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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Nesa Safe?

NESBNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Oct 30, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The HypERC20 contract implements an interchain token bridge using a proxy architecture.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by mailbox: Multisig
  • Upgradeable proxy — the admin can replace the logic; admin: ProxyAdmin -> Multisig
  • Liquidity not locked
  • Top-10 concentration > 70%
  • Code: State Variable Shadowing
  • The deployer has launched a honeypot before
Exact factors
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by mailbox: Multisig
  • Upgradeable proxy — the admin can replace the logic; admin: ProxyAdmin -> Multisig
  • Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool) — held by independent providers — market-depth risk
  • Top-10 concentration > 70% (99.0% total → 75.2% effective; 59.3% in EOAs, 39.6% in contracts)
  • Code: State Variable Shadowing (High, static analysis)
  • The deployer has launched a honeypot before

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Oct 303 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityUpgradeable
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Oct 30, 202631,497 holders
39.6%Contracts59.3%Wallets
39.6%Contracts59.3%Wallets
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
99.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking39.6%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell59.3%
  • Everyone else31,487 holders1.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads75.2%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 30, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Oct 30$1.01M across 7 pairs
  • Pancakeswap Infinity (CLMM)USDTAnalysed$1.01M100.0%
  • Pancakeswap Infinity (CLMM)USDT$240.0%
  • Uniswap V3 (BSC)USDT$10.0%
  • Uniswap V3 (BSC)USDT$00.0%
  • Pancakeswap V3 (BSC)PREDICT$00.0%

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$1.01MShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0x19d8…b802

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High2 Medium4 Info
High

State Variable Shadowing

The contract contains instances where local variables or inherited state variables shadow existing ones, potentially leading to incorrect state updates or logic errors during execution.CD-01

Issue

The contract contains instances where local variables or inherited state variables shadow existing ones, potentially leading to incorrect state updates or logic errors during execution.

Fix

Rename shadowed variables to ensure clarity and prevent accidental overwriting of critical state data.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Privileged Minting Capability

The functions 'transferRemote' and 'handle' allow for the creation of new tokens. This is a standard feature of cross-chain bridges, but it means that the bridge mechanism itself has the power to increase the total supply of the token, which could dilute existing holders if the bridge security is breached.CP-01

Issue

The functions 'transferRemote' and 'handle' allow for the creation of new tokens. This is a standard feature of cross-chain bridges, but it means that the bridge mechanism itself has the power to increase the total supply of the token, which could dilute existing holders if the bridge security is breached.

Fix

Implement strict monitoring on the total supply and ensure the mailbox contract is secured by a robust, multi-layered security module.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Liquidity not locked

0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x19d8…b802 — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY

Issue

0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x19d8…b802 — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.

Fix

Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Who holds the supply

The ten largest holders own 99.0% of supply. What remains: 59.3% in wallets, 39.6% in other contracts. 31,497 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS

Issue

The ten largest holders own 99.0% of supply. What remains: 59.3% in wallets, 39.6% in other contracts. 31,497 holders in total.

Fix

Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Identity verified by independent sources

Listed on CoinGecko as Nesa (NES), market cap $36M, rank #572. 31,497 holders. Verified by: CoinGecko.QA-IDENTITY

Issue

Listed on CoinGecko as Nesa (NES), market cap $36M, rank #572. 31,497 holders. Verified by: CoinGecko.

Fix

Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

The market for this token

Liquidity $1.0M (GeckoTerminal, all pools). 24h trading volume $11.0M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $6.5M (GeckoTerminal, all pools).QA-MARKET

Issue

Liquidity $1.0M (GeckoTerminal, all pools). 24h trading volume $11.0M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $6.5M (GeckoTerminal, all pools).

Fix

Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Asset class: Project token

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: a ProxyAdmin contract. Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $1.0M of DEX liquidity across 7 pools. Launch: 51 days of market history.QA-PROFILE

Issue

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: a ProxyAdmin contract. Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $1.0M of DEX liquidity across 7 pools. Launch: 51 days of market history.

Fix

Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.

Status

Acknowledged

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 30
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The HypERC20 contract implements an interchain token bridge using a proxy architecture. The system relies on a multisig-controlled ProxyAdmin for upgrades and administrative configuration. While the core logic follows standard cross-chain patterns, the ability to mint tokens via the bridge mechanism introduces inherent economic risks regarding supply inflation.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The architecture utilizes a robust Transparent Proxy pattern (7.1) with clear separation of concerns between the router and token logic. Code security (7.2) is high, leveraging established OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20 and Ownable functionality. Access control (7.3) is strictly enforced via the Mailbox and ProxyAdmin, ensuring only authorized entities can trigger sensitive operations.

Governance1/10High risk

Economic risk (7.4) is primarily driven by the bridge's ability to mint tokens on the destination chain, which could lead to supply dilution if the bridge is compromised. Governance (7.5) is centralized under a 6-of-10 multisig, providing a strong security buffer for administrative actions. External dependencies (7.6) are limited to the underlying messaging mailbox, which is a critical point of failure.

Upgrades1/10High risk

The contract supports transparent upgrades (7.7) managed by a dedicated ProxyAdmin. Operations (7.8) are well-defined, allowing for the enrollment of new remote routers and adjustment of gas configurations. The use of a multisig for upgrades ensures that no single point of failure exists for logic changes.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Maintain the current multisig threshold and ensure that all administrative actions are subject to a time-lock if possible.

Regularly monitor the bridge's total supply across chains to detect any unauthorized minting events. Ensure that the 'handle' function's integration with the mailbox remains strictly audited, as it is the primary vector for cross-chain token minting. Consider implementing a circuit breaker or pause mechanism to halt cross-chain transfers in the event of an detected anomaly.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeTransparentUpgradeableProxy
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age1mo
Contract0x097a…5b81
Deployer0x1cfd…6e1e
Proxy Upgrade Controls
Proxy TypeEip1967 Transparent
AdminOZ ProxyAdmin → Multisig 6-of-10
ImplementationVerified source
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Audit History
  1. Oct 30, 202681High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the NES contract address?

The Nesa (NES) contract on BNB Chain is 0x097acf27503753e77bca940277806156c5925b81. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.

Is Nesa a scam?

Quantum Audit's risk score for Nesa is 81/100 (High risk) as of Oct 30, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Retained; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Upgradeable; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.

Is NES liquidity locked?

Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Oct 30, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $1.01M.

Who holds NES?

As of Oct 30, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 99.0% of the supply across 31,497 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.

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