The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee exclusion logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning privileged functions are now dormant. However, critical vulnerabilities exist in the internal swap logic that could lead to unauthorized token movement and loss of funds.

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is 50000000 a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee exclusion logic.
Read the full analysis- LP lock ends in 16d
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement
- Code: Rounding Errors via Division Before Multiplication
- Code: Locked ETH in Contract
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values
Exact factors
- LP lock ends in 16d (short-term protection)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (54.9× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Rounding Errors via Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Locked ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 23Holders
as of audit · Oct 23, 2026- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell2.2%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity1.1%
- Everyone else4,026 holders96.7%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 23, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 23The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060x2627…346fNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Movement
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from arbitrary addresses using transferFrom without sufficient validation, potentially allowing unauthorized drainage of user funds.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from arbitrary addresses using transferFrom without sufficient validation, potentially allowing unauthorized drainage of user funds.
Fix
Restrict the use of transferFrom to only authorized contract-controlled addresses and implement strict access controls on the swap execution logic.
Status
Unresolved
HighIgnored Transfer Return Values
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved but the contract state updates as if they were.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved but the contract state updates as if they were.
Fix
Always check the return value of transfer and transferFrom calls, or use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library to handle non-standard token implementations.
Status
Unresolved
MediumLocked ETH in Contract
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, effectively locking any ETH sent to the contract address.CD-03
Issue
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH, but there is no mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, effectively locking any ETH sent to the contract address.
Fix
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to a multi-sig or DAO, or remove the receive function if ETH reception is not intended.
Status
Unresolved
LowRounding Errors via Division Before Multiplication
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, division is performed before multiplication, which causes precision loss and can lead to incorrect fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, division is performed before multiplication, which causes precision loss and can lead to incorrect fee calculations.
Fix
Reorder operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 3.3% of supply. Of that, 1.1% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 2.2% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 4,036 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 3.3% of supply. Of that, 1.1% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 2.2% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 4,036 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
4,036 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
4,036 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
96.2% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 96.2% is locked in PinkLock02 until 09 Nov 2026 (16 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 3.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
96.2% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 96.2% is locked in PinkLock02 until 09 Nov 2026 (16 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 3.7% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $438K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $24.1M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $438K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $24.1M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4.22% on sell. Market: $438K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4.22% on sell. Market: $438K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 23The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns with added fee-on-transfer logic. 7.1 Architecture is standard, but 7.2 Code Security is compromised by improper handling of external calls. 7.3 Access Control is effectively disabled due to ownership renouncement. 7.6 External interactions in _executeSwapAndLiquify are unsafe and lack return value validation.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance are currently static as ownership is renounced. No further changes to fee structures or protocol parameters can be made by the original deployer. The economic model relies on the integrity of the swap function, which is currently flawed.
7.7 Upgrades are not applicable as the contract is not a proxy. The code is immutable. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers.
Immediate action is required to address the critical token movement vulnerability in the swap logic.
The contract should be redeployed with a secure implementation that validates all external call return values and prevents unauthorized token access.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 23, 202684High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the 50000000 contract address?
The 50000000 contract on BNB Chain is 0xd7aa9ed7a3b5b575743f8c3a628f050f2f2fc521. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is 50000000 a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for 50000000 is 84/100 (High risk) as of Oct 23, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 4% / 4.2%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is 50000000 liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Oct 23, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $438.2K.
Who holds 50000000?
As of Oct 23, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 3.3% of the supply across 4,036 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of 50000000?
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page