On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
EthereumThis audit covers the NaorisTokenV3 contract, an ERC-20 token implementation utilizing OpenZeppelin's upgradeable standards, including UUPS proxy, AccessControl, and Pausable features.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 18, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x3ba5…1274The contract lets its controller — an owner that could not be resolved — pause all transfers. Nothing independent vouches for whoever holds them, so each is a live risk to holders.
Check who holds these powers and whether a timelock or multisig stands between them and holders.
Acknowledged
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0x3ba5…1274 — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
The verified source code was reviewed and no issue rising to Informational severity or above was identified. This is a statement about the code that was read, not a guarantee: the review covers the published source only. Fact-layer checks (mint capability, holder concentration) were applied separately and feed the risk score.
Re-check after any contract upgrade or ownership change, both of which can alter behaviour without changing this page.
Acknowledged
The ten largest holders own 98.7% of supply. What remains: 5.0% in wallets, 93.7% in other contracts. 2,100 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
Listed on CoinGecko as NaoX Protocol (NAORIS), market cap $18M, rank #877. 2,100 holders.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $136K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $841K (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $37K (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $136K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 443 days of market history.
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Acknowledged
This audit covers the NaorisTokenV3 contract, an ERC-20 token implementation utilizing OpenZeppelin's upgradeable standards, including UUPS proxy, AccessControl, and Pausable features. The contract allows for token transfers, and its operations can be paused by a designated role. No specific vulnerabilities were identified within the provided code map and key function sources.
The NaorisTokenV3 contract is an ERC-20 token built upon well-audited OpenZeppelin upgradeable libraries, ensuring a robust foundation (7.1 Architecture). Key functions like transfer and transferFrom correctly implement the whenNotPaused modifier, preventing token movements during a paused state (7.2 Code Security). No technical vulnerabilities such as reentrancy or integer overflows were identified in the provided code snippets.
The contract incorporates AccessControlUpgradeable and PausableUpgradeable, centralizing significant control (7.3 Access Control). A PAUSER_ROLE can halt all token transfers via pause() and unpause(), impacting token liquidity (7.4 Economic). The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE has broad authority, including granting and revoking other roles, though it cannot renounce its own role (7.5 Governance). This centralization requires robust operational security for the controlling addresses (7.8 Operations).
NaorisTokenV3 is implemented as an upgradeable UUPS proxy, allowing the contract logic to be modified in the future (7.7 Upgrades). The upgradeToAndCall function, restricted to a specific role/proxy, enables this upgrade functionality. While providing flexibility for bug fixes and feature enhancements, this also introduces a point of centralization and potential risk if the upgrade mechanism is compromised or misused.
To mitigate the risks associated with centralized control, it is strongly recommended to secure the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and PAUSER_ROLE with a robust multi-signature wallet.
This ensures that critical operations, such as pausing transfers or initiating upgrades, require consensus from multiple trusted parties, significantly reducing the risk of a single point of failure or malicious action. Additionally, all proposed upgrades should undergo thorough testing and independent security audits before deployment to production.
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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