The SecuritiesToken is an upgradeable ERC-20 token designed with extensive administrative control. Key functionalities like transfer rules, fees, and external compliance/pause mechanisms are centrally managed by a privileged role. While this allows for flexibility and regulatory compliance, it introduces significant centralization risks, as a compromise of the controlling address could lead to manipulation of token behavior or funds.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is Alibaba Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The SecuritiesToken is an upgradeable ERC-20 token designed with extensive administrative control.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on
- Owner can change the buy/sell tax
- A privileged address can change transfer or wallet limits
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Upgradeable proxy — the admin can replace the logic
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity not locked
- Top-10 concentration > 50%
- The deployer has launched a honeypot before
Exact factors
- A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on
- Owner can change the buy/sell tax
- A privileged address can change transfer or wallet limits
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Upgradeable proxy — the admin can replace the logic
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool; this pool is 89% of DEX liquidity) — held by independent providers — market-depth risk
- Top-10 concentration > 50% (92.1% total → 67.4% effective; 66.2% in EOAs, 3.0% in contracts; 22.8% burned, locked or in pools excluded)
- The deployer has launched a honeypot before
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 15Holders
as of audit · Oct 15, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking3.0%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell66.2%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity22.8%
- Everyone else35,208 holders7.9%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 15, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 15- Pancakeswap v3USDTAnalysed$2.53M88.6%
- Pancakeswap v2天猫$66.9K2.3%
- Pancakeswap v2阿里巴巴$45.7K1.6%
- Pancakeswap v2BS$30.8K1.1%
- Pancakeswap v2噜噜$15.1K0.5%
- Pancakeswap v2牛马人生$14.8K0.5%
Show 4 more pairs
The 20 remaining pairs hold $105.6K between them and are not listed. The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x5b0d…a9b90x556b…d59e0x8145…09920x92af…33530xcece…cbe80xef6e…cce70xe27a…5e840x9afa…8b470x8815…76260x0e5f…c311No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighCentralized Control Over Critical External Contracts
A privileged address, specifically the one holding the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, has the ability to replace the PauseManager and Compliance contracts. These external contracts are called during token transfers to determine if a transfer is allowed or paused. If the controlling address is compromised, it could redirect token logic to a malicious contract, potentially blocking all transfers or imposing arbitrary rules.CP-03
Issue
A privileged address, specifically the one holding the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, has the ability to replace the PauseManager and Compliance contracts. These external contracts are called during token transfers to determine if a transfer is allowed or paused. If the controlling address is compromised, it could redirect token logic to a malicious contract, potentially blocking all transfers or imposing arbitrary rules.
Fix
Token holders should be aware that the administrator can change the core logic governing transfers by updating the PauseManager (via setPauseManager function) and Compliance (via setCompliance function) contract addresses. This power should be secured by a multi-signature wallet and any changes should be publicly announced with sufficient lead time.
Status
Unresolved
MediumAdministrator Can Change Transfer Fees
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE has the power to modify the _uiMultiplier parameter using the setUIMultiplier function. This parameter directly influences the fees or amounts deducted during token transfers. A malicious or compromised administrator could set excessively high fees, impacting the economic viability of token transactions for users.CP-07
Issue
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE has the power to modify the _uiMultiplier parameter using the setUIMultiplier function. This parameter directly influences the fees or amounts deducted during token transfers. A malicious or compromised administrator could set excessively high fees, impacting the economic viability of token transactions for users.
Fix
Token holders should understand that the administrator can change the fees associated with transfers using the setUIMultiplier function. It is recommended that any changes to transfer fees are communicated transparently and that the controlling role is secured with a multi-signature wallet to prevent unauthorized modifications.
Status
Unresolved
MediumLiquidity not locked
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 94.2% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x5b0d…a9b9 — holds 70.8% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them. This assessment covers the main pool, which holds 89% of the token's DEX liquidity; the other pools were not assessed.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 94.2% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x5b0d…a9b9 — holds 70.8% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them. This assessment covers the main pool, which holds 89% of the token's DEX liquidity; the other pools were not assessed.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
LowAdministrator Can Change Transfer Limits
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can adjust numeric limits checked during the transfer process, such as those related to the UI multiplier, via the setUIMultiplier function. While not directly a "fee," changes to this multiplier could indirectly affect perceived transfer amounts or introduce unexpected behavior related to how amounts are scaled or validated.CP-08
Issue
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE can adjust numeric limits checked during the transfer process, such as those related to the UI multiplier, via the setUIMultiplier function. While not directly a "fee," changes to this multiplier could indirectly affect perceived transfer amounts or introduce unexpected behavior related to how amounts are scaled or validated.
Fix
Token holders should be aware that the administrator can modify certain numeric parameters that might affect how transfers are processed, using the setUIMultiplier function. While this might not directly impose a fee, it could alter how amounts are calculated or validated. This control should be managed responsibly and transparently.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 92.1% of supply. Of that, 22.8% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 66.2% in wallets, 3.0% in other contracts. 35,218 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 92.1% of supply. Of that, 22.8% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 66.2% in wallets, 3.0% in other contracts. 35,218 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoListed, but not independently verified
Listed on CoinGecko as Alibaba (bStocks Tokenized Stock) (BABAB), market cap $9M, rank #1308. 35,218 holders.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
Listed on CoinGecko as Alibaba (bStocks Tokenized Stock) (BABAB), market cap $9M, rank #1308. 35,218 holders.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $2.9M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $13.8M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $4.1M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $2.9M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $13.8M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $4.1M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Tokenized real-world asset
A token backed by an off-chain asset (a stock, gold, treasury bills, a fund share) held by a named issuer or custodian. Issuance, redemption and transfer restrictions are the issuer's by design. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: CoinGecko category: Tokenized Stocks. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $2.9M of DEX liquidity across 30 pools. Launch: 73 days of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token backed by an off-chain asset (a stock, gold, treasury bills, a fund share) held by a named issuer or custodian. Issuance, redemption and transfer restrictions are the issuer's by design. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: CoinGecko category: Tokenized Stocks. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: upgradeable proxy. Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $2.9M of DEX liquidity across 30 pools. Launch: 73 days of market history.
Fix
Treat the issuer or custodian as the counterparty: check its custody reports and who may hold or redeem the token.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 15The SecuritiesToken is an upgradeable ERC-20 token leveraging OpenZeppelin's AccessControlEnumerableUpgradeable for robust role-based access management (7.3 Access Control). It integrates external PauseManagerClientUpgradeable and ComplianceClientUpgradeable contracts, allowing dynamic control over transfer logic (7.1 Architecture). However, the ability for a privileged role to replace critical external contracts (setPauseManager, setCompliance) and modify transfer parameters (setUIMultiplier) introduces a high technical risk (7.2 Code Security).
The token's economic model and governance are highly centralized, with a DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE controlling critical functions (7.5 Governance). This role can enable/disable minting and burning, set the UI multiplier which affects transfer fees, and change the token's name/symbol (7.4 Economic). While this provides flexibility for a regulated asset, it concentrates significant power, posing a high economic risk if the controlling entity acts maliciously or is compromised.
The SecuritiesToken is deployed via a Beacon Proxy pattern, enabling future upgrades to its logic (7.7 Upgrades). This design allows for bug fixes and feature enhancements without redeploying the token. However, the upgrade mechanism itself is controlled by a privileged role, meaning the administrator can unilaterally change the contract's entire logic, which is a medium risk if not managed securely.
It is crucial to secure the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE with the highest possible standards, ideally using a robust multi-signature wallet solution with a high threshold for execution.
All changes to critical parameters, especially those affecting transfer logic, fees, or external contract addresses, should be communicated transparently to token holders. Consider implementing a time-lock mechanism for sensitive administrative actions to provide a window for review and reaction.
Contract & Record
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