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Is Gen Z a Scam?

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis

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Gen Z Z
0x9adc…ffff
BNB Chain Not verifiedLast checked 3d ago 1 audit on record New Launch · 1d old
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → Medium Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

This audit covers the OpenZeppelin `Address` utility library, a foundational component providing essential low-level address interaction functions. The code is highly robust and well-tested, with explicit warnings regarding potential misuse patterns. No direct vulnerabilities were found within the library itself; findings are informational, highlighting best practices for integration.

3 Informational
! Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (1d old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.
Volume 24h
$1.7K
Liquidity
$27.7K
Price
$0.00005091
Token Age
1d
Top 10 Holders
77.9%

Security Findings

3 Info
Info

`isContract` Limitations for Security Checks

I-01The `isContract` function, while useful, has known limitations as explicitly stated in its NatSpec. It returns false for contracts in construction, destroyed contracts, or EOAs, and can be circumvented by calling from a contract constructor. It is explicitly warned against using it to protect against flash loan attacks or to prevent calls from contracts due to composability issues (7.2 Code Security).
IssueThe `isContract` function, while useful, has known limitations as explicitly stated in its NatSpec. It returns false for contracts in construction, destroyed contracts, or EOAs, and can be circumvented by calling from a contract constructor. It is explicitly warned against using it to protect against flash loan attacks or to prevent calls from contracts due to composability issues (7.2 Code Security).
FixDevelopers should not rely on `isContract` as a primary security mechanism to distinguish between EOAs and contracts or to prevent specific types of attacks (e.g., flash loans). Instead, robust access control, reentrancy guards, and careful state management should be employed.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Potential Reentrancy with `sendValue`

I-02The `sendValue` function, which uses a low-level `call` to transfer Ether, explicitly warns about the potential for reentrancy vulnerabilities if not used carefully. Control is transferred to the recipient, allowing them to re-enter the calling contract before its state is updated (7.2 Code Security).
IssueThe `sendValue` function, which uses a low-level `call` to transfer Ether, explicitly warns about the potential for reentrancy vulnerabilities if not used carefully. Control is transferred to the recipient, allowing them to re-enter the calling contract before its state is updated (7.2 Code Security).
FixWhen using `sendValue` or any low-level call that transfers value, developers must strictly adhere to the checks-effects-interactions pattern. Implement reentrancy guards (e.g., OpenZeppelin's `ReentrancyGuard`) on functions that perform external calls and modify state.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Safe Use of Low-Level Call Functions

I-03The `Address` library provides several `functionCall` variants for performing low-level `call`, `staticcall`, and `delegatecall`. While these functions include checks for call success and revert reasons, their misuse in a calling contract can lead to unexpected behavior, reentrancy, or incorrect state updates. `delegatecall` in particular carries significant risk if the target contract is not trusted or properly vetted, as it executes code in the context of the calling contract (7.2 Code Security).
IssueThe `Address` library provides several `functionCall` variants for performing low-level `call`, `staticcall`, and `delegatecall`. While these functions include checks for call success and revert reasons, their misuse in a calling contract can lead to unexpected behavior, reentrancy, or incorrect state updates. `delegatecall` in particular carries significant risk if the target contract is not trusted or properly vetted, as it executes code in the context of the calling contract (7.2 Code Security).
FixDevelopers integrating `functionCall`, `functionStaticCall`, or `functionDelegateCall` must thoroughly understand the implications of low-level calls. Ensure the target contract is trusted, input data is validated, and the calling contract's logic correctly handles potential reentrancy or state changes resulting from the external call. `delegatecall` should only be used with extreme caution and only with fully trusted and audited implementation contracts.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow10/10

The `Address` library (7.1 Architecture) demonstrates excellent code security (7.2 Code Security) and adherence to best practices. It provides robust functions for low-level calls and address checks, with clear warnings about potential reentrancy in `sendValue` and limitations of `isContract`. The library itself is well-tested (7.6 External) and does not implement direct access control (7.3 Access Control), relying on calling contracts for such logic.

GovernanceHigh3/10

As a foundational utility library, `Address.sol` does not incorporate specific economic mechanisms (7.4 Economic) or governance structures (7.5 Governance). Its impact on a protocol's economics or governance is indirect, depending entirely on how it is integrated and utilized by higher-level contracts.

UpgradesLow9/10

The `Address` library is a standalone utility and is not designed for direct upgradeability (7.7 Upgrades) in the same manner as a proxy contract. Its immutability ensures consistent behavior for all contracts that link to it. Any changes would require redeployment and updates to all dependent contracts, which is a standard practice for foundational libraries.

Security Checklist

4/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedPass
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedFail
Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

77.9% in top 10
50.7% in wallets27.2% in contracts
Effective Concentration61.6%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$27.7K across 2 pairs
Pancakeswap v2NVDABanalysed$27.7K100.0%Pancakeswap v3USDT$20.0%

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Key Addresses

2 addresses
Deployer
0xa78f…e8f1
Unlocked LP Held By
0xb94f…5030

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

6 factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 50% (77.9% total → 61.6% effective; 50.7% in EOAs, 27.2% in contracts — heavy)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • Liquidity < $50k ($27,704 across 2 pairs — thin market)
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • Token age < 7 days (early, volatile)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

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