The contract implements a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee exclusion logic. While ownership has been renounced, preventing further administrative changes, the contract contains critical logic flaws in its internal swap and liquidity mechanisms that pose significant risks to user funds and contract integrity. Coverage includes 7.1 Architecture, 7.2 Code Security, 7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance, 7.6 External, 7.7 Upgrades, 7.8 Operations.

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
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This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract implements a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee exclusion logic.
Read the full analysis- LP lock ends in 9d
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement
- Code: Precision Loss in Calculations
- Code: Trapped ETH
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values
Exact factors
- LP lock ends in 9d (short-term protection)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (63.0× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Precision Loss in Calculations (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Trapped ETH (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Nov 5Holders
as of audit · Nov 5, 2026- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell0.4%
- Burnedout of circulation90.0%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.4%
- Everyone else29,734 holders9.2%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 5, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Nov 5The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060xce68…44e8No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Movement
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has previously approved the contract, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has previously approved the contract, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.
Fix
Restrict the scope of token transfers to only those explicitly authorized by the user and ensure the contract does not initiate transfers on behalf of arbitrary users.
Status
Unresolved
HighIgnored Transfer Return Values
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which may fail silently without reverting the transaction.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which may fail silently without reverting the transaction.
Fix
Always check the return value of token transfers or use SafeERC20 to ensure the transfer was successful.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTrapped ETH
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, effectively trapping them in the contract forever.CD-03
Issue
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, effectively trapping them in the contract forever.
Fix
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to a designated address or remove the receive function if ETH handling is not required.
Status
Unresolved
LowPrecision Loss in Calculations
The contract performs division before multiplication in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, which leads to rounding errors and potential loss of precision in fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
The contract performs division before multiplication in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, which leads to rounding errors and potential loss of precision in fee calculations.
Fix
Perform all multiplications before divisions to maintain precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 90.8% of supply. Of that, 90.0% burned, 0.4% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.4% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 29,744 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 90.8% of supply. Of that, 90.0% burned, 0.4% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.4% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 29,744 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
29,744 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
29,744 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
96.3% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 96.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 15 Nov 2026 (9 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 3.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
96.3% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 96.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 15 Nov 2026 (9 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 3.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $143K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $9.0M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $143K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $9.0M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4% on sell. Market: $143K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4% on sell. Market: $143K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 5The architecture relies on standard ERC-20 patterns but introduces dangerous logic in the _executeSwapAndLiquify function. It fails to validate return values from external token transfers, which can lead to silent failures. The contract also suffers from precision loss due to improper arithmetic ordering and contains trapped ETH that cannot be recovered.
Ownership has been renounced, meaning no further changes can be made to the fee exclusion list or other administrative parameters. This effectively locks the current economic configuration. No further governance or economic manipulation is possible by the original deployer.
The contract is not upgradeable and does not utilize proxy patterns. The logic is immutable, ensuring that the current vulnerabilities cannot be patched via administrative action.
The contract should be considered unsafe for deployment due to the critical vulnerability allowing unauthorized token movement.
It is recommended to redeploy a new version that strictly adheres to standard ERC-20 implementation patterns and removes the flawed internal swap logic. If the contract is already live, users should be warned that the contract's internal liquidity mechanisms are non-functional and potentially exploitable. There is no path to remediation for the trapped ETH or the critical transfer logic flaws without a full migration to a new contract.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Nov 5, 202684High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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