BnagentToken is a standard ERC-20 token with additional administrative controls allowing the minter to manage supply and restrict transferability. The contract implements a centralized governance model where the minter role holds significant power over token liquidity and holder access. While the code follows standard OpenZeppelin patterns, the presence of blacklisting and transfer-blocking mechanisms introduces substantial centralization risk for token holders.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is BNAGENT a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →BnagentToken is a standard ERC-20 token with additional administrative controls allowing the minter to manage supply and restrict transferability.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity < $50k
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
Exact factors
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Owner can blacklist or freeze individual holders; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity < $50k ($13,846 across 1 pairs — thin market)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (19.6× — wash-trading signal)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 30Holders
as of audit · Oct 30, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking3.1%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell5.1%
- Burnedout of circulation28.2%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity33.6%
- Everyone else848 holders30.1%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 30, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 30The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The mint(address,uint256) function allows the privileged minter to create new tokens at will. This can lead to significant dilution of existing token holders' value if the minter acts maliciously or their key is compromised.CP-01
Issue
The mint(address,uint256) function allows the privileged minter to create new tokens at will. This can lead to significant dilution of existing token holders' value if the minter acts maliciously or their key is compromised.
Fix
Restrict the minting capability to a multi-signature wallet or implement a hard-coded supply cap that cannot be bypassed by the minter.
Status
Unresolved
MediumArbitrary Transfer Blocking Switch
The disableBlocks() function allows the minter to toggle a global switch that can halt all token transfers. This creates a risk where the minter can unilaterally freeze the entire market for the token.CP-05
Issue
The disableBlocks() function allows the minter to toggle a global switch that can halt all token transfers. This creates a risk where the minter can unilaterally freeze the entire market for the token.
Fix
Remove the global transfer-blocking functionality or implement a decentralized voting mechanism to trigger such a state change.
Status
Unresolved
MediumBlacklisting Capability
The setPoolBlocked(address,bool) function allows the minter to blacklist specific addresses from transferring tokens. This gives the minter the power to censor individual users and prevent them from selling their holdings.CP-06
Issue
The setPoolBlocked(address,bool) function allows the minter to blacklist specific addresses from transferring tokens. This gives the minter the power to censor individual users and prevent them from selling their holdings.
Fix
Limit the use of blacklisting to specific regulatory compliance scenarios and ensure the process is transparent and auditable.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 69.9% of supply. Of that, 28.2% burned, 33.6% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 5.1% in wallets, 3.1% in other contracts. 858 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 69.9% of supply. Of that, 28.2% burned, 33.6% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 5.1% in wallets, 3.1% in other contracts. 858 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
858 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
858 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn
99.5% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.5% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.5% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
99.5% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.5% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.5% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $14K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $271K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $14K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $271K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $14K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $14K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 30The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin ERC-20 libraries, ensuring robust base functionality. 7.1 Architecture is straightforward, relying on a single-contract design. 7.2 Code Security is high due to the use of well-audited libraries, though 7.3 Access Control is highly centralized. 7.6 External interactions are minimal, reducing the attack surface for reentrancy or flash loan exploits.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are dominated by the minter role. The ability to mint tokens and block addresses creates a high risk of rug-pull or arbitrary fund freezing. There are no time-locks or multi-signature requirements for these privileged functions, leaving holders vulnerable to a single compromised key.
7.7 Upgrades are not applicable as the contract is not a proxy. The logic is immutable, which provides certainty to users regarding the contract's behavior. 7.8 Operations are limited to the minter's defined functions.
To improve security, transition the minter role to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized DAO governance contract to prevent single-point-of-failure risks.
Implement a time-lock mechanism for any administrative actions that affect token supply or transferability to provide transparency and notice to the community.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 30, 202656Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the BNAGENT contract address?
The BNAGENT contract on BNB Chain is 0xc7f95a3bff008053a4e2f235baf2f6d784e6c5fb. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is BNAGENT a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for BNAGENT is 56/100 (Medium risk) as of Oct 30, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 1% / 2%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is BNAGENT liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Oct 30, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $13.8K.
Who holds BNAGENT?
As of Oct 30, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 69.9% of the supply across 858 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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