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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Sport.fun Safe?

FUNBase
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The Fun token contract implements a standard ERC20 token with UUPS upgradeability and OpenZeppelin's AccessControl.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Proxy contract
  • Top-10 concentration > 70%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 98.8%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • 2 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Proxy contract (upgradeable — admin can replace logic)
  • Top-10 concentration > 70% (75.9% total → 75.9% effective; 75.9% in EOAs, 0.0% in contracts — extreme)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 98.8% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 92% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 92% of DEX liquidity)
  • 2 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 42 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityUpgradeable

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
75.9%Wallets24.1%Everyone else
75.9%Wallets24.1%Everyone else
WalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
75.9%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell75.9%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply24.1%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads75.9%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$369.2K across 6 pairs
LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$339.9KShare of depth92.1%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder98.8%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0x8815…288b0xe24d…c94a

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

2 High1 Medium1 Low
High

Centralized Control of Token Supply

The initialize function mints the entire MAX_SUPPLY (1,000,000,000 * 1e18 tokens) to the owner address. This grants the initial owner complete control over the token's distribution and market dynamics, posing a significant centralization risk. A single entity holds all tokens, which could lead to market manipulation or a lack of trust from the community (7.4 Economic).H-01

Issue

The initialize function mints the entire MAX_SUPPLY (1,000,000,000 * 1e18 tokens) to the owner address. This grants the initial owner complete control over the token's distribution and market dynamics, posing a significant centralization risk. A single entity holds all tokens, which could lead to market manipulation or a lack of trust from the community (7.4 Economic).

Fix

Implement a more decentralized token distribution strategy. Consider vesting schedules, community airdrops, or a gradual release mechanism instead of minting the entire supply to a single address. If the current design is intentional, clearly communicate this centralization to users.

Status

Unresolved

High

Single Point of Failure for Administrative and Upgrade Roles

During initialization, the owner address is granted both DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and GOVERNOR_ROLE. The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can manage all other roles, including GOVERNOR_ROLE, which is responsible for authorizing contract upgrades. This setup creates a single point of failure: if the owner's private key is compromised, an attacker would gain full administrative control over the contract, including the ability to upgrade it to malicious code and manage all roles (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance, 7.7 Upgrades).H-02

Issue

During initialization, the owner address is granted both DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and GOVERNOR_ROLE. The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can manage all other roles, including GOVERNOR_ROLE, which is responsible for authorizing contract upgrades. This setup creates a single point of failure: if the owner's private key is compromised, an attacker would gain full administrative control over the contract, including the ability to upgrade it to malicious code and manage all roles (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance, 7.7 Upgrades).

Fix

Transfer DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and GOVERNOR_ROLE to a multi-signature wallet or a DAO governance system. This decentralizes control and requires multiple approvals for critical operations, significantly reducing the risk associated with a single compromised key.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Lack of Explicit Token Burn Mechanism

The contract does not provide an explicit function for burning tokens. While _mint is used once during initialization, there is no corresponding _burn function or a mechanism to reduce the total supply after initial minting. This might be an intentional design choice, but it limits flexibility for supply management, such as implementing deflationary mechanisms or burning tokens from a treasury (7.4 Economic).M-01

Issue

The contract does not provide an explicit function for burning tokens. While _mint is used once during initialization, there is no corresponding _burn function or a mechanism to reduce the total supply after initial minting. This might be an intentional design choice, but it limits flexibility for supply management, such as implementing deflationary mechanisms or burning tokens from a treasury (7.4 Economic).

Fix

If a burn mechanism is desired for future tokenomics or supply management, consider adding a burn function, potentially restricted by a role (e.g., GOVERNOR_ROLE), that calls _burn from the ERC20Upgradeable base contract. If not desired, document this design choice.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Absence of Pause Mechanism

The contract does not include a pause mechanism (e.g., PausableUpgradeable) to halt token transfers or other critical operations in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability or a major market disruption. While not always strictly necessary, a pause function can be a valuable tool for mitigating risks in a centralized token system (7.8 Operations).L-01

Issue

The contract does not include a pause mechanism (e.g., PausableUpgradeable) to halt token transfers or other critical operations in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability or a major market disruption. While not always strictly necessary, a pause function can be a valuable tool for mitigating risks in a centralized token system (7.8 Operations).

Fix

Consider integrating OpenZeppelin's PausableUpgradeable module. This would allow a designated role (e.g., GOVERNOR_ROLE or a new PAUSER_ROLE) to temporarily pause and unpause contract functionality, providing an emergency stop-gap measure.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The Fun token contract implements a standard ERC20 token with UUPS upgradeability and OpenZeppelin's AccessControl. While leveraging well-audited libraries, the contract exhibits significant centralization risks. The entire token supply is minted to a single owner address, which also holds all administrative and upgrade roles. This creates a critical single point of failure for both economic control and contract integrity.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The contract is built upon well-audited OpenZeppelin Upgradeable libraries for ERC20, AccessControl, and UUPS, contributing to high code security and architectural soundness (7.1 Architecture, 7.2 Code Security). The initialize function correctly sets up the token and roles, and _disableInitializers prevents re-initialization. A key technical concern is the single point of failure for critical administrative functions and upgrades, as the owner address initially controls all roles (7.3 Access Control).

Governance1/10High risk

The contract utilizes OpenZeppelin's AccessControlUpgradeable for robust role-based access management, defining DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and GOVERNOR_ROLE. However, a significant economic risk exists as the entire MAX_SUPPLY of tokens is minted to a single owner address during initialization (7.4 Economic). Furthermore, this owner address initially holds both DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and GOVERNOR_ROLE, creating a single point of failure for all administrative and governance actions (7.5 Governance).

Upgrades1/10High risk

The contract correctly implements the UUPS upgradeability pattern using OpenZeppelin's UUPSUpgradeable module, ensuring a secure and standard upgrade path. The _authorizeUpgrade function is appropriately restricted to the GOVERNOR_ROLE. However, the initial assignment of the GOVERNOR_ROLE to a single owner address presents a centralization risk for future upgrades (7.7 Upgrades), as compromise of this address would allow unauthorized contract modifications.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to decentralize control over the contract's administrative roles and token supply.

Transfer DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and GOVERNOR_ROLE to a robust multi-signature wallet or a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) to mitigate the single point of failure risk. Consider implementing a token distribution strategy that avoids concentrating the entire supply in a single address, and evaluate the need for a token burn mechanism or a pause functionality for emergency situations.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeERC1967Proxy
NetworkBase
Token age1y
Contract0x16ee…dd92
Deployer0x1c58…30ae
Proxy Upgrade Controls
Proxy TypeEip1967 Uups
ImplementationVerified source
Upgrades (30d)0 · stable
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202674High
  2. Aug 11, 202672High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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