The audit covers the TokenImplementation contract, which serves as the logic for a Beacon Proxy-based BridgeToken. The contract implements ERC-20 functionality, including minting, burning, and EIP-2612 permit. Key findings include significant centralized control by the owner over token supply and metadata, inherent front-running risks with the permit function, and the critical need for careful storage layout management during future upgrades. The code generally adheres to good security practices for standard ERC-20 operations.

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This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The audit covers the TokenImplementation contract, which serves as the logic for a Beacon Proxy-based BridgeToken.
Read the full analysis- Ownership not renounced — owner is a contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Proxy contract
- Complex proxy pattern
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership NOT renounced — owner is a contract (governance/executor, not an EOA)
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Proxy contract (upgradeable — admin can replace logic)
- Complex proxy pattern (BEACON)
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (56.0% total → 34.0% effective; 19.4% in EOAs, 36.6% in contracts — moderate)
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 5Holders
as of audit · Sep 5, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking36.6%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell19.4%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply44.0%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 5, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 5The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighCentralized Control over Token Supply and Metadata
The owner address has the ability to mint and burn tokens, directly affecting the total supply and individual balances. Additionally, the updateDetails function allows the owner to change the token's name and symbol. This level of centralized control introduces significant economic and reputational risk if the owner's private key is compromised or misused. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance)H-01
Issue
The owner address has the ability to mint and burn tokens, directly affecting the total supply and individual balances. Additionally, the updateDetails function allows the owner to change the token's name and symbol. This level of centralized control introduces significant economic and reputational risk if the owner's private key is compromised or misused. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance)
Fix
Implement robust operational security for the owner address, ideally through a battle-tested multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance mechanism. Clearly communicate the capabilities of the owner to the community and ensure transparency regarding any changes to token metadata or supply.
Status
Unresolved
MediumFront-Running Risk in Permit Function
The permit function, while implementing the EIP-2612 standard, is inherently susceptible to front-running. An attacker could observe a signed permit message on the mempool and submit their own transaction with a higher gas price to execute the permit before the legitimate user, potentially exploiting the allowance before the intended recipient. This is a known characteristic of the EIP-2612 standard. (7.2 Code Security)M-01
Issue
The permit function, while implementing the EIP-2612 standard, is inherently susceptible to front-running. An attacker could observe a signed permit message on the mempool and submit their own transaction with a higher gas price to execute the permit before the legitimate user, potentially exploiting the allowance before the intended recipient. This is a known characteristic of the EIP-2612 standard. (7.2 Code Security)
Fix
Educate users on the risks of front-running with permit and advise them to set appropriate deadline values. While not a contract-level vulnerability, off-chain strategies or careful transaction submission can mitigate this risk.
Status
Unresolved
LowCustom Owner Implementation
The contract implements a custom onlyOwner modifier and stores the owner address directly in _state.owner, rather than inheriting from OpenZeppelin's Ownable contract. While functionally similar, using a standard, audited library like OpenZeppelin's Ownable is generally preferred for consistency, reduced audit surface, and battle-tested security features (e.g., transferOwnership, renounceOwnership). (7.2 Code Security)L-01
Issue
The contract implements a custom onlyOwner modifier and stores the owner address directly in _state.owner, rather than inheriting from OpenZeppelin's Ownable contract. While functionally similar, using a standard, audited library like OpenZeppelin's Ownable is generally preferred for consistency, reduced audit surface, and battle-tested security features (e.g., transferOwnership, renounceOwnership). (7.2 Code Security)
Fix
Consider refactoring to inherit from OpenZeppelin's Ownable contract to leverage a widely adopted and audited solution, reducing the custom code footprint and potential for subtle bugs.
Status
Unresolved
InfoStorage Layout Compatibility for Upgrades
The contract utilizes a Beacon Proxy pattern, which allows for upgradeability. Any future upgrades to the TokenImplementation logic contract must strictly adhere to the storage layout of the TokenState struct and any other state variables declared in the implementation. Deviations in variable order, type, or deletion could lead to storage collisions, data corruption, or unexpected behavior in the proxy, potentially bricking the contract or leading to loss of funds. (7.7 Upgrades)I-01
Issue
The contract utilizes a Beacon Proxy pattern, which allows for upgradeability. Any future upgrades to the TokenImplementation logic contract must strictly adhere to the storage layout of the TokenState struct and any other state variables declared in the implementation. Deviations in variable order, type, or deletion could lead to storage collisions, data corruption, or unexpected behavior in the proxy, potentially bricking the contract or leading to loss of funds. (7.7 Upgrades)
Fix
Maintain a strict storage layout for TokenState and other state variables across all future implementation versions. Thoroughly test all upgrade scenarios on a testnet, including data migration and function calls, before deploying to production. Consider using tools like OpenZeppelin's hardhat-upgrades plugin to assist with storage layout checks.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 5The contract demonstrates good technical security practices, utilizing Solidity 0.8.0+ for automatic integer overflow/underflow protection (7.2 Code Security) and OpenZeppelin libraries for cryptographic primitives (ECDSA). Standard ERC-20 functions are correctly implemented, and the _transfer function includes necessary zero-address checks and balance requirements. However, the EIP-2612 permit function, while standard, introduces a known front-running risk (7.2 Code Security), where an attacker could exploit a user's signed message before the intended recipient. Additionally, the custom onlyOwner modifier, while functional, deviates from the more commonly used and audited OpenZeppelin Ownable pattern (7.2 Code Security).
The contract exhibits a high degree of centralized control by the designated owner address (7.5 Governance). The owner possesses the ability to mint and burn tokens, directly influencing the total supply and individual balances (7.4 Economic). Furthermore, the updateDetails function allows the owner to modify the token's name and symbol, which could lead to user confusion if not managed transparently. While the owner is noted as an 'Other-Contract', implying a potential multi-sig or governance mechanism, the inherent power of the owner address itself represents a significant economic and governance risk if compromised or misused.
The contract is designed as an upgradeable implementation for a Beacon Proxy (7.1 Architecture, 7.7 Upgrades), allowing for future logic updates. The initialize function correctly uses an initializer modifier to prevent re-initialization, a critical security measure for proxy contracts. A key strength is the separation of state into TokenState, which helps manage storage layout. However, any future upgrades must meticulously maintain storage layout compatibility, especially concerning the TokenState struct and any other state variables, to prevent storage collisions and potential data corruption (7.7 Upgrades).
It is recommended to implement robust operational security for the owner address, ideally through a battle-tested multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance mechanism, given its extensive control over token supply and metadata.
For the permit function, users should be educated on the risks of front-running and encouraged to use appropriate deadlines. Future upgrades must prioritize rigorous testing of storage layout compatibility to prevent critical issues. Consider replacing the custom onlyOwner modifier with OpenZeppelin's Ownable for enhanced standardization and audited security features.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 5, 202636Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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