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Is Worldcoin Safe?

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Worldcoin WLD
0x163f…8753
Ethereum
Not verifiedThis record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked 18d ago 1 audit on record
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → Medium Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The WLD token contract implements a standard ERC20 token with additional logic for initial supply distribution and a controlled inflation mechanism. It leverages OpenZeppelin's Ownable2Step for robust ownership management. While the core token functionality and access controls are well-implemented, the centralized nature of the owner and minter roles, coupled with the complexity of the inflation logic, introduces notable risks. The contract is not upgradeable via proxy, simplifying its architecture but requiring new deployments for any future changes.

1 High1 Medium1 Low1 Informational
Volume 24h
$27.0K
Liquidity
$176.6K
Price
$0.3949
Token Age
2y
Top 10 Holders
68.9%

Security Findings

1 High1 Med1 Low1 Info
High

Centralization Risk with Owner and Minter Roles

H-01The `owner` role, secured by `Ownable2Step`, holds significant power, including a one-time mint of up to `INITIAL_SUPPLY_CAP` and the ability to set/change the `minter` address. The `minter` then controls all subsequent inflation minting. If these roles are controlled by a single EOA, it introduces a high degree of centralization and a single point of failure, potentially leading to unauthorized supply manipulation or governance issues. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance)
IssueThe `owner` role, secured by `Ownable2Step`, holds significant power, including a one-time mint of up to `INITIAL_SUPPLY_CAP` and the ability to set/change the `minter` address. The `minter` then controls all subsequent inflation minting. If these roles are controlled by a single EOA, it introduces a high degree of centralization and a single point of failure, potentially leading to unauthorized supply manipulation or governance issues. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance)
FixConsider implementing a multi-signature wallet or a robust governance mechanism (e.g., a DAO) to control the `owner` and `minter` roles. This would distribute control and require multiple approvals for critical operations, enhancing security and decentralization.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Complex Inflation Logic and Potential for Misinterpretation

M-01The `mintInflation` function implements a detailed inflation mechanism with `inflationUnlockTime`, `inflationCapPeriod`, and `inflationCapWad`. The NatSpec explicitly notes that 'it is possible for period over period inflation to reach up to (1 + inflation cap)^2 - 1' under certain conditions. While documented, this complexity could lead to misinterpretation by stakeholders regarding the actual maximum inflation rate over arbitrary periods, potentially causing unexpected token supply increases. (7.2 Code Security, 7.4 Economic)
IssueThe `mintInflation` function implements a detailed inflation mechanism with `inflationUnlockTime`, `inflationCapPeriod`, and `inflationCapWad`. The NatSpec explicitly notes that 'it is possible for period over period inflation to reach up to (1 + inflation cap)^2 - 1' under certain conditions. While documented, this complexity could lead to misinterpretation by stakeholders regarding the actual maximum inflation rate over arbitrary periods, potentially causing unexpected token supply increases. (7.2 Code Security, 7.4 Economic)
FixEnsure comprehensive documentation and clear communication to all stakeholders about the nuances of the inflation mechanism, especially the potential for slightly higher-than-expected inflation over certain intervals. Consider adding internal helper functions or clearer comments if the logic can be further modularized for readability.
StatusUnresolved
Low

Immutability of Critical Constructor Parameters

L-01Several critical parameters, including `inflationCapPeriod`, `inflationCapWad`, and `inflationUnlockTime`, are set as `immutable` during contract deployment via the constructor. Additionally, the initial `existingHolders` and `existingAmounts` are processed only at deployment. Any error or misconfiguration in these parameters during deployment cannot be corrected post-deployment, requiring a new contract deployment and migration if a mistake occurs. (7.1 Architecture, 7.8 Operations)
IssueSeveral critical parameters, including `inflationCapPeriod`, `inflationCapWad`, and `inflationUnlockTime`, are set as `immutable` during contract deployment via the constructor. Additionally, the initial `existingHolders` and `existingAmounts` are processed only at deployment. Any error or misconfiguration in these parameters during deployment cannot be corrected post-deployment, requiring a new contract deployment and migration if a mistake occurs. (7.1 Architecture, 7.8 Operations)
FixThoroughly review and test all constructor parameters in a controlled environment before mainnet deployment. Implement robust deployment scripts and verification processes to minimize the risk of misconfiguration. While immutability provides certainty, ensure the initial setup is flawless.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Lack of Event for Minter Address Update

I-01The `setMinter` function allows the contract owner to update the `minter` address, which is a critical role responsible for inflation minting. However, this function does not emit an event upon a successful update. This lack of an event makes it challenging for off-chain monitoring systems, block explorers, and users to track changes to the `minter` address, reducing transparency and auditability. (7.2 Code Security, 7.8 Operations)
IssueThe `setMinter` function allows the contract owner to update the `minter` address, which is a critical role responsible for inflation minting. However, this function does not emit an event upon a successful update. This lack of an event makes it challenging for off-chain monitoring systems, block explorers, and users to track changes to the `minter` address, reducing transparency and auditability. (7.2 Code Security, 7.8 Operations)
FixAdd an event to the `setMinter` function, such as `event MinterUpdated(address indexed oldMinter, address indexed newMinter);`, to log changes to the `minter` address. This will improve transparency and allow for easier tracking and auditing of this critical role.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow8/10

The WLD token contract demonstrates good technical quality, utilizing battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20 and Ownable2Step functionalities, which enhances code security (7.2 Code Security). The architecture (7.1 Architecture) is straightforward for a non-upgradeable token. However, the inflation logic within `mintInflation` is intricate, with explicit acknowledgments in the NatSpec about potential 'one too many' inflation periods, which, while documented, adds complexity and potential for misinterpretation.

GovernanceMedium4/10

The contract exhibits a high degree of centralization, primarily through the `owner` and `minter` roles (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance). The owner can perform a one-time mint up to `INITIAL_SUPPLY_CAP` and has the sole authority to set the `minter` address. The `minter` then controls all subsequent inflation minting, which is a significant economic power (7.4 Economic). This centralized control, if managed by a single entity, presents a single point of failure and potential for governance issues.

UpgradesLow7/10

The WLD contract is implemented as a standard, non-upgradeable token contract. It does not utilize proxy patterns (e.g., UUPS, Transparent) for upgradeability (7.7 Upgrades). This design choice eliminates risks associated with proxy implementation, such storage collisions or incorrect upgrade paths, but means any future protocol changes would necessitate a new contract deployment and a token migration process.

Security Checklist

3/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedFail
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedFail
Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

68.9% in top 10
0.0% in wallets68.9% in contracts
Effective Concentration27.5%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$224.3K across 7 pairs
Uniswap v3WETHanalysed$176.6K78.7%Uniswap v4ETH$41.4K18.4%Uniswap v3ZIK$5.3K2.3%Uniswap v4ZIK$7820.3%SupernovaWETH$1900.1%Pancakeswap v3WETH$1010.0%
Show 1 more pairShow less
Uniswap v4ETH$390.0%

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder52.0%
Top-3 Unlocked94.6%

Key Addresses

11 addresses
Deployer
0xc3e0…c348
Unlocked LP Held By
0x5793…0d660xa5a7…ff240x1f4c…ba830x08cd…a4a60xaf80…30000xd08b…bc5f0x24dc…0cbe0x950c…ad5e0x91a9…c8970xa0ac…9c12

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

8 factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — weak Multisig (1-of-1)
  • Top-10 concentration > 20% (68.9% total → 27.5% effective; 0.0% in EOAs, 68.9% in contracts — mild)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 52.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 79% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 94.6% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 79% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Worldcoin a scam?

Based on the provided data, Worldcoin (WLD) exhibits several risk factors commonly associated with potential scams, though this analysis doesn't definitively label it one. The critical concerns include ownership not being renounced, extreme token centralization with 69.7% in top 10 holders, and unlocked liquidity. These factors create significant avenues for malicious action or market instability, warranting extreme caution from investors.

Is Worldcoin safe to buy?

Investing in Worldcoin (WLD) carries a critical risk, indicated by its 75/100 risk score, making it unsafe for risk-averse investors. Key safety concerns include the unrenounced contract ownership, allowing the deployer control. The vast majority of tokens (69.7%) are concentrated in the top 10 wallets, posing a high centralization risk. Furthermore, unlocked liquidity means funds could be withdrawn, impacting market stability significantly.

Has Worldcoin been audited?

The provided data confirms that the Worldcoin (WLD) contract is verified on Ethereum, meaning its code is publicly available for inspection. However, contract verification is not the same as a comprehensive security audit by an independent third party. The data provided does not explicitly state whether Worldcoin has undergone a formal security audit. Investors should seek audit reports if available.

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