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Non-Playable Coin NPC
0xfebf…8605
BNB Chain Not verifiedLast checked 1d ago 1 audit on record
How is this score calculated? → Medium Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The audit covers the TokenImplementation contract, which serves as the logic for a Beacon Proxy-based BridgeToken. The contract implements ERC-20 functionality, including minting, burning, and EIP-2612 permit. Key findings include significant centralized control by the owner over token supply and metadata, inherent front-running risks with the permit function, and the critical need for careful storage layout management during future upgrades. The code generally adheres to good security practices for standard ERC-20 operations.

1 High1 Medium1 Low1 Informational
Volume 24h
$242.1K
Liquidity
$723.0K
Price
$0.02107
Token Age
1y
Top 10 Holders
56.0%

Security Findings

High

Centralized Control over Token Supply and Metadata

H-01The `owner` address has the ability to `mint` and `burn` tokens, directly affecting the total supply and individual balances. Additionally, the `updateDetails` function allows the owner to change the token's `name` and `symbol`. This level of centralized control introduces significant economic and reputational risk if the owner's private key is compromised or misused. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance)
IssueThe `owner` address has the ability to `mint` and `burn` tokens, directly affecting the total supply and individual balances. Additionally, the `updateDetails` function allows the owner to change the token's `name` and `symbol`. This level of centralized control introduces significant economic and reputational risk if the owner's private key is compromised or misused. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance)
FixImplement robust operational security for the owner address, ideally through a battle-tested multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance mechanism. Clearly communicate the capabilities of the owner to the community and ensure transparency regarding any changes to token metadata or supply.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Front-Running Risk in Permit Function

M-01The `permit` function, while implementing the EIP-2612 standard, is inherently susceptible to front-running. An attacker could observe a signed `permit` message on the mempool and submit their own transaction with a higher gas price to execute the `permit` before the legitimate user, potentially exploiting the allowance before the intended recipient. This is a known characteristic of the EIP-2612 standard. (7.2 Code Security)
IssueThe `permit` function, while implementing the EIP-2612 standard, is inherently susceptible to front-running. An attacker could observe a signed `permit` message on the mempool and submit their own transaction with a higher gas price to execute the `permit` before the legitimate user, potentially exploiting the allowance before the intended recipient. This is a known characteristic of the EIP-2612 standard. (7.2 Code Security)
FixEducate users on the risks of front-running with `permit` and advise them to set appropriate `deadline` values. While not a contract-level vulnerability, off-chain strategies or careful transaction submission can mitigate this risk.
StatusUnresolved
Low

Custom Owner Implementation

L-01The contract implements a custom `onlyOwner` modifier and stores the owner address directly in `_state.owner`, rather than inheriting from OpenZeppelin's `Ownable` contract. While functionally similar, using a standard, audited library like OpenZeppelin's `Ownable` is generally preferred for consistency, reduced audit surface, and battle-tested security features (e.g., `transferOwnership`, `renounceOwnership`). (7.2 Code Security)
IssueThe contract implements a custom `onlyOwner` modifier and stores the owner address directly in `_state.owner`, rather than inheriting from OpenZeppelin's `Ownable` contract. While functionally similar, using a standard, audited library like OpenZeppelin's `Ownable` is generally preferred for consistency, reduced audit surface, and battle-tested security features (e.g., `transferOwnership`, `renounceOwnership`). (7.2 Code Security)
FixConsider refactoring to inherit from OpenZeppelin's `Ownable` contract to leverage a widely adopted and audited solution, reducing the custom code footprint and potential for subtle bugs.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Storage Layout Compatibility for Upgrades

I-01The contract utilizes a Beacon Proxy pattern, which allows for upgradeability. Any future upgrades to the `TokenImplementation` logic contract must strictly adhere to the storage layout of the `TokenState` struct and any other state variables declared in the implementation. Deviations in variable order, type, or deletion could lead to storage collisions, data corruption, or unexpected behavior in the proxy, potentially bricking the contract or leading to loss of funds. (7.7 Upgrades)
IssueThe contract utilizes a Beacon Proxy pattern, which allows for upgradeability. Any future upgrades to the `TokenImplementation` logic contract must strictly adhere to the storage layout of the `TokenState` struct and any other state variables declared in the implementation. Deviations in variable order, type, or deletion could lead to storage collisions, data corruption, or unexpected behavior in the proxy, potentially bricking the contract or leading to loss of funds. (7.7 Upgrades)
FixMaintain a strict storage layout for `TokenState` and other state variables across all future implementation versions. Thoroughly test all upgrade scenarios on a testnet, including data migration and function calls, before deploying to production. Consider using tools like OpenZeppelin's `hardhat-upgrades` plugin to assist with storage layout checks.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalMedium6/10

The contract demonstrates good technical security practices, utilizing Solidity 0.8.0+ for automatic integer overflow/underflow protection (7.2 Code Security) and OpenZeppelin libraries for cryptographic primitives (ECDSA). Standard ERC-20 functions are correctly implemented, and the `_transfer` function includes necessary zero-address checks and balance requirements. However, the EIP-2612 `permit` function, while standard, introduces a known front-running risk (7.2 Code Security), where an attacker could exploit a user's signed message before the intended recipient. Additionally, the custom `onlyOwner` modifier, while functional, deviates from the more commonly used and audited OpenZeppelin `Ownable` pattern (7.2 Code Security).

GovernanceMedium6/10

The contract exhibits a high degree of centralized control by the designated `owner` address (7.5 Governance). The owner possesses the ability to `mint` and `burn` tokens, directly influencing the total supply and individual balances (7.4 Economic). Furthermore, the `updateDetails` function allows the owner to modify the token's `name` and `symbol`, which could lead to user confusion if not managed transparently. While the owner is noted as an 'Other-Contract', implying a potential multi-sig or governance mechanism, the inherent power of the owner address itself represents a significant economic and governance risk if compromised or misused.

UpgradesHigh1/10

The contract is designed as an upgradeable implementation for a Beacon Proxy (7.1 Architecture, 7.7 Upgrades), allowing for future logic updates. The `initialize` function correctly uses an `initializer` modifier to prevent re-initialization, a critical security measure for proxy contracts. A key strength is the separation of state into `TokenState`, which helps manage storage layout. However, any future upgrades must meticulously maintain storage layout compatibility, especially concerning the `TokenState` struct and any other state variables, to prevent storage collisions and potential data corruption (7.7 Upgrades).

Security Checklist

Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedFail
No Mint FunctionFail
Liquidity LockedPass
Not a ProxyFail
HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Proxy Upgrade Controls

Proxy TypeBeacon
ImplementationVerified source

Holder Composition

19.4% in wallets36.6% in contracts
Effective Concentration34.0%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

LP Burned99.9% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked99.9% · Null Address

Key Addresses

Deployer
0x7846…24a5
Unlocked LP Held By
0x0ed9…9706

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

  • Ownership NOT renounced — owner is a contract (governance/executor, not an EOA)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Proxy contract (upgradeable — admin can replace logic)
  • Complex proxy pattern (BEACON)
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (56.0% total → 34.0% effective; 19.4% in EOAs, 36.6% in contracts — moderate)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

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