Is Aurora Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Findings

1 Med2 Low2 Info

Medium

Centralized Initial Token Distribution

M-01The entire `_TOTALCAP` of AuroraTokens is minted to a single `dao` address during contract deployment. This design choice centralizes 100% of the token supply under the control of this single address. This creates a significant single point of failure and grants immense power to the entity controlling the `dao` address over the token's future and ecosystem. A compromise or mismanagement of this address could lead to the loss or misuse of all tokens.

IssueThe entire `_TOTALCAP` of AuroraTokens is minted to a single `dao` address during contract deployment. This design choice centralizes 100% of the token supply under the control of this single address. This creates a significant single point of failure and grants immense power to the entity controlling the `dao` address over the token's future and ecosystem. A compromise or mismanagement of this address could lead to the loss or misuse of all tokens.

FixImplement robust security measures for the `dao` address, such as a well-secured multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) with a diverse set of trusted signers. Establish clear operational procedures and access controls for managing this address. Consider a phased distribution or vesting schedule for the tokens to reduce immediate centralization risk, if applicable to the project's design.

StatusUnresolved

Low

Fixed Token Parameters

L-01The `_DECIMALS` (18) and `_TOTALCAP` (1,000,000,000) are hardcoded as `constant` variables within the `AuroraToken` contract. While this provides predictability and immutability, it removes any flexibility for future adjustments. If the project's economic model or token utility requires changes to these parameters, a new contract deployment would be necessary, along with a token migration process.

IssueThe `_DECIMALS` (18) and `_TOTALCAP` (1,000,000,000) are hardcoded as `constant` variables within the `AuroraToken` contract. While this provides predictability and immutability, it removes any flexibility for future adjustments. If the project's economic model or token utility requires changes to these parameters, a new contract deployment would be necessary, along with a token migration process.

FixAcknowledge this design choice. If future flexibility is desired, consider making these parameters configurable via administrative functions (e.g., `Ownable` or `AccessControl`) or through a governance mechanism, though this would introduce additional complexity and potential attack surface. For this simple token, the current approach is acceptable if immutability is the goal.

StatusUnresolved

Low

Standard ERC-20 Allowance Race Condition

L-02The standard `approve()` function in ERC-20, inherited from OpenZeppelin, is susceptible to a known allowance race condition. If a user calls `approve(spender, newAmount)` while a `spender` is simultaneously attempting to `transferFrom` an old allowance, the `spender` might be able to spend both the old and new allowances, effectively doubling the approved amount. While OpenZeppelin provides `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance` to mitigate this, the base `approve` function remains vulnerable if used directly.

IssueThe standard `approve()` function in ERC-20, inherited from OpenZeppelin, is susceptible to a known allowance race condition. If a user calls `approve(spender, newAmount)` while a `spender` is simultaneously attempting to `transferFrom` an old allowance, the `spender` might be able to spend both the old and new allowances, effectively doubling the approved amount. While OpenZeppelin provides `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance` to mitigate this, the base `approve` function remains vulnerable if used directly.

FixEducate users and integrated applications to primarily use `increaseAllowance()` and `decreaseAllowance()` functions instead of directly calling `approve()` when modifying an existing allowance. If `approve()` must be used, ensure the allowance is first set to zero before setting a new non-zero value.

StatusUnresolved

Info

Reliance on OpenZeppelin Libraries

I-01The `AuroraToken` contract extensively utilizes battle-tested and widely audited OpenZeppelin ERC-20 contracts and utilities. This practice significantly reduces the risk of common vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, integer overflows/underflows, and improper ERC-20 implementations, as these libraries are maintained by a reputable team and have undergone extensive security scrutiny.

IssueThe `AuroraToken` contract extensively utilizes battle-tested and widely audited OpenZeppelin ERC-20 contracts and utilities. This practice significantly reduces the risk of common vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, integer overflows/underflows, and improper ERC-20 implementations, as these libraries are maintained by a reputable team and have undergone extensive security scrutiny.

FixContinue to leverage well-established and audited libraries like OpenZeppelin. Ensure that the specific versions used are up-to-date and free from known vulnerabilities. Regularly monitor security advisories for any dependencies.

StatusUnresolved

Info

Contract Immutability

I-02The `AuroraToken` contract is designed without any upgradeability mechanisms (e.g., proxy patterns) or administrative functions that could alter its core logic or parameters post-deployment (beyond standard ERC-20 operations). This immutability ensures that the contract's behavior will remain consistent throughout its lifetime, providing certainty to users and integrators.

IssueThe `AuroraToken` contract is designed without any upgradeability mechanisms (e.g., proxy patterns) or administrative functions that could alter its core logic or parameters post-deployment (beyond standard ERC-20 operations). This immutability ensures that the contract's behavior will remain consistent throughout its lifetime, providing certainty to users and integrators.

FixAcknowledge that immutability means no future changes or bug fixes are possible without a new deployment. Ensure that the initial design and implementation are thoroughly reviewed, as any discovered issues cannot be patched. Communicate the immutable nature of the token clearly to the community.

StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow8/10

The AuroraToken contract (7.1 Architecture) is a straightforward ERC-20 implementation, inheriting from OpenZeppelin's well-audited contracts, which significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities (7.2 Code Security). The use of `unchecked` blocks is appropriately guarded by prior `require` statements, preventing integer underflows. There are no complex external interactions or reentrancy vectors. The contract's simplicity and reliance on established libraries contribute to its high technical security posture.

GovernanceHigh3/10

The contract's economic model (7.4 Economic) is simple: a fixed total supply is minted entirely to a single 'dao' address during deployment. This design choice centralizes the entire token supply under the control of this single entity (7.5 Governance). While this simplifies initial distribution, it creates a single point of failure. If the 'dao' address is compromised or mismanaged, it could lead to the loss or misuse of all tokens, posing a significant risk to the token's ecosystem.

UpgradesLow7/10

The AuroraToken contract is not designed with any upgradeability mechanism (7.7 Upgrades). It is a standard, immutable ERC-20 token. This eliminates any risks associated with upgrade proxies or administrative upgrade functions, providing certainty regarding its deployed logic. However, it also means that no future changes or bug fixes can be implemented without a complete redeployment.

Security Checklist

4/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership Renounced?

No Mint FunctionPass

Liquidity LockedPass

Not a ProxyPass

HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

92.4% in top 10

11.7% in wallets80.7% in contracts

Effective Concentration44.0%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$251.1K across 2 pairs

Uniswap v2WETHanalysed$241.9K Uniswap v4USDT$9.1K

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder99.5%

Top-3 Unlocked99.9%

Key Addresses

5 addresses

Deployer

0x272a…44c0

Unlocked LP Held By

0xe7b0…084c0x01eb…7fd60x0187…5fbd0x969a…6e2a

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

7 factors

Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
Top-10 concentration > 30% (92.4% total → 44.0% effective; 11.7% in EOAs, 80.7% in contracts — moderate)
LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.5% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 96% of DEX liquidity)
LP top3 unlocked holders = 99.9% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 96% of DEX liquidity)
LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
1 Medium finding(s) from audit
2 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Not Signed In

Is Aurora Safe?

Security Findings

Centralized Initial Token Distribution

Fixed Token Parameters

Standard ERC-20 Allowance Race Condition

Reliance on OpenZeppelin Libraries

Contract Immutability

Category Ratings

Security Checklist

Holder Composition

Liquidity Depth

LP Distribution

Key Addresses

What Raised This Score

Related Audits

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