The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee-exclusion logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning the privileged functions are now dormant and cannot be invoked. The contract contains critical flaws regarding token movement and ETH handling that impact asset safety.

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Elon Musk a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee-exclusion logic.
Read the full analysis- LP lock ends in 17d
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement
- Code: Rounding Errors in Arithmetic
- Code: Trapped ETH in Contract
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values
Exact factors
- LP lock ends in 17d (short-term protection)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (66.2× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Rounding Errors in Arithmetic (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Trapped ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 29Holders
as of audit · Oct 29, 2026- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell1.9%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity2.3%
- Everyone else17,350 holders95.8%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 29, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 29The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060x0b63…87c5No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Movement
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has granted an allowance, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has granted an allowance, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.
Fix
Restrict the swap and liquidity functions to only interact with the contract's own balance rather than arbitrary user allowances.
Status
Unresolved
HighIgnored Transfer Return Values
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function fails to check the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved as expected.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function fails to check the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved as expected.
Fix
Always verify the return value of transfer calls or use the SafeERC20 library from OpenZeppelin.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTrapped ETH in Contract
The contract accepts ETH through its receive function but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, causing them to be permanently locked.CD-03
Issue
The contract accepts ETH through its receive function but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, causing them to be permanently locked.
Fix
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to a secure address or ensure the contract does not accept ETH unless intended.
Status
Unresolved
LowRounding Errors in Arithmetic
The contract performs division before multiplication in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, which leads to precision loss and inaccurate fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
The contract performs division before multiplication in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, which leads to precision loss and inaccurate fee calculations.
Fix
Perform all multiplications before divisions to maintain precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 4.2% of supply. Of that, 2.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 1.9% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 17,360 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 4.2% of supply. Of that, 2.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 1.9% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 17,360 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
17,360 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
17,360 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
96.5% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 96.5% is locked in PinkLock02 until 16 Nov 2026 (17 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 3.5% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
96.5% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 96.5% is locked in PinkLock02 until 16 Nov 2026 (17 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 3.5% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $296K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $19.6M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $296K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $19.6M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Meme token
A community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: meme vocabulary in name/ticker (elon). Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4.1% on sell. Market: $296K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: meme vocabulary in name/ticker (elon). Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4.1% on sell. Market: $296K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Expect attention-driven volatility; the facts in this report say whether the contract itself can be used against holders.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 29The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns but introduces custom logic for fee management. 7.1 Architecture is standard, while 7.2 Code Security is compromised by unchecked return values and improper arithmetic. 7.3 Access Control is effectively disabled due to ownership renouncement, preventing further administrative updates.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance are currently static as the contract ownership is renounced. No further changes to fee structures or tokenomics can be made by any party. The lack of withdrawal mechanisms for trapped ETH represents a permanent economic loss for the contract.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as this is a standard non-proxy contract. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers. No upgrade path exists to fix the identified vulnerabilities.
The contract should be considered high-risk due to the inability to recover trapped ETH and the presence of critical vulnerabilities in the swap logic.
Since ownership is renounced, these issues cannot be patched via contract updates. Users should exercise extreme caution when interacting with this contract. If the token is intended for production use, a redeployment with a corrected codebase and a secure, audited implementation is strongly advised.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 29, 202682High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the MUSK contract address?
The Elon Musk (MUSK) contract on BNB Chain is 0x682a0b4f32390372db85133ac5fb1eab7c0641ea. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Elon Musk a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Elon Musk is 82/100 (High risk) as of Oct 29, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 4% / 4.1%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is MUSK liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Oct 29, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $295.9K.
Who holds MUSK?
As of Oct 29, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 4.2% of the supply across 17,360 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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