Is Radiant (RDNT) Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Findings

3 Med1 Low3 Info

Medium

Owner can mint new tokens

CP-01The `sendAndCall` function, which is controlled by the contract owner (a multisig wallet), has the capability to increase the total supply of tokens. This means the owner can create new tokens at will, potentially diluting the value for existing token holders.

IssueThe `sendAndCall` function, which is controlled by the contract owner (a multisig wallet), has the capability to increase the total supply of tokens. This means the owner can create new tokens at will, potentially diluting the value for existing token holders.

FixToken holders should be aware that the multisig wallet controlling the contract can mint new tokens using the `sendAndCall` function. It is recommended that the project team implements strict governance policies and transparency around the use of this function, or explores technical solutions to remove or restrict this minting capability if it's not intended for ongoing use.

StatusUnresolved

Medium

Liquidity not locked

QA-LIQUIDITY0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 96.7% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0x4fd9…cb5e — holds 67.6% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.

Issue0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 96.7% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0x4fd9…cb5e — holds 67.6% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.

FixCheck the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.

StatusAcknowledged

Medium

The market for this token

QA-MARKETLiquidity $136K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $4.6M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $976K (DexScreener, all pools). CoinGecko's record for this coin: all-time high $0.585 on 2022-09-16; the price is now 99.8371% below it.

IssueLiquidity $136K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $4.6M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $976K (DexScreener, all pools). CoinGecko's record for this coin: all-time high $0.585 on 2022-09-16; the price is now 99.8371% below it.

FixSize any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.

StatusAcknowledged

Low

Potential rounding loss in bridge fee calculation

CD-01The `getBridgeFee` function calculates fees by performing division before multiplication. In Solidity, integer division truncates decimals, which can lead to a small loss of precision or rounding down of the fee amount. While typically minor, this can accumulate over many transactions.

IssueThe `getBridgeFee` function calculates fees by performing division before multiplication. In Solidity, integer division truncates decimals, which can lead to a small loss of precision or rounding down of the fee amount. While typically minor, this can accumulate over many transactions.

FixToken holders should note that small rounding losses might occur during bridge fee calculations. The project team should consider reordering the operations in the `getBridgeFee` function to perform multiplication before division (e.g., `(amount * numerator) / denominator`) to minimize or eliminate these rounding losses and ensure more accurate fee collection.

StatusUnresolved

Info

Who holds the supply

QA-HOLDERSThe ten largest holders own 82.5% of supply. Of that, 19.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 59.9% in wallets, 2.7% in other contracts. 150,870 holders in total.

IssueThe ten largest holders own 82.5% of supply. Of that, 19.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 59.9% in wallets, 2.7% in other contracts. 150,870 holders in total.

FixWatch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.

StatusAcknowledged

Info

Identity verified by independent sources

QA-IDENTITYListed on CoinGecko as Radiant Capital (RDNT), market cap $1M, rank #2721. Traded on Binance. 150,870 holders. Verified by: exchange listings.

IssueListed on CoinGecko as Radiant Capital (RDNT), market cap $1M, rank #2721. Traded on Binance. 150,870 holders. Verified by: exchange listings.

FixMatch the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.

StatusAcknowledged

Info

Asset class: Project token

QA-PROFILEA token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: a 4-of-11 multisig. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $136K of DEX liquidity across 18 pools. Launch: 1290 days of market history.

IssueA token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: a 4-of-11 multisig. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $136K of DEX liquidity across 18 pools. Launch: 1290 days of market history.

FixCheck the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.

StatusAcknowledged

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow8/10

The RadiantOFT contract implements the ERC-20 standard and integrates LayerZero for cross-chain functionality, enabling token transfers across different chains (7.1 Architecture). The contract includes a pausing mechanism controlled by the owner. A medium-severity issue was identified where the `sendAndCall` function, controlled by the owner, can mint new tokens, potentially diluting existing token supply (7.2 Code Security). Additionally, a low-severity issue exists in `getBridgeFee` due to division before multiplication, which could lead to minor rounding losses (7.2 Code Security).

GovernanceHigh1/10

The contract's ownership is retained by a multisig wallet, which enhances security by requiring multiple approvals for critical operations (7.5 Governance). The owner has significant control over core parameters, including the ability to pause transfers, set bridge fees, and designate the treasury address (7.3 Access Control). The ability of the owner to mint new tokens via `sendAndCall` introduces a centralized economic risk, as it allows for arbitrary supply increases (7.4 Economic).

UpgradesHigh3/10

The RadiantOFT contract is not designed with an explicit upgrade mechanism (7.7 Upgrades). This means its logic cannot be changed post-deployment, providing immutability but requiring a new deployment for any future feature enhancements or bug fixes. This reduces the risk of malicious upgrades but limits flexibility.

Security Checklist

2/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership RenouncedFail

No Mint FunctionFail

Liquidity LockedFail

Not a ProxyPass

HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

82.5% in top 10

59.9% in wallets2.7% in contracts

Effective Concentration61.0%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$136.1K across 18 pairs

Pancakeswap v2WBNBanalysed$131.5K Squadswap v2WBNB$2.3K Traderjoe v1WBNB$2.2K Pancakeswap v3WBNB$61 Pancakeswap v2DEC$38 ThenaankrBNB$19

Show 4 more pairsShow less

0x6fB6…cbE5USDT$6 Pancakeswap v2AUSD$5 Pancakeswap v2ETH$1 Pancakeswap v2BTC$1

The 8 remaining pairs hold $1 between them and are not listed.

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder67.6%

Top-3 Unlocked92.0%

Key Addresses

11 addresses

Deployer

0x225c…fd2e

Unlocked LP Held By

0x4fd9…cb5e0xe051…a1310x23a5…914c0xe375…e9030x0d01…4cd50x558a…9be40xb897…a09c0xcf6e…e6740xc5f1…cf8a0x8c70…09db

What Raised This Score

5 factors

Owner can change the buy/sell tax
Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool; this pool is 97% of DEX liquidity) — who holds it cannot be verified
Top-10 concentration > 50% (82.5% total → 61.0% effective; 59.9% in EOAs, 2.7% in contracts; 19.9% burned, locked or in pools excluded)
Code: Potential rounding loss in bridge fee calculation (Low, static analysis)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Not Signed In

Is Radiant Safe?

Security Findings

Owner can mint new tokens

Liquidity not locked

The market for this token

Potential rounding loss in bridge fee calculation

Who holds the supply

Identity verified by independent sources

Asset class: Project token

Category Ratings

Security Checklist

Holder Composition

Liquidity Depth

LP Distribution

Key Addresses

What Raised This Score

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