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Is o1.exchange Safe?

OBNB Chain
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical8/10Governance1/10Upgrades7/10Checks passed3 of 5Findings1 Medium · 2 Info3
SummaryAI Copilot

The audit reviewed the MyOFT and MyOFTAdapter contracts, which implement LayerZero's Omnichain Fungible Token (OFT) and OFT Adapter functionalities.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — strong Multisig
  • Top-10 concentration > 70%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 73.2%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 87.8%
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — strong Multisig (3-of-5)
  • Top-10 concentration > 70% (97.4% total → 78.6% effective; 66.1% in EOAs, 31.4% in contracts — extreme)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 73.2% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 98% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 87.8% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 98% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 43 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
31.4%Contracts66.1%Wallets2.6%
31.4%Contracts66.1%Wallets
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
97.4%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking31.4%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell66.1%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply2.6%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads78.6%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$2.74M across 4 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$2.70MShare of depth98.3%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder73.2%
Top-3 Unlocked87.8%
Unlocked LP held by
0xf949…02980x0dff…71660xaaf2…a6010xbc7a…3e710x1498…d27e0x0528…d2610x0bf6…85920xd379…60d80x96da…66000x8e0a…76c1

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Medium2 Info
Medium

Centralization Risk due to Owner Privileges

The owner of the MyOFTAdapter contract holds significant centralized control over critical functionalities. The owner can enable or disable bridging for all users via setBridgingEnabled, manage a whitelist of addresses that can bypass bridging restrictions using setWhitelist, and recover any ERC20 tokens sent to the contract via the sweep function. While the provided context indicates the owner is a multisig, these extensive privileges still represent a single point of control that could lead to censorship, denial of service, or fund manipulation if the multisig is compromised or acts maliciously.M-01

Issue

The owner of the MyOFTAdapter contract holds significant centralized control over critical functionalities. The owner can enable or disable bridging for all users via setBridgingEnabled, manage a whitelist of addresses that can bypass bridging restrictions using setWhitelist, and recover any ERC20 tokens sent to the contract via the sweep function. While the provided context indicates the owner is a multisig, these extensive privileges still represent a single point of control that could lead to censorship, denial of service, or fund manipulation if the multisig is compromised or acts maliciously.

Fix

Ensure the multisig controlling the owner address is highly secure with strong operational procedures, including robust key management, quorum requirements, and clear policies for transaction execution. Consider implementing time-locks or additional governance mechanisms for highly sensitive functions if further decentralization is desired in the future.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Dependency on LayerZero Protocol Security

The MyOFT and MyOFTAdapter contracts are built upon and heavily rely on the LayerZero protocol for their omnichain functionality. This includes interactions with LayerZero endpoints and the underlying messaging infrastructure. The security and operational integrity of these contracts are therefore directly dependent on the security of the LayerZero protocol itself (7.6 External). Any vulnerabilities, compromises, or operational issues within the LayerZero ecosystem could directly impact the functionality and security of these deployed contracts.I-01

Issue

The MyOFT and MyOFTAdapter contracts are built upon and heavily rely on the LayerZero protocol for their omnichain functionality. This includes interactions with LayerZero endpoints and the underlying messaging infrastructure. The security and operational integrity of these contracts are therefore directly dependent on the security of the LayerZero protocol itself (7.6 External). Any vulnerabilities, compromises, or operational issues within the LayerZero ecosystem could directly impact the functionality and security of these deployed contracts.

Fix

Maintain continuous monitoring of LayerZero's security posture, official announcements, and any reported vulnerabilities. Ensure that the LayerZero endpoint addresses configured in the contracts are correct and trusted. Implement robust monitoring for cross-chain transactions and LayerZero's operational status.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Configurable Bridging Control Mechanism

The MyOFTAdapter contract includes a configurable bridging control mechanism through the bridgingEnabled flag and a whitelist mapping. When bridgingEnabled is set to false, only addresses present in the whitelist are permitted to initiate bridging operations via the _debit function. This feature provides the owner with a powerful tool to pause or restrict token bridging, either globally or for specific users. This is a design choice that offers flexibility for operational control but also introduces a potential point of centralized control over user access to bridging services.I-02

Issue

The MyOFTAdapter contract includes a configurable bridging control mechanism through the bridgingEnabled flag and a whitelist mapping. When bridgingEnabled is set to false, only addresses present in the whitelist are permitted to initiate bridging operations via the _debit function. This feature provides the owner with a powerful tool to pause or restrict token bridging, either globally or for specific users. This is a design choice that offers flexibility for operational control but also introduces a potential point of centralized control over user access to bridging services.

Fix

Clearly document the intended use cases and operational policies for the bridgingEnabled flag and the whitelist. Communicate these controls transparently to users. Regularly review the necessity and scope of these controls to ensure they align with the project's long-term decentralization goals and risk management strategy.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The audit reviewed the MyOFT and MyOFTAdapter contracts, which implement LayerZero's Omnichain Fungible Token (OFT) and OFT Adapter functionalities. The contracts leverage battle-tested OpenZeppelin and LayerZero libraries. Key findings highlight the inherent centralization risks associated with owner privileges and the critical dependency on LayerZero's underlying infrastructure. No critical or high-severity technical vulnerabilities were identified.

Technical8/10Low risk

The technical architecture (7.1) is robust, utilizing standard inheritance from OpenZeppelin and LayerZero libraries for core functionalities. Code security (7.2) is enhanced by Solidity 0.8.x's default overflow/underflow protection and the use of SafeERC20 for token interactions. Access control (7.3) is appropriately implemented via the Ownable pattern, restricting sensitive functions like setBridgingEnabled and sweep to the contract owner. No reentrancy, integer overflows, or other significant technical vulnerabilities were identified.

Governance1/10High risk

The contracts exhibit a medium level of governance and economic risk (7.4, 7.5) primarily due to the centralized control held by the owner address. The owner possesses significant privileges, including the ability to enable/disable bridging, manage a whitelist of addresses for bridging, and sweep any ERC20 tokens accidentally sent to the adapter. While the owner is a multisig (as per provided context), this still represents a single point of control that could impact economic stability or user access if compromised or misused.

Upgrades7/10Low risk

These contracts are not designed as upgradeable proxies (7.7) and do not implement any upgrade mechanisms. Therefore, there are no specific upgrade safety concerns for these particular deployments. Any future modifications to the contract logic would necessitate a redeployment of new contracts and a migration of state, if applicable.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is crucial to ensure the multisig controlling the owner address is secured with robust operational procedures, including stringent key management and transaction signing policies.

Regularly review the necessity and scope of the bridgingEnabled flag and whitelist to ensure they align with the project's evolving operational requirements and risk tolerance. Maintain continuous vigilance regarding LayerZero protocol updates and security advisories, as the system's security is inherently tied to its underlying infrastructure.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age2mo
Contract0x500a…d1c4
Deployer0x66f0…2f6c
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202650Medium
  2. Aug 20, 202639Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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