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Is Covalent X Token Safe?

CXTEthereum
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 2 audits on record
Chart
High RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical6/10Governance2/10Upgrades4/10Checks passed3 of 5Findings2 High · 1 Medium · 1 Low · 2 Info6
SummaryAI Copilot

The CovalentXToken contract is an ERC20 token with custom access control for minting and cap management.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 20%
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.6%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 99.9%
  • LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
  • 2 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 20% (56.0% total → 29.8% effective; 12.2% in EOAs, 43.8% in contracts — mild)
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.6% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 99.9% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
  • 2 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 43 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintMintable
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
43.8%Contracts12.2%Wallets44.0%Everyone else
43.8%Contracts12.2%44.0%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
56.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking43.8%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell12.2%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply44.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads29.8%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$52.5K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$52.5KShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder99.6%
Top-3 Unlocked99.9%
Unlocked LP held by
0x220b…e57e0xf385…5f850xebfc…291d0xcf8e…2520

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

2 High1 Medium1 Low2 Info
High

Centralized Control of Minting Cap

The updateMintCap function, controlled by the CAP_MANAGER_ROLE, allows setting mintPerSecondCap to any uint256 value without an upper bound. If the address holding CAP_MANAGER_ROLE is compromised, an attacker could set an extremely high or infinite minting cap, effectively removing all emission controls and leading to arbitrary token inflation. This poses a severe economic risk to the token's value.H-01

Issue

The updateMintCap function, controlled by the CAP_MANAGER_ROLE, allows setting mintPerSecondCap to any uint256 value without an upper bound. If the address holding CAP_MANAGER_ROLE is compromised, an attacker could set an extremely high or infinite minting cap, effectively removing all emission controls and leading to arbitrary token inflation. This poses a severe economic risk to the token's value.

Fix

Implement a multi-signature wallet for the CAP_MANAGER_ROLE to distribute control. Consider adding a maximum allowable value for mintPerSecondCap or a time-locked delay for significant cap increases to provide a window for community review or emergency intervention.

Status

Unresolved

High

High Power of DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE

The protocolCouncil address is granted the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE in the constructor. This role has the power to grant and revoke any other role, including itself. This creates a single point of failure where compromise of the protocolCouncil address would grant an attacker complete control over all access control mechanisms, including minting, cap management, and Permit2 allowance toggling.H-02

Issue

The protocolCouncil address is granted the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE in the constructor. This role has the power to grant and revoke any other role, including itself. This creates a single point of failure where compromise of the protocolCouncil address would grant an attacker complete control over all access control mechanisms, including minting, cap management, and Permit2 allowance toggling.

Fix

Assign the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to a robust multi-signature wallet with a high number of required confirmations. This significantly reduces the risk of a single compromised key leading to full protocol takeover. Regularly review and audit the signers of this multi-sig.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Miner Manipulability of block.timestamp for Minting

The mint function calculates maxMint based on block.timestamp - lastMint. While block.timestamp is generally reliable, miners have a limited ability to manipulate it (e.g., up to 900 seconds on Ethereum) to slightly increase the timeElapsedSinceLastMint and thus the maxMint amount within a block. Although the impact might be minor given the mintPerSecondCap, a malicious miner could potentially front-run or manipulate block timestamps to mint slightly more tokens than intended.M-01

Issue

The mint function calculates maxMint based on block.timestamp - lastMint. While block.timestamp is generally reliable, miners have a limited ability to manipulate it (e.g., up to 900 seconds on Ethereum) to slightly increase the timeElapsedSinceLastMint and thus the maxMint amount within a block. Although the impact might be minor given the mintPerSecondCap, a malicious miner could potentially front-run or manipulate block timestamps to mint slightly more tokens than intended.

Fix

While block.timestamp is a common and generally accepted practice for time-based calculations, for highly sensitive operations like token minting, consider if an alternative time source (e.g., an oracle for time) or a mechanism that averages block.timestamp over several blocks could further reduce this risk, if deemed necessary. For this specific use case, the risk is mitigated by the mintPerSecondCap and lastMint update.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Missing Zero Address Check for emissionManager in Constructor

The constructor explicitly checks if migration, protocolCouncil, or emergencyCouncil are address(0) and reverts with InvalidAddress. However, there is no such check for the emissionManager address. While _grantRole would likely revert if emissionManager is address(0), an explicit check improves clarity and consistency.L-01

Issue

The constructor explicitly checks if migration, protocolCouncil, or emergencyCouncil are address(0) and reverts with InvalidAddress. However, there is no such check for the emissionManager address. While _grantRole would likely revert if emissionManager is address(0), an explicit check improves clarity and consistency.

Fix

Add an explicit require(emissionManager != address(0), "InvalidAddress") check for the emissionManager parameter in the constructor to ensure all critical role addresses are valid.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Non-Upgradeable Contract

The CovalentXToken contract is deployed as a standard implementation contract and is not designed with an upgradeable proxy pattern. This means that once deployed, its logic cannot be modified. Any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or changes to the token's economic model would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating existing token holders.I-01

Issue

The CovalentXToken contract is deployed as a standard implementation contract and is not designed with an upgradeable proxy pattern. This means that once deployed, its logic cannot be modified. Any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or changes to the token's economic model would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating existing token holders.

Fix

Acknowledge the implications of non-upgradeability. For future contracts, consider implementing an upgradeable proxy pattern (e.g., UUPS or Transparent) if flexibility for future changes is desired. Ensure thorough testing and auditing of the current non-upgradeable contract to minimize the need for future redeployments.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Permit2 Default Max Approval

The contract grants type(uint256).max allowance to the hardcoded Permit2 address by default if permit2Enabled is true. While this is a common pattern for Permit2 integration to simplify user experience, it delegates significant trust to the Permit2 contract itself. If a vulnerability were to be discovered in Permit2, or if the PERMIT2_REVOKER_ROLE were compromised, it could lead to unauthorized token transfers.I-02

Issue

The contract grants type(uint256).max allowance to the hardcoded Permit2 address by default if permit2Enabled is true. While this is a common pattern for Permit2 integration to simplify user experience, it delegates significant trust to the Permit2 contract itself. If a vulnerability were to be discovered in Permit2, or if the PERMIT2_REVOKER_ROLE were compromised, it could lead to unauthorized token transfers.

Fix

Ensure the PERMIT2_REVOKER_ROLE is secured with a multi-signature wallet. Regularly monitor the security landscape of the Permit2 contract and be prepared to disable the integration via updatePermit2Allowance(false) if any critical vulnerabilities are identified in Permit2.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The CovalentXToken contract is an ERC20 token with custom access control for minting and cap management. It leverages OpenZeppelin libraries for standard functionality and role-based access. The primary risks identified are related to the high degree of centralization in critical roles, particularly the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and CAP_MANAGER_ROLE, which can significantly impact token supply and value if compromised. The contract is not upgradeable, meaning any future changes would require a new deployment.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The contract demonstrates good technical architecture (7.1) by utilizing battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20 and AccessControl functionalities, enhancing code security (7.2). The minting logic correctly uses block.timestamp and updates lastMint to prevent re-entry issues within the same block. However, the reliance on block.timestamp for maxMint calculation introduces a minor risk of miner manipulation (7.2). The Permit2 integration is well-implemented, providing a revocable default max approval.

Governance2/10High risk

The economic model (7.4) is highly dependent on the security of the EMISSION_ROLE and CAP_MANAGER_ROLE, as these control token supply and emission limits. The governance model (7.5) is centralized, with the protocolCouncil holding the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, CAP_MANAGER_ROLE, and PERMIT2_REVOKER_ROLE. This concentration of power means a compromise of the protocolCouncil address could lead to unlimited token minting via updateMintCap (H-01) or full control over all roles (H-02), posing a significant economic risk to token holders. The initial mint of 1 billion tokens to a migration address is a critical operational (7.8) decision.

Upgrades4/10Medium risk

The CovalentXToken contract is not designed to be upgradeable (7.7). This means that any future changes, bug fixes, or feature additions would require a complete redeployment of the contract and a migration of existing token holders. While this eliminates risks associated with proxy upgrade mechanisms, it introduces inflexibility for future protocol evolution.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

To mitigate the identified risks, it is strongly recommended to implement robust security measures for the addresses holding critical roles, especially the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and CAP_MANAGER_ROLE.

Consider using a multi-signature wallet with a high threshold for these roles to distribute control and reduce single points of failure. Additionally, establish clear operational procedures and monitoring for all privileged actions, particularly those related to minting and cap adjustments. For future iterations, evaluate the benefits of an upgradeable contract architecture to allow for greater flexibility in addressing potential issues or evolving protocol requirements without requiring a full token migration.

Contract & Record

2 audits on record
TypeCovalentXToken
NetworkEthereum
Token age2y
Contract0x7abc…2c4d
Deployer0xebba…652a
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202674High
  2. Jul 27, 202679High
  3. Jul 25, 202666High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Covalent X Token a scam?

Based on automated analysis, Covalent X Token scores 66/100 (High Risk) on our risk scale. No honeypot was detected, but always verify independently before investing.

Is Covalent X Token safe to buy?

Our scanner flagged a risk score of 66/100. Ownership has not been renounced, which is a risk factor. DYOR before purchasing any token.

Has Covalent X Token been audited?

The contract has not been verified on-chain. Verification is not the same as a full security audit. Use Quantum Audit's free tool to run a deeper analysis of the contract code.

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