The KieDex token contract implements a standard ERC-20 interface with an integrated fee-redirection mechanism. The contract exhibits critical flaws regarding external calls and state management that could lead to total loss of contract funds.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is KieDex a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The KieDex token contract implements a standard ERC-20 interface with an integrated fee-redirection mechanism.
Read the full analysis- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity not locked
- Liquidity < $50k
- Top-10 concentration > 70%
Exact factors
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool) — who holds it cannot be verified
- Liquidity < $50k ($33,439 across 1 pairs — thin market)
- Top-10 concentration > 70% (79.1% total → 79.0% effective; 79.0% in EOAs, 0.0% in contracts; deployer/owner holds 78.9%)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Nov 6Holders
as of audit · Nov 6, 2026- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell79.0%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.1%
- Everyone else2,104 holders20.9%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 6, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Nov 6The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x73a2…3aebSecurity Findings
HighWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 79.1% of supply. What remains: 79.0% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. The deployer/owner wallet itself holds 78.9%. A holder that also controls the contract can sell into its own liquidity. 2,114 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 79.1% of supply. What remains: 79.0% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. The deployer/owner wallet itself holds 78.9%. A holder that also controls the contract can sell into its own liquidity. 2,114 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
MediumLack of Input Validation
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The 'feeWallet' address is not validated, potentially allowing transfers to be sent to an uninitialized or malicious contract.M-01
Issue
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The 'feeWallet' address is not validated, potentially allowing transfers to be sent to an uninitialized or malicious contract.
Fix
Add a check to ensure the feeWallet address is not the zero address and is a trusted contract.
Status
Unresolved
MediumUnsafe External Call to Fee Wallet
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The 'transfer' and 'transferFrom' functions call 'self.feeWallet.send(value = self.balance)'. This attempts to send the entire contract balance to the fee wallet on every transfer, which will drain the contract of all native tokens.M-02
Issue
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The 'transfer' and 'transferFrom' functions call 'self.feeWallet.send(value = self.balance)'. This attempts to send the entire contract balance to the fee wallet on every transfer, which will drain the contract of all native tokens.
Fix
Remove the automatic balance transfer logic. If fees are required, implement a specific fee calculation based on the transaction amount, not the contract balance.
Status
Unresolved
MediumReentrancy Vulnerability
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The contract performs an external call to 'feeWallet' before updating internal balances, creating a reentrancy vector.M-03
Issue
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The contract performs an external call to 'feeWallet' before updating internal balances, creating a reentrancy vector.
Fix
Follow the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern. Update all internal state variables before making any external calls.
Status
Unresolved
MediumIrreversible Ownership Lock
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The constructor sets the owner to the zero address, permanently locking any administrative functions that might be added in the future.M-04
Issue
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The constructor sets the owner to the zero address, permanently locking any administrative functions that might be added in the future.
Fix
Set the owner to a secure multisig or a DAO address during deployment.
Status
Unresolved
MediumLiquidity not locked
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0x73a2…3aeb — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0x73a2…3aeb — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRedundant State Variables
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The variables 'lastFrom', 'lastTo', and 'sender' are updated but never used for logic, increasing gas costs unnecessarily.I-01
Issue
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The variables 'lastFrom', 'lastTo', and 'sender' are updated but never used for logic, increasing gas costs unnecessarily.
Fix
Remove unused state variables to optimize gas usage.
Status
Unresolved
InfoNot listed by any independent source
2,114 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
2,114 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $33K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $179K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $33K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $179K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $33K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 1 days of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $33K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 1 days of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — 1 day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is 1 day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is 1 day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 6The architecture follows a standard ERC-20 pattern but introduces a dangerous fee-redirection logic. 7.1 Architecture: The contract uses a simple state-based transfer mechanism. 7.2 Code Security: The use of 'self.balance' in a 'send' call within transfer functions is highly insecure. 7.3 Access Control: Ownership transfer is hardcoded to the zero address, preventing future administrative updates.
7.4 Economic: The token lacks deflationary or inflationary mechanics beyond the fee redirection. 7.5 Governance: No governance mechanisms are implemented. 7.6 External: The contract relies on an external 'feeWallet' which is not validated for security.
7.7 Upgrades: The contract is immutable and does not support proxy patterns. 7.8 Operations: Operational security is limited by the lack of administrative control over the fee destination.
Immediate remediation is required to remove the 'self.balance' transfer logic, which exposes the contract to potential drainage.
Implement standard reentrancy guards and ensure that external calls to the fee wallet are strictly controlled and validated.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Nov 6, 202664Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the KDX contract address?
The KieDex (KDX) contract on Base is 0x2580aaefdf307f943691e8f7edd1315506690496. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is KieDex a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for KieDex is 64/100 (Medium risk) as of Nov 6, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is KDX liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Nov 6, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $33.4K.
Who holds KDX?
As of Nov 6, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 79.1% of the supply across 2,114 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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