The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee exclusion logic. Ownership has been renounced, rendering administrative functions dormant. However, critical vulnerabilities exist in the internal swap logic, specifically regarding token transfers and fund handling, which pose a risk to liquidity and user assets.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is A Meme Dog a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee exclusion logic.
Read the full analysis- LP lock ends in 19d
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Unauthorized Token Withdrawal Risk
- Code: Precision Loss via Division Before Multiplication
- Code: Trapped ETH in Contract
- Code: Unchecked Token Transfer Results
Exact factors
- LP lock ends in 19d (short-term protection)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (38.1× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Unauthorized Token Withdrawal Risk (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Precision Loss via Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Trapped ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Unchecked Token Transfer Results (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Nov 4Holders
as of audit · Nov 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking0.1%
- Burnedout of circulation94.0%
- Everyone else15,198 holders5.9%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Nov 4The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060x6ec2…c146No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Withdrawal Risk
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function uses transferFrom in a way that could allow the contract to pull tokens from any address that has previously approved the contract, potentially draining user balances.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function uses transferFrom in a way that could allow the contract to pull tokens from any address that has previously approved the contract, potentially draining user balances.
Fix
Restrict the scope of transferFrom calls to only interact with authorized liquidity pools or specific contract-owned addresses.
Status
Unresolved
HighUnchecked Token Transfer Results
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which may lead to silent failures where liquidity operations appear successful despite failing to move tokens.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which may lead to silent failures where liquidity operations appear successful despite failing to move tokens.
Fix
Always verify the return value of transfer and transferFrom calls using a library like OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTrapped ETH in Contract
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no logic to withdraw or utilize these funds, causing them to be permanently locked in the contract.CD-03
Issue
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no logic to withdraw or utilize these funds, causing them to be permanently locked in the contract.
Fix
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to a governance address or a mechanism to automatically swap and distribute trapped ETH.
Status
Unresolved
LowPrecision Loss via Division Before Multiplication
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, division is performed before multiplication, which causes rounding errors and loss of precision in fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, division is performed before multiplication, which causes rounding errors and loss of precision in fee calculations.
Fix
Perform all multiplications before divisions to maintain maximum precision during fee calculations.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 94.1% of supply. Of that, 94.0% burned — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.0% in wallets, 0.1% in other contracts. 15,208 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 94.1% of supply. Of that, 94.0% burned — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.0% in wallets, 0.1% in other contracts. 15,208 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
15,208 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
15,208 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
98.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 24 Nov 2026 (19 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 2.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
98.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.0% is locked in PinkLock02 until 24 Nov 2026 (19 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 2.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $230K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $8.7M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $230K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $8.7M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Meme token
A community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: meme vocabulary in name/ticker (meme). Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 4.14% on sell. Market: $230K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: meme vocabulary in name/ticker (meme). Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 4.14% on sell. Market: $230K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Expect attention-driven volatility; the facts in this report say whether the contract itself can be used against holders.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 4The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns but includes a flawed internal swap mechanism. 7.1 Architecture is standard, 7.2 Code Security is compromised by unchecked return values, and 7.3 Access Control is currently locked due to renounced ownership. 7.6 External interactions are risky as the contract lacks mechanisms to recover trapped ETH.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance are effectively static. Since ownership is renounced, no further changes to fee exclusions or token parameters can be made. The economic model is fixed, preventing rug-pulls via administrative parameter manipulation.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers. The contract is immutable, which provides security against malicious upgrades but prevents patching the identified bugs.
The contract should be considered high-risk due to the identified vulnerabilities in the swap logic.
Users should exercise extreme caution as the contract cannot be updated to fix these issues. Developers should avoid using this contract in production environments. If a new version is deployed, ensure all external calls are checked for success and that arithmetic operations are performed in a way that preserves precision.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Nov 4, 202682High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the AMD contract address?
The A Meme Dog (AMD) contract on BNB Chain is 0x545a12090624c95fb96ef9a4ce9b60e58be98ee9. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is A Meme Dog a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for A Meme Dog is 82/100 (High risk) as of Nov 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 3.9% / 4.1%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is AMD liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Nov 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $229.9K.
Who holds AMD?
As of Nov 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 94.1% of the supply across 15,208 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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