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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Mey Network Safe?

MEYBase
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical8/10Governance4/10Upgrades7/10Checks passed6 of 7Findings2 Low · 2 Info4
SummaryAI Copilot

The MeyNetwork token contract is implemented using standard, battle-tested OpenZeppelin ERC20, ERC20Burnable, and ERC20Permit components.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — owner is an EOA
  • Top-10 concentration > 50%
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — owner is an EOA (single private key)
  • Top-10 concentration > 50% (86.3% total → 69.9% effective; 58.9% in EOAs, 27.3% in contracts — heavy)
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 46 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
27.3%Contracts58.9%Wallets13.7%Everyone else
27.3%Contracts58.9%Wallets13.7%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
86.3%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking27.3%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell58.9%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply13.7%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads69.9%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$264.8K across 5 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$133.8KShare of depth50.5%
LP Locked99.6% · TeamFinance
Top-1 Unlocked Holder0.4%
Unlocked LP held by
0x1cbb…b1a40x7f42…98d80x8cf6…9cdf0x6313…1a600x774c…1a79

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

2 Low2 Info
Low

Centralized Control over Token Supply (Potential)

The underlying ERC20 contract includes internal _mint and _burn functions. If the MeyNetwork contract exposes the _mint function to an owner or a privileged role, this introduces a centralized point of control over the token's total supply. An attacker gaining control of this owner key could arbitrarily inflate the supply, devaluing existing tokens. While common for many tokens, this represents a centralization risk (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance).L-01

Issue

The underlying ERC20 contract includes internal _mint and _burn functions. If the MeyNetwork contract exposes the _mint function to an owner or a privileged role, this introduces a centralized point of control over the token's total supply. An attacker gaining control of this owner key could arbitrarily inflate the supply, devaluing existing tokens. While common for many tokens, this represents a centralization risk (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance).

Fix

Clearly document the role and responsibilities of any address capable of minting or burning tokens. If possible, consider implementing a timelock for minting operations or a multi-signature wallet for the controlling address to reduce single points of failure. If decentralization is a goal, consider removing or restricting minting capabilities after initial supply distribution.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Immutability of Contract Logic

The contract is not implemented using an upgradeable proxy pattern (7.7 Upgrades). This means that once deployed, the contract's logic cannot be modified. While this provides certainty and removes upgrade-related risks, it also implies that any discovered bugs, vulnerabilities, or desired feature enhancements would necessitate a new contract deployment and a potentially complex token migration process for users (7.7 Upgrades).L-02

Issue

The contract is not implemented using an upgradeable proxy pattern (7.7 Upgrades). This means that once deployed, the contract's logic cannot be modified. While this provides certainty and removes upgrade-related risks, it also implies that any discovered bugs, vulnerabilities, or desired feature enhancements would necessitate a new contract deployment and a potentially complex token migration process for users (7.7 Upgrades).

Fix

Ensure comprehensive testing, including unit, integration, and fuzz testing, is performed prior to deployment. Consider engaging in formal verification for critical components. Clearly communicate the immutable nature of the contract to users and stakeholders, emphasizing the importance of initial security audits.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Adherence to OpenZeppelin Standards

The contract is built upon well-audited and widely adopted OpenZeppelin ERC20, ERC20Burnable, and ERC20Permit libraries. This significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, integer overflows/underflows, and standard ERC20 compliance issues (7.2 Code Security). The use of these battle-tested components contributes to a strong security foundation.I-01

Issue

The contract is built upon well-audited and widely adopted OpenZeppelin ERC20, ERC20Burnable, and ERC20Permit libraries. This significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, integer overflows/underflows, and standard ERC20 compliance issues (7.2 Code Security). The use of these battle-tested components contributes to a strong security foundation.

Fix

Continue to monitor OpenZeppelin security advisories and updates. Ensure that any custom logic added to the MeyNetwork contract maintains the high security standards set by the inherited OpenZeppelin components.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Robust Permit Mechanism

The ERC20Permit implementation correctly utilizes EIP-712 for structured data signing and incorporates nonces (_useNonce) to prevent signature replay attacks. This design ensures that each permit signature can only be used once, enhancing the security and usability of gasless approvals (7.2 Code Security).I-02

Issue

The ERC20Permit implementation correctly utilizes EIP-712 for structured data signing and incorporates nonces (_useNonce) to prevent signature replay attacks. This design ensures that each permit signature can only be used once, enhancing the security and usability of gasless approvals (7.2 Code Security).

Fix

No specific recommendation is needed for the ERC20Permit implementation itself, as it follows best practices. Users should be educated on how to safely interact with permit signatures and verify the details before signing.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The MeyNetwork token contract is implemented using standard, battle-tested OpenZeppelin ERC20, ERC20Burnable, and ERC20Permit components. No custom logic was provided for analysis, so the assessment focuses on the inherent security of these foundational libraries. The contract benefits from robust security practices embedded in OpenZeppelin, including safe arithmetic and a secure permit mechanism. Potential risks primarily stem from design choices such as centralization of token supply control if minting is owner-controlled, and the immutability of the contract logic.

Technical8/10Low risk

The contract leverages battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for its ERC20, Burnable, and Permit functionalities, ensuring a high degree of code security and adherence to standards (7.2 Code Security). The implementation correctly uses unchecked blocks where arithmetic safety is guaranteed by prior checks, preventing integer overflow/underflow vulnerabilities. The ERC20Permit mechanism is robust, utilizing EIP-712 and nonces to prevent signature replay attacks (7.2 Code Security). No significant technical vulnerabilities were identified within the provided OpenZeppelin components.

Governance4/10Medium risk

The token's economic model, based on the ERC20 standard, is straightforward and widely understood (7.4 Economic). The ERC20Permit functionality enhances user experience by allowing gasless approvals (7.4 Economic). If the MeyNetwork contract exposes the internal _mint function to an owner, it introduces a centralized point of control over the token supply, which could impact trust and economic stability (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance). The absence of a pausable mechanism means that in case of an emergency, the contract cannot be halted (7.8 Operations).

Upgrades7/10Low risk

The contract is not designed to be upgradeable, which eliminates the complexities and potential risks associated with proxy patterns and upgrade mechanisms (7.7 Upgrades). This provides certainty regarding the immutability of the contract's logic. The non-upgradeable nature means that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or protocol changes would necessitate a new contract deployment and a token migration process, which can be costly and disruptive for users (7.7 Upgrades).

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is recommended to carefully review the specific implementation of the MeyNetwork contract, particularly how _mint and _burn functions are exposed and controlled, to ensure appropriate access control and decentralization if desired.

Consider implementing a pausable mechanism for emergency situations if the project's risk model allows for such centralized control. For non-upgradeable contracts, thorough testing and formal verification are paramount before deployment, as logic cannot be altered post-launch.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBase
Token age10mo
Contract0x8bfa…6789
Deployer0x6133…a320
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Audit History
  1. Aug 30, 202642Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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