The BurnAgentMixed contract implements an ERC-20 token with custom minting and transfer control logic. The protocol relies on privileged roles (earlyopener, idcollection) to manage supply and transfer availability. While the core ERC-20 implementation is standard, the centralization of control over token issuance and transferability poses a significant risk to token holders.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Burn Agent a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The BurnAgentMixed contract implements an ERC-20 token with custom minting and transfer control logic.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by idcollection: EOA
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by idcollection: EOA
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity < $50k
- Code: Precision Loss in Calculations
Exact factors
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by idcollection: EOA
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by idcollection: EOA
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity < $50k ($41,119 across 1 pairs — thin market)
- Code: Precision Loss in Calculations (Low, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Nov 3Holders
as of audit · Nov 3, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking5.2%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell3.4%
- Burnedout of circulation5.3%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity41.0%
- Everyone else574 holders45.0%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 3, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Nov 3The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The functions mint, mintWithInviter, and openEarly allow privileged addresses to create new tokens at will. This can lead to significant supply inflation and dilution of existing token holders' value.CP-01
Issue
The functions mint, mintWithInviter, and openEarly allow privileged addresses to create new tokens at will. This can lead to significant supply inflation and dilution of existing token holders' value.
Fix
Implement a hard cap on the total supply or transition the minting authority to a decentralized governance contract.
Status
Unresolved
MediumAdministrative Control Over Transfers
Privileged addresses can toggle a switch that determines whether token transfers are permitted. This allows administrators to freeze user funds or restrict market liquidity arbitrarily.CP-05
Issue
Privileged addresses can toggle a switch that determines whether token transfers are permitted. This allows administrators to freeze user funds or restrict market liquidity arbitrarily.
Fix
Remove the transfer-blocking functionality or implement a community-voted mechanism to trigger such restrictions.
Status
Unresolved
LowPrecision Loss in Calculations
The functions _oracle and priceAt perform division before multiplication, which results in rounding errors. This can lead to inaccurate pricing and potential economic discrepancies.CD-01
Issue
The functions _oracle and priceAt perform division before multiplication, which results in rounding errors. This can lead to inaccurate pricing and potential economic discrepancies.
Fix
Rearrange the mathematical operations to perform multiplication before division, ensuring that intermediate values do not overflow.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 55.0% of supply. Of that, 5.3% burned, 41.0% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 3.4% in wallets, 5.2% in other contracts. 584 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 55.0% of supply. Of that, 5.3% burned, 41.0% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 3.4% in wallets, 5.2% in other contracts. 584 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
584 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
584 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn
99.3% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.3% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
99.3% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.3% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $41K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $258K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $41K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $258K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 2% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $41K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 2% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $41K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 3The contract utilizes ReentrancyGuard to protect sensitive functions, which is a strong security practice. Code structure is modular, separating minting logic from standard ERC-20 operations. However, the reliance on external price oracles and internal state switches introduces potential points of failure. Specifically, the division before multiplication in price calculations may lead to precision loss.
The protocol exhibits high centralization, as privileged addresses have the authority to mint tokens and halt transfers at will. This creates a trust-based model where holders are vulnerable to administrative actions. There are no governance mechanisms or timelocks to mitigate the impact of compromised or malicious privileged keys.
The contract is not implemented as a proxy and is therefore immutable. This eliminates risks associated with logic upgrades or proxy storage collisions. The current state is fixed, providing transparency regarding the contract's future behavior.
It is recommended to implement a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to manage the privileged roles, reducing the risk of a single point of failure.
Additionally, consider adding a timelock for any administrative changes to transfer rules to provide transparency to the community. For mathematical operations, ensure that all multiplication occurs before division to maintain precision. Consider using a library like ABDKMath64x64 or OpenZeppelin's Math library to handle fixed-point arithmetic safely.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Nov 3, 202679High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the BURN contract address?
The Burn Agent (BURN) contract on BNB Chain is 0x7de1606230aa70802caecf1a3e90039a6265b1c4. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Burn Agent a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Burn Agent is 79/100 (High risk) as of Nov 3, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 2% / 2%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is BURN liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Nov 3, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $41.1K.
Who holds BURN?
As of Nov 3, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 55.0% of the supply across 584 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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