On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
The APYX token implementation contains critical logic flaws regarding fee handling and arithmetic operations.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 5, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0xe085…faecThe ten largest holders own 36.0% of supply. What remains: 35.9% in wallets, 0.1% in other contracts. The deployer/owner wallet itself holds 35.8%. A holder that also controls the contract can sell into its own liquidity. 9,132 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The functions MultiSum and check are identical and serve no purpose for an ERC-20 token.
Remove unused and redundant code to reduce gas costs and attack surface.
Unresolved
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The transfer functions call feeWallet.send(value = self.balance) on every transfer. This will cause all transfers to fail if the contract has insufficient ETH or if the feeWallet is not a payable contract, effectively bricking the token.
Remove the fee distribution logic or implement a standard fee-on-transfer mechanism that only transfers a percentage of the token amount, not the contract's ETH balance.
Unresolved
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The expression 'num1 - num5 / num6' in MultiSum does not check if num1 is greater than the result of the division, leading to potential underflow errors in Vyper.
Add explicit checks to ensure num1 >= (num5 / num6) before subtraction.
Unresolved
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The feeWallet address is not restricted, allowing any address to be set if a setter existed, or potentially causing issues if the address is a malicious contract.
Validate the feeWallet address and ensure it implements the expected interface.
Unresolved
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0xe085…faec — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
Not confirmed by static analysis (the model's own reading of the source). The transfer functions do not prevent transfers to the zero address.
Add 'assert _to != empty(address)' to prevent accidental burning of tokens.
Unresolved
9,132 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $50K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $486K (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $50K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 13 days of market history.
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Acknowledged
The token's oldest DEX pool is 13 days old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Acknowledged
The APYX token implementation contains critical logic flaws regarding fee handling and arithmetic operations. The contract attempts to send the entire contract balance to a fee wallet on every transfer, which is highly dangerous and likely to cause transaction failures or loss of funds. The audit covers 7.1 Architecture, 7.2 Code Security, 7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance, 7.6 External, 7.7 Upgrades, 7.8 Operations.
The architecture relies on an external fee wallet call within every transfer, which is prone to reentrancy and gas exhaustion. 7.1 Architecture shows a lack of separation between token logic and fee distribution. 7.2 Code Security identifies dangerous arithmetic in MultiSum. 7.6 External interactions are unconstrained, allowing potential DoS via the feeWallet.
7.4 Economic analysis shows no complex DeFi primitives, but the fee mechanism is fundamentally broken. 7.5 Governance is non-existent as ownership is burned at deployment. No economic incentives or governance structures are present.
7.7 Upgrades: The contract is not upgradeable. The ownership is burned, making the contract immutable. No upgrade risk exists.
The contract should be redeployed after removing the fee-on-transfer mechanism, which currently attempts to send the entire contract balance on every transaction.
The arithmetic functions should be audited for underflow risks and removed if they serve no purpose for the token's core functionality.
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
The APYX contract on Base is 0x36d539900653b5d721ecec9ca9d7bacf65f10290. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Quantum Audit's risk score for APYX is 49/100 (Medium risk) as of Nov 5, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Nov 5, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $49.6K.
As of Nov 5, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 36.0% of the supply across 9,132 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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