The audit of the SecuritiesToken contract, serving as the implementation for a Beacon Proxy, identified a critical vulnerability related to the initialization of the admin role, which could lead to permanent loss of administrative control. Additional medium and low-severity issues were found concerning zero-address checks for external dependencies and inherent centralization risks. The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin upgradeable patterns and role-based access control.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is Invesqo QQQ Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The audit of the SecuritiesToken contract, serving as the implementation for a Beacon Proxy, identified a critical vulnerability related to the initialization of the admin role, which could lead to permanent loss of administrative control.
Read the full analysis- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Proxy contract
- Complex proxy pattern
- Top-10 concentration > 70%
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- Token age < 30 days
- 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Proxy contract (upgradeable — admin can replace logic)
- Complex proxy pattern (BEACON)
- Top-10 concentration > 70% (81.7% total → 75.5% effective; 71.4% in EOAs, 10.3% in contracts — extreme)
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- Token age < 30 days (still settling)
- 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking10.3%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell71.4%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply18.3%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4- Pancakeswap v3USDTAnalysed$2.52M85.3%
- UniswapUSDC$315.3K10.7%
- Pancakeswap v3WBNB$48.3K1.6%
- Pancakeswap v2WBNB$33.8K1.1%
- Pancakeswap v3USDT$29.3K1.0%
- TopazUSDT$4.4K0.2%
Show 3 more pairs
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x2f7d…5ef00x556b…d59e0x7b87…b51e0x64fd…2f280x97d2…f1820xde6a…c0550xb46b…224e0xc37e…87e10xe7d2…371b0x1fee…ed6fNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalMissing Zero Address Check for Admin Role in initialize
The initialize function, which sets up the initial DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, does not validate that the admin_ parameter is not the zero address (address(0)). If address(0) is provided during initialization, the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE will be granted to the zero address, making it impossible to manage roles, enable/disable minting/burning, or perform any other administrative functions. This would lead to a permanent lockout of administrative control over the contract.C-01
initializeIssue
The initialize function, which sets up the initial DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, does not validate that the admin_ parameter is not the zero address (address(0)). If address(0) is provided during initialization, the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE will be granted to the zero address, making it impossible to manage roles, enable/disable minting/burning, or perform any other administrative functions. This would lead to a permanent lockout of administrative control over the contract.
Fix
Add a check in the initialize function to ensure admin_ is not address(0) before granting the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. For example: if (admin_ == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
Status
Unresolved
MediumMissing Zero Address Checks for External Client Contracts
The initialize function accepts compliance_ and pauseManager_ addresses for external client contracts without validating that these addresses are not the zero address (address(0)). While not directly leading to a loss of funds, setting these critical external dependencies to address(0) could result in unexpected runtime errors, non-functional compliance checks, or an inability to pause the token, severely impacting the contract's intended behavior and operational stability.M-01
Issue
The initialize function accepts compliance_ and pauseManager_ addresses for external client contracts without validating that these addresses are not the zero address (address(0)). While not directly leading to a loss of funds, setting these critical external dependencies to address(0) could result in unexpected runtime errors, non-functional compliance checks, or an inability to pause the token, severely impacting the contract's intended behavior and operational stability.
Fix
Implement zero-address checks for compliance_ and pauseManager_ parameters in the initialize function. For example: if (compliance_ == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress(); and if (pauseManager_ == address(0)) revert ZeroAddress();
Status
Unresolved
LowHigh Centralization Risk with DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE holds extensive power over the SecuritiesToken contract. This role can set the token's name, symbol, and identifier, enable/disable minting and burning, and grant/revoke any other role, including the ISSUER_ROLE. While common for security tokens requiring centralized control, this concentration of power means that a compromise of the single entity holding the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE could lead to significant operational and economic risks, including unauthorized token issuance or manipulation of token metadata.L-01
Issue
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE holds extensive power over the SecuritiesToken contract. This role can set the token's name, symbol, and identifier, enable/disable minting and burning, and grant/revoke any other role, including the ISSUER_ROLE. While common for security tokens requiring centralized control, this concentration of power means that a compromise of the single entity holding the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE could lead to significant operational and economic risks, including unauthorized token issuance or manipulation of token metadata.
Fix
Consider implementing a multi-signature wallet or a time-locked governance mechanism for the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to distribute control and introduce a delay for critical operations. This would enhance security by requiring multiple approvals for sensitive actions and providing a window for intervention.
Status
Unresolved
InfoReliance on External Compliance and Pause Managers
The SecuritiesToken contract integrates ComplianceClientUpgradeable and PauseManagerClientUpgradeable, making its core functionalities (transfers, minting, burning) dependent on the logic and availability of these external contracts. The security, reliability, and upgradeability of these external dependencies are paramount, as any vulnerability or malfunction in them could directly impact the SecuritiesToken's operations and user experience.I-01
Issue
The SecuritiesToken contract integrates ComplianceClientUpgradeable and PauseManagerClientUpgradeable, making its core functionalities (transfers, minting, burning) dependent on the logic and availability of these external contracts. The security, reliability, and upgradeability of these external dependencies are paramount, as any vulnerability or malfunction in them could directly impact the SecuritiesToken's operations and user experience.
Fix
Ensure that the external ComplianceClientUpgradeable and PauseManagerClientUpgradeable contracts are thoroughly audited, well-maintained, and controlled by robust governance mechanisms. Implement monitoring for these external contracts to detect any unusual behavior or potential compromises promptly.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The contract leverages OpenZeppelin's upgradeable patterns and AccessControlEnumerable for robust role management (7.1 Architecture, 7.3 Access Control). Custom error types enhance readability and debugging (7.2 Code Security). However, a critical flaw exists in the initialize function where the admin_ address is not validated against the zero address, potentially leading to an unrecoverable loss of administrative control (7.3 Access Control). Additionally, external compliance and pause manager addresses lack zero-address checks, which could cause operational issues (7.6 External).
The token's economic model relies on a centralized DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE for critical operations such as enabling/disabling minting/burning, and managing all other roles (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance). This centralization, while common for security tokens, introduces a single point of failure. The contract's functionality is also heavily dependent on external Compliance and Pause Manager contracts, whose security and governance directly impact the token's transferability and availability (7.6 External).
The contract correctly implements OpenZeppelin's upgradeable proxy pattern, utilizing _disableInitializers() in the constructor and the initializer modifier for the initialize function (7.7 Upgrades). This approach minimizes the risk of re-initialization and ensures proper deployment within a proxy architecture. No apparent storage collision risks or other upgrade-specific vulnerabilities were identified in the provided code snippet.
Address the critical vulnerability by implementing a zero-address check for the admin_ parameter in the initialize function to prevent irreversible loss of administrative control.
Additionally, add zero-address checks for compliance_ and pauseManager_ to ensure robust system integrity. Consider implementing multi-signature control for the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to mitigate centralization risks and enhance operational security.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 4, 202689Critical
- Jul 27, 2026100Critical
- Jul 26, 202663Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Invesqo QQQ a scam?
Based on automated analysis, Invesqo QQQ scores 63/100 (High Risk) on our risk scale. No honeypot was detected, but always verify independently before investing.
Is Invesqo QQQ safe to buy?
Our scanner flagged a risk score of 63/100. Ownership has not been renounced, which is a risk factor. DYOR before purchasing any token.
Has Invesqo QQQ been audited?
The contract has not been verified on-chain. Verification is not the same as a full security audit. Use Quantum Audit's free tool to run a deeper analysis of the contract code.
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