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Is Artificial Superintelligence Alliance Safe?

FETEthereum
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical8/10Governance2/10Upgrades3/10Checks passed2 of 5Findings3 Info3
SummaryAI Copilot

This audit covers the provided Solidity source code for the EnumerableSet and Address utility libraries.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 68.8%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 95.6%
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (45.0% total → 30.6% effective; 21.0% in EOAs, 24.1% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 68.8% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 73% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 95.6% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 73% of DEX liquidity)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 42 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
24.1%Contracts21.0%Wallets55.0%Everyone else
24.1%Contracts21.0%Wallets55.0%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
45.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking24.1%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell21.0%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply55.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads30.6%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.58M across 7 pairs
Show 1 more pair

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$1.16MShare of depth73.1%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder68.8%
Top-3 Unlocked95.6%
Unlocked LP held by
0x830b…0c300xb57f…37a10xdaa1…130b0x9361…4fae0x25c9…c88b0xb26c…17270xc224…9ffd0x5ba4…7bd70x6d70…dc810x3e70…844a

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

3 Info
Info

Older Solidity Compiler Version

The contract uses Solidity version 0.6.2. While functional, newer versions (e.g., 0.8.x) include built-in overflow/underflow checks for uint types, reducing the need for SafeMath or similar libraries. They also offer other language improvements and bug fixes.I-01

Issue

The contract uses Solidity version 0.6.2. While functional, newer versions (e.g., 0.8.x) include built-in overflow/underflow checks for uint types, reducing the need for SafeMath or similar libraries. They also offer other language improvements and bug fixes.

Fix

Consider upgrading to a more recent Solidity compiler version (e.g., 0.8.x) to benefit from enhanced security features and improved developer experience. Thoroughly test all contract logic after any compiler upgrade.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Address.isContract Limitations (Documented)

The Address.isContract function, while useful, has known limitations as explicitly documented within the library itself. It may return false for contracts under construction, addresses where a contract will be created, or addresses where a contract was destroyed. Relying solely on isContract to distinguish between EOAs and contracts can lead to incorrect assumptions.I-02

Issue

The Address.isContract function, while useful, has known limitations as explicitly documented within the library itself. It may return false for contracts under construction, addresses where a contract will be created, or addresses where a contract was destroyed. Relying solely on isContract to distinguish between EOAs and contracts can lead to incorrect assumptions.

Fix

Users of Address.isContract should be fully aware of its limitations and avoid making critical security decisions based solely on its return value. For robust contract interaction checks, consider alternative methods or multi-factor verification where applicable.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Non-Guaranteed Element Order in EnumerableSet

The EnumerableSet library explicitly states that 'No guarantees are made on the ordering' of elements, and the order 'may change when more values are added or removed.' This is a consequence of the 'swap and pop' optimization used for O(1) removals, which reorders elements to maintain efficiency.I-03

Issue

The EnumerableSet library explicitly states that 'No guarantees are made on the ordering' of elements, and the order 'may change when more values are added or removed.' This is a consequence of the 'swap and pop' optimization used for O(1) removals, which reorders elements to maintain efficiency.

Fix

Developers utilizing EnumerableSet must not rely on the order of elements when iterating or accessing them via the at(index) function. If a specific order is required, an alternative data structure or an additional mapping to maintain order should be implemented by the consuming contract.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

This audit covers the provided Solidity source code for the EnumerableSet and Address utility libraries. These libraries, originating from OpenZeppelin, are foundational components designed for efficient data management and address utility functions. The code exhibits high quality, robust design, and adherence to best practices. No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities were identified. The prefill indicated 'FetchToken' as the contract name, but the provided source code is for these libraries.

Technical8/10Low risk

The technical architecture of the EnumerableSet and Address libraries is highly robust and well-optimized. EnumerableSet provides O(1) operations for add, remove, contains, and length, utilizing a 'swap and pop' mechanism for efficient deletions (7.1 Architecture). Code security (7.2 Code Security) is strong, with careful handling of array indexing and explicit checks like `require(set._values.length > index, 'EnumerableSet: index out of bounds') in _at`. Access control (7.3 Access Control) is not directly applicable as these are libraries, but their internal functions are private, ensuring proper encapsulation. The Address.isContract function clearly documents its limitations, which is a good practice.

Governance2/10High risk

These libraries do not implement any direct governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance) or economic models (7.4 Economic). Their function is purely utility-based, providing data structures and address-related helpers to other contracts. Therefore, they do not introduce inherent governance or economic risks to a protocol. Any such risks would stem from the contracts that utilize these libraries, not the libraries themselves.

Upgrades3/10High risk

Libraries in Solidity are immutable once deployed and cannot be upgraded (7.7 Upgrades). Contracts that use these libraries are compiled with the library's bytecode linked, meaning any changes to the library would require redeploying the dependent contracts. This design choice ensures stability and predictability for contracts relying on these foundational components. There are no specific upgrade safety issues within the libraries themselves, but users should be aware of the immutability implications.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

The provided EnumerableSet and Address libraries are highly secure and well-engineered.

For future development, consider migrating to newer Solidity compiler versions (e.g., 0.8.x) to leverage built-in safety features like overflow checks and reduce potential compatibility issues with newer tools and best practices. Ensure that any contracts integrating these libraries are thoroughly audited, paying close attention to how they manage state, access control, and external interactions, as these are the primary vectors for vulnerabilities in application-specific logic.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeFetchToken
NetworkEthereum
Token age3y
Contract0xaea4…ad85
Deployer0xa47c…7ac5
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Audit History
  1. Jul 23, 202640Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Artificial Superintelligence Alliance a scam?

The contract for Artificial Superintelligence Alliance (FET) is verified and its ownership has been renounced, which are positive indicators for transparency and reduced centralized control. While these steps mitigate some fundamental scam risks, investors should still consider other high-risk factors identified, such as token concentration and unlocked liquidity, to form a comprehensive view of its investment profile.

Is Artificial Superintelligence Alliance safe to buy?

Given the high-risk score of 65/100, FET presents notable safety concerns for investors. Key factors include the top 10 holders controlling 50.1% of the supply, creating significant centralization risk. Furthermore, the liquidity is not locked, exposing investors to potential rug pull scenarios where liquidity could be suddenly withdrawn. The existence of a mint function also introduces inflationary potential.

Has Artificial Superintelligence Alliance been audited?

The FET token contract has been verified, confirming its source code matches the deployed code on the blockchain for transparency. This allows public inspection of its functionality. However, contract verification is not the same as a comprehensive security audit by an independent third party, which thoroughly assesses for vulnerabilities and potential exploits.

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