calls fail, potentially leaving funds stuck or preventing liquidity additions.

Governance5/10Medium risk

The contract's economic model is highly centralized and vulnerable to owner manipulation (7.4 Economic). The owner has absolute control over critical parameters, including the ability to set buy and sell taxes to any value, including 100%, effectively enabling a rug pull. The owner can also update _maxTxAmount and _maxWalletSize at will, potentially freezing user funds or preventing trading. Furthermore, the owner can blacklist any address using the setBots function, leading to arbitrary fund freezing (7.3 Access Control). The openTrading function, controlled solely by the owner, dictates when trading can commence, creating a single point of failure and potential for market manipulation (7.5 Governance).

Upgrades7/10Low risk

The contract is not designed with an upgrade mechanism (7.7 Upgrades). This means that once deployed, its logic cannot be altered. While this eliminates upgrade-related risks, it also means that any identified vulnerabilities or design flaws, particularly the severe centralization issues, are permanent and cannot be patched without a new deployment and migration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Given the critical centralization risks, it is strongly recommended that the project team consider a complete redesign of the token contract to decentralize control over critical parameters.

Implement multi-signature wallets for sensitive administrative functions, or better yet, remove the ability to unilaterally modify taxes, transaction limits, and user blacklists. If such extensive control is deemed necessary, transparent communication and robust governance mechanisms should be established to ensure community oversight and prevent malicious actions. Users should be made fully aware of the inherent risks associated with such a highly centralized token.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeRouter, Token
NetworkEthereum
Token age3y
Contract0x72e4…eea9
Deployer0x41bc…fa88
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202661Medium
  2. Jul 29, 202669High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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