The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with additional fee logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning privileged functions like setExclusionFromFee are now permanently disabled. The contract contains critical logic flaws regarding token movement and ETH handling that pose risks to users and trapped funds.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Gang a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with additional fee logic.
Read the full analysis- LP lock ends in 20d
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement
- Code: Precision Loss via Division Before Multiplication
- Code: Trapped Native ETH
- Code: Unchecked ERC-20 Transfer Results
Exact factors
- LP lock ends in 20d (short-term protection)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (19.1× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Precision Loss via Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Trapped Native ETH (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Unchecked ERC-20 Transfer Results (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 29Holders
as of audit · Oct 29, 2026- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell0.1%
- Burnedout of circulation94.0%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.1%
- Everyone else13,682 holders5.9%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 29, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 29The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060xd100…5074No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Movement
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has granted an allowance, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has granted an allowance, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.
Fix
Restrict the scope of token movement to only the contract's own balance or explicitly authorized liquidity pools.
Status
Unresolved
HighUnchecked ERC-20 Transfer Results
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can fail silently without reverting the transaction.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can fail silently without reverting the transaction.
Fix
Always check the return value of transfer and transferFrom calls or use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTrapped Native ETH
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but provides no mechanism for the owner or users to withdraw these funds, causing them to be permanently locked.CD-03
Issue
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but provides no mechanism for the owner or users to withdraw these funds, causing them to be permanently locked.
Fix
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to a governance address or a DAO to recover trapped native assets.
Status
Unresolved
LowPrecision Loss via Division Before Multiplication
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, performing division before multiplication leads to rounding errors, which can result in inaccurate fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, performing division before multiplication leads to rounding errors, which can result in inaccurate fee calculations.
Fix
Reorder arithmetic operations to perform multiplication before division to preserve precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 94.1% of supply. Of that, 94.0% burned — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.1% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 13,692 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 94.1% of supply. Of that, 94.0% burned — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.1% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 13,692 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
13,692 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
13,692 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
98.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 19 Nov 2026 (20 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 2.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
98.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 19 Nov 2026 (20 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 2.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $434K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $8.3M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $434K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $8.3M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 4.01% on sell. Market: $434K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 4.01% on sell. Market: $434K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 29The contract implements standard ERC-20 functionality with custom fee logic. 7.1 Architecture is straightforward, but 7.2 Code Security is compromised by unchecked return values and improper arithmetic. 7.3 Access Control is currently locked due to renounced ownership, preventing further configuration changes. 7.6 External interactions are flawed, specifically regarding the handling of native ETH.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance are effectively static as ownership is renounced. No further changes to fee exclusions or tokenomics can be made by the original deployer. The economic model relies on the integrity of the swap logic, which is currently flawed.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers. The contract is immutable in its current state.
The contract should be redeployed with corrected logic. Specifically, the swap and liquidity functions must be refactored to check return values of external calls and perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.
Furthermore, the contract should implement a mechanism to withdraw accidentally sent ETH, as the current receive function traps funds permanently. Given the renounced ownership, these issues cannot be patched in the existing deployment.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 29, 202684High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the GANG contract address?
The Gang contract on BNB Chain is 0x6a3379115ece6823c8fcc422109a5862b8b431d2. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Gang a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Gang is 84/100 (High risk) as of Oct 29, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 3.9% / 4%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is GANG liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Oct 29, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $434.0K.
Who holds GANG?
As of Oct 29, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 94.1% of the supply across 13,692 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of Gang?
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Add your links and get it Verified