The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee exclusion logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning privileged functions are now dormant. However, the contract contains critical vulnerabilities in its internal swap and liquidity management logic that could lead to unauthorized token movement and loss of funds.

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is LYX Ecosystem a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee exclusion logic.
Read the full analysis- LP lock ends in 28d
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement
- Code: Rounding Errors due to Division Before Multiplication
- Code: Locked ETH in Contract
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values
Exact factors
- LP lock ends in 28d (short-term protection)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (53.0× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Rounding Errors due to Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Locked ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 30Holders
as of audit · Oct 30, 2026- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell0.6%
- Burnedout of circulation23.3%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.3%
- Everyone else31,459 holders75.7%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 30, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 30The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060x279a…95cbNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Movement
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has granted an allowance, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has granted an allowance, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.
Fix
Restrict the scope of transferFrom to only authorized contract-controlled addresses or remove the ability to pull tokens from arbitrary user addresses.
Status
Unresolved
HighIgnored Transfer Return Values
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function fails to check the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not actually moved.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function fails to check the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not actually moved.
Fix
Always check the return value of transfer and transferFrom calls, or use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library.
Status
Unresolved
MediumLocked ETH in Contract
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no mechanism to withdraw or transfer these funds out, causing them to be permanently locked.CD-03
Issue
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no mechanism to withdraw or transfer these funds out, causing them to be permanently locked.
Fix
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to a secure address or remove the receive function if ETH handling is not required.
Status
Unresolved
LowRounding Errors due to Division Before Multiplication
Calculations in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer perform division before multiplication, which leads to precision loss and incorrect fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
Calculations in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer perform division before multiplication, which leads to precision loss and incorrect fee calculations.
Fix
Rearrange mathematical operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 24.3% of supply. Of that, 23.3% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.6% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 31,469 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 24.3% of supply. Of that, 23.3% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.6% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 31,469 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
31,469 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
31,469 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
95.5% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 95.5% is locked in PinkLock02 until 28 Nov 2026 (28 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 4.5% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
95.5% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 95.5% is locked in PinkLock02 until 28 Nov 2026 (28 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 4.5% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $1.2M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $61.4M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $1.2M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $61.4M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4.5% on buy, 4.66% on sell. Market: $1.2M of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4.5% on buy, 4.66% on sell. Market: $1.2M of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 30The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns but includes flawed internal swap logic. 7.1 Architecture is standard, but 7.2 Code Security is compromised by improper handling of transfer return values and unsafe arithmetic. 7.3 Access Control is currently locked due to renounced ownership, preventing further configuration of fee exclusions. 7.6 External interactions are risky due to the lack of return value checks in the swap function.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance are currently static as ownership is renounced. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers. No active governance mechanisms exist to modify the contract state.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. The code is immutable, which provides security against malicious upgrades but prevents fixing the identified vulnerabilities.
The contract should be considered high-risk due to the identified critical and high-severity vulnerabilities.
Since ownership is renounced, these issues cannot be patched via contract updates. It is strongly recommended to migrate to a new, audited contract implementation that properly handles ERC-20 return values and implements secure arithmetic practices. Users should exercise extreme caution when interacting with the current contract.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 30, 202684High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of LYX Ecosystem?
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Add your links and get it Verified