Quantum Audit Logo
Launch App

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Yield Basis Safe?

YBEthereum
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical5/10Governance4/10Upgrades5/10Checks passed3 of 5Findings1 Critical · 1 High · 1 Medium · 1 Low · 1 Info5
SummaryAI Copilot

The YBToken contract implements a custom ERC-20 token with an exponential emission schedule.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 88.0%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 97.6%
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (86.2% total → 37.4% effective; 4.8% in EOAs, 81.4% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 88.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 97% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 97.6% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 97% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 43 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
81.4%Contracts4.8%13.8%Everyone else
81.4%Contracts4.8%13.8%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
86.2%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking81.4%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell4.8%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply13.8%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads37.4%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.22M across 5 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$1.19MShare of depth97.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder88.0%
Top-3 Unlocked97.6%
Unlocked LP held by
0xda21…e12f0x0a44…d0090xf32b…f01b0x6c7f…a1bb0x8d8a…2d6b0x577b…b1cc0x0a83…11b50x0f71…aac4

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Critical1 High1 Medium1 Low1 Info
Critical

Critical Emission Calculation Bug

The _emissions function, central to the token's supply mechanism, contains a syntax error and a potential logical flaw in the argument passed to math._wad_exp. The line reserve * (10**18 - math._wad_exp(-dt * rate_36 uint256)) is syntactically incorrect (the uint256 after rate_36 is misplaced) and rate_36 is calculated as max_mint_rate * rate_factor, where max_mint_rate is already scaled by 10**18. This over-scaling of the _wad_exp argument could lead to _wad_exp returning 0 prematurely, causing amount to be equal to reserve (minting the entire reserve in one go), or causing reverts due to extreme input values, effectively bricking the emission mechanism.C-01

Issue

The _emissions function, central to the token's supply mechanism, contains a syntax error and a potential logical flaw in the argument passed to math._wad_exp. The line reserve * (10**18 - math._wad_exp(-dt * rate_36 uint256)) is syntactically incorrect (the uint256 after rate_36 is misplaced) and rate_36 is calculated as max_mint_rate * rate_factor, where max_mint_rate is already scaled by 10**18. This over-scaling of the _wad_exp argument could lead to _wad_exp returning 0 prematurely, causing amount to be equal to reserve (minting the entire reserve in one go), or causing reverts due to extreme input values, effectively bricking the emission mechanism.

Fix

Correct the syntax error in the _emissions function. Carefully review the scaling of rate_36 and the expected input for math._wad_exp to ensure the emission formula behaves as intended. The argument to _wad_exp typically represents a rate per unit time, often requiring division by 10**18 if the rate itself is WAD-scaled.

Status

Unresolved

High

Irreversible Minter Bricking Risk

The renounce_ownership function transfers ownership to the zero address, making the contract ownerless. Concurrently, it sets erc20.is_minter[msg.sender] = False, revoking the deployer's minting privileges. If the set_minter function (which is owner-restricted) is not called by the deployer *before* renouncing ownership to grant minting rights to a designated entity (like a GaugeController), the contract will become permanently unable to mint new tokens, rendering its core emission functionality inoperable.H-01

Issue

The renounce_ownership function transfers ownership to the zero address, making the contract ownerless. Concurrently, it sets erc20.is_minter[msg.sender] = False, revoking the deployer's minting privileges. If the set_minter function (which is owner-restricted) is not called by the deployer *before* renouncing ownership to grant minting rights to a designated entity (like a GaugeController), the contract will become permanently unable to mint new tokens, rendering its core emission functionality inoperable.

Fix

Ensure that the set_minter function is called by the deployer to authorize the intended minter (e.g., GaugeController) *before* renounce_ownership is executed. Implement clear deployment and post-deployment procedures to prevent this critical misconfiguration. Consider adding a check in renounce_ownership to ensure at least one minter is active before allowing ownership renunciation, or allow a specific role to set minters even after ownership is renounced (though this goes against the…

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Outdated Vyper Version and Libraries

The contract is compiled with Vyper 0.4.3, which is an outdated version of the language. This version may contain known or undiscovered compiler bugs and lacks modern security features and optimizations present in current Vyper releases. Additionally, the snekmate libraries used are likely also outdated, potentially introducing further vulnerabilities or non-standard behaviors.M-01

Issue

The contract is compiled with Vyper 0.4.3, which is an outdated version of the language. This version may contain known or undiscovered compiler bugs and lacks modern security features and optimizations present in current Vyper releases. Additionally, the snekmate libraries used are likely also outdated, potentially introducing further vulnerabilities or non-standard behaviors.

Fix

Migrate the contract to a modern, audited Vyper version (e.g., 0.3.x) and update to actively maintained and audited libraries. Thoroughly re-audit the contract after migration to ensure no new issues are introduced and all existing logic remains correct.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Lack of Emergency Pause Mechanism

The contract lacks a mechanism to pause critical functions like emit in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability or an economic exploit. This could leave the protocol vulnerable to rapid exploitation without a way to mitigate ongoing damage.L-01

Issue

The contract lacks a mechanism to pause critical functions like emit in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability or an economic exploit. This could leave the protocol vulnerable to rapid exploitation without a way to mitigate ongoing damage.

Fix

Consider implementing a pause mechanism for the emit function. This mechanism should be controlled by a trusted multi-signature wallet or a governance process, allowing for a temporary halt of emissions in emergencies. Given the ownerless design, this would need to be integrated carefully, perhaps allowing a designated GaugeController or a separate governance contract to trigger a pause.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Implicit Trust in Designated Minter

The contract's design, particularly after ownership renunciation, places implicit trust in an external GaugeController (or similar designated minter) to manage token emissions responsibly. The emit function's rate_factor parameter allows the minter to control the percentage of inflation. The security of the token's supply and economic model heavily relies on the designated minter's implementation, its own access controls, and its resistance to manipulation.I-01

Issue

The contract's design, particularly after ownership renunciation, places implicit trust in an external GaugeController (or similar designated minter) to manage token emissions responsibly. The emit function's rate_factor parameter allows the minter to control the percentage of inflation. The security of the token's supply and economic model heavily relies on the designated minter's implementation, its own access controls, and its resistance to manipulation.

Fix

Conduct a thorough audit of the GaugeController contract (or any designated minter) that will interact with this YBToken. Ensure its access control mechanisms are robust, its logic is sound, and it cannot be manipulated to mint tokens maliciously or in an unintended manner.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The YBToken contract implements a custom ERC-20 token with an exponential emission schedule. The audit identified a critical bug in the emission calculation formula, which could lead to incorrect token minting or system failure. A high-severity access control issue exists where the emission mechanism can be permanently disabled if the minter role is not correctly configured before ownership is renounced. The contract also uses an outdated Vyper compiler version, increasing potential risks.

Technical5/10Medium risk

The contract implements a custom ERC-20 token with an exponential emission model. The architecture is straightforward, leveraging snekmate libraries for standard ERC-20 and ownership functionalities. However, a critical bug was identified in the _emissions calculation (7.2 Code Security), potentially leading to incorrect token minting or system failure. Additionally, the contract uses an outdated Vyper compiler version (7.2 Code Security), which may expose it to known vulnerabilities. Access control (7.3 Access Control) for minting is based on a minter role, which can be irreversibly misconfigured.

Governance4/10Medium risk

The economic model is based on a continuous exponential emission schedule, designed to deplete a fixed reserve over time. The max_mint_rate and reserve are set at deployment, making the core parameters immutable. A critical bug in the emission calculation (7.4 Economic) directly threatens the intended tokenomics. The system relies on a designated minter (e.g., GaugeController) to manage the rate_factor, which dictates the actual emission rate. The irreversible ownerless state combined with the minter setup (7.5 Governance) presents a high risk of bricking the emission mechanism if not configured precisely during deployment.

Upgrades5/10Medium risk

The contract is not designed with upgradeability in mind, meaning its logic is immutable once deployed. This eliminates risks associated with upgrade mechanisms (7.7 Upgrades) but also prevents any future bug fixes or feature enhancements without a full redeployment and migration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Address the critical emission calculation bug immediately, as it directly impacts the core functionality and economic model of the token.

Implement robust deployment procedures to ensure the designated minter is correctly authorized *before* ownership is renounced, preventing the irreversible bricking of the emission mechanism. Consider migrating the contract to a modern, audited Vyper version to benefit from security improvements and reduce the risk of compiler-related vulnerabilities.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeYBToken
NetworkEthereum
Token age9mo
Contract0x0179…45ff
Deployer0xa39e…c80d
Badge for your website
Yield Basis security record badge

Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.

Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202650Medium
  2. Aug 11, 202642Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Related Audits

6 more on the recordAll audits
EthenaENA · Ethereum50MediumEigenCloud (prev. EigenLayer)EIGEN · Ethereum50MediumOlympusOHM · Ethereum50MediumFabric ProtocolROBO · Ethereum50MediumUSDeEthereum50MediumVirtuals ProtocolVIRTUAL · Ethereum51Medium

Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of Yield Basis?

Our AI-powered scanner gives you a deeper, real-time smart contract analysis — free, with every scoring factor shown.

Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page