Is AIW3 Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Findings

1 High1 Low1 Info

High

Centralized Initial Token Distribution

H-01The entire `TOTAL_SUPPLY` of 1,000,000,000 AIW3 tokens (10^9 * 10^18 wei) is minted to a single `initialHolder` address during contract deployment. This creates a single point of control for the entire token supply at launch, posing a significant economic risk (7.4 Economic). A large portion of the supply held by one entity can lead to market manipulation, concentrated selling pressure, or disproportionate influence in any future governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance).

IssueThe entire `TOTAL_SUPPLY` of 1,000,000,000 AIW3 tokens (10^9 * 10^18 wei) is minted to a single `initialHolder` address during contract deployment. This creates a single point of control for the entire token supply at launch, posing a significant economic risk (7.4 Economic). A large portion of the supply held by one entity can lead to market manipulation, concentrated selling pressure, or disproportionate influence in any future governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance).

FixImplement a diversified token distribution strategy. This could involve vesting schedules, multiple initial distribution addresses, or a community-driven launch mechanism. If a single `initialHolder` is necessary, consider using a multi-signature wallet for this address to enhance security and decentralization of control. Clearly communicate the distribution plan to the community.

StatusUnresolved

Low

Redundant Constant `TOTAL_SUPPLY_WHOLE`

L-01The constant `TOTAL_SUPPLY_WHOLE` is declared with a value of `1_000_000_000` but is not utilized anywhere within the contract's logic. While harmless, it adds unnecessary code and could potentially lead to confusion if not clearly distinguished from `TOTAL_SUPPLY` (which includes decimals) by future developers or auditors (7.2 Code Security).

IssueThe constant `TOTAL_SUPPLY_WHOLE` is declared with a value of `1_000_000_000` but is not utilized anywhere within the contract's logic. While harmless, it adds unnecessary code and could potentially lead to confusion if not clearly distinguished from `TOTAL_SUPPLY` (which includes decimals) by future developers or auditors (7.2 Code Security).

FixRemove the `TOTAL_SUPPLY_WHOLE` constant if it serves no functional purpose within the contract. If it is intended for off-chain informational use, consider adding a comment to clarify its role and prevent misinterpretation.

StatusUnresolved

Info

Immutability and Lack of Administrative Control

I-01The AIW3Token contract is designed to be immutable, meaning it has no administrative functions such as pausing transfers, blacklisting addresses, or upgradeability (7.3 Access Control, 7.7 Upgrades). This design choice enhances decentralization and predictability, as the contract's behavior cannot be altered post-deployment. However, it also means that no emergency measures can be taken in the event of unforeseen circumstances, such as a major exploit in a DeFi protocol interacting with the token, or a critical bug discovered in the token's logic (though unlikely given OpenZeppelin's foundation).

IssueThe AIW3Token contract is designed to be immutable, meaning it has no administrative functions such as pausing transfers, blacklisting addresses, or upgradeability (7.3 Access Control, 7.7 Upgrades). This design choice enhances decentralization and predictability, as the contract's behavior cannot be altered post-deployment. However, it also means that no emergency measures can be taken in the event of unforeseen circumstances, such as a major exploit in a DeFi protocol interacting with the token, or a critical bug discovered in the token's logic (though unlikely given OpenZeppelin's foundation).

FixAcknowledge this design choice and its implications. For a simple, non-governance token, immutability is often preferred for its security benefits. Ensure that all integrations and ecosystem partners are aware of the token's immutable nature and the absence of emergency controls.

StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow8/10

The AIW3Token contract is built upon the latest OpenZeppelin ERC-20 standard (v0.8.20+), ensuring a robust and well-audited foundation (7.2 Code Security). The contract's logic is minimal, primarily extending the ERC-20 functionality with fixed constants and a single initial minting event in the constructor (7.1 Architecture). All arithmetic operations are handled safely, leveraging OpenZeppelin's `unchecked` blocks where appropriate after bounds checks, mitigating integer overflow/underflow risks. No complex external interactions or reentrancy vectors were identified.

GovernanceHigh1/10

The primary economic risk (7.4 Economic) stems from the initial token distribution, where the entire `TOTAL_SUPPLY` is minted to a single `initialHolder` address. This creates a highly centralized supply at launch, which could lead to significant market volatility or concentrated influence if the token were to be used in a governance model (7.5 Governance). The contract is not mintable after deployment, which is a positive for supply predictability. There are no administrative roles like pausers or blacklisters, which enhances decentralization but removes emergency control (7.3 Access Control).

UpgradesMedium6/10

The AIW3Token contract is not designed with upgradeability features (7.7 Upgrades). It is a simple, immutable ERC-20 token. This design choice eliminates all risks associated with upgrade mechanisms, such as proxy implementation bugs or administrative key compromise for upgrades. The contract's behavior is fixed upon deployment.

Security Checklist

3/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership Renounced?

No Mint FunctionPass

Liquidity LockedFail

Not a ProxyPass

HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

87.6% in top 10

1.0% in wallets86.6% in contracts

Effective Concentration35.6%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$1.11M

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%

Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Key Addresses

2 addresses

Deployer

0xab46…7a3e

Unlocked LP Held By

0xc517…7bb2

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

8 factors

Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
Top-10 concentration > 30% (87.6% total → 35.6% effective; 1.0% in EOAs, 86.6% in contracts — moderate)
Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
Token age < 30 days (still settling)
1 High finding(s) from audit
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Is AIW3 Safe?

Security Findings

Centralized Initial Token Distribution

Redundant Constant `TOTAL_SUPPLY_WHOLE`

Immutability and Lack of Administrative Control

Category Ratings

Security Checklist

Holder Composition

Liquidity Depth

LP Distribution

Key Addresses

What Raised This Score

Related Audits

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