Quantum Audit Logo

Is USDe Safe?

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page →

USDe USDE
0x4c9e…68b3
Ethereum Not verifiedLast checked 3d ago 1 audit on record
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → High Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The USDe contract implements an ERC20 token with burnable and permit functionalities, utilizing OpenZeppelin's Ownable2Step for ownership management. A key feature is the `minter` role, which is exclusively authorized to mint new tokens. The contract's security is enhanced by using battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries and a Timelock for the owner address. However, the centralized control over token supply via the `minter` and `owner` roles introduces significant economic and governance risks, as the token's stability relies heavily on the integrity of these privileged accounts and associated off-chain processes.

1 High1 Medium1 Low1 Informational
Volume 24h
$99.0K
Liquidity
$34.04M
Price
$0.9999
Token Age
2y
Top 10 Holders
95.0%

Security Findings

1 High1 Med1 Low1 Info
High

Centralized Control over Token Supply

H-01The `minter` address has the exclusive and unlimited ability to mint new USDe tokens. This centralized control (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic) means that the token's supply and value are highly dependent on the security and integrity of the `minter`'s private keys and the underlying off-chain collateralization mechanism. A compromise of the `minter` address would allow an attacker to mint arbitrary amounts of tokens, leading to severe inflation and loss of value.
IssueThe `minter` address has the exclusive and unlimited ability to mint new USDe tokens. This centralized control (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic) means that the token's supply and value are highly dependent on the security and integrity of the `minter`'s private keys and the underlying off-chain collateralization mechanism. A compromise of the `minter` address would allow an attacker to mint arbitrary amounts of tokens, leading to severe inflation and loss of value.
FixImplement robust security measures for the `minter` address, such as a multi-signature wallet with a high threshold, hardware security modules (HSMs), and strict operational controls. Regularly review and audit the processes surrounding the `minter`'s operations and the off-chain collateral management (7.8 Operations).
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Owner's Authority to Change Minter

M-01The contract owner has the authority to change the `minter` address via the `setMinter` function (7.3 Access Control). While the owner is a Timelock (7.8 Operations), this still grants significant control over the token's core functionality. A malicious or compromised owner could assign a new `minter` to an attacker-controlled address, effectively taking over the minting capability.
IssueThe contract owner has the authority to change the `minter` address via the `setMinter` function (7.3 Access Control). While the owner is a Timelock (7.8 Operations), this still grants significant control over the token's core functionality. A malicious or compromised owner could assign a new `minter` to an attacker-controlled address, effectively taking over the minting capability.
FixEnsure the Timelock controlling the owner address has a sufficiently long delay and is managed by a decentralized or highly secure governance process (7.5 Governance). Consider implementing additional checks or a multi-signature requirement for critical owner actions like `setMinter` if the current Timelock setup is deemed insufficient.
StatusUnresolved
Low

Ownership Renunciation Disabled

L-01The `renounceOwnership` function is explicitly overridden to revert, preventing the owner from relinquishing control of the contract (7.3 Access Control). While this prevents accidental renunciation, it also means the owner role can never be permanently removed from the contract, which might be a desired feature for protocols aiming for full decentralization. For a centralized stablecoin, this is likely an intentional design choice to maintain oversight.
IssueThe `renounceOwnership` function is explicitly overridden to revert, preventing the owner from relinquishing control of the contract (7.3 Access Control). While this prevents accidental renunciation, it also means the owner role can never be permanently removed from the contract, which might be a desired feature for protocols aiming for full decentralization. For a centralized stablecoin, this is likely an intentional design choice to maintain oversight.
FixConfirm that preventing ownership renunciation aligns with the long-term decentralization goals of the USDe protocol. If future decentralization is a goal, consider a mechanism to transfer ownership to a zero address or a community-controlled contract, or to enable renunciation, possibly after a significant transition period.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Implied Off-Chain Collateralization

I-01The contract's minting mechanism is permissioned but does not include any on-chain checks or enforcement for collateralization (7.4 Economic, 7.6 External). The stability and value of USDe are implicitly reliant on off-chain reserves and operational procedures managed by the protocol, which are not auditable within the smart contract code. Users must trust the issuer's commitment to maintain the peg through external means.
IssueThe contract's minting mechanism is permissioned but does not include any on-chain checks or enforcement for collateralization (7.4 Economic, 7.6 External). The stability and value of USDe are implicitly reliant on off-chain reserves and operational procedures managed by the protocol, which are not auditable within the smart contract code. Users must trust the issuer's commitment to maintain the peg through external means.
FixClearly communicate the off-chain collateralization strategy, audit reports of reserves, and redemption mechanisms to users. While not a smart contract vulnerability, transparency regarding the external dependencies is crucial for user confidence and understanding of the token's economic model.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow7/10

The USDe contract demonstrates strong technical security (7.2 Code Security) by inheriting from well-audited OpenZeppelin contracts (ERC20, ERC20Burnable, ERC20Permit, Ownable2Step). The code is straightforward, avoiding complex logic that often leads to vulnerabilities. Standard arithmetic operations are protected by `require` statements before `unchecked` blocks, preventing integer overflows/underflows. The architecture (7.1 Architecture) is simple and clear, focusing on a permissioned minting mechanism.

GovernanceHigh3/10

The contract's economic model (7.4 Economic) and governance (7.5 Governance) are highly centralized. The `minter` role has unlimited power to mint tokens, making the token's supply and value entirely dependent on the `minter`'s integrity and off-chain collateralization. The `owner` (7.3 Access Control), which is a Timelock (7.8 Operations), can set the `minter`, thus retaining ultimate control over the minting mechanism. This centralization, while intended for a stablecoin, represents a significant single point of failure if privileged keys are compromised or misused.

UpgradesMedium5/10

The USDe contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades). This means there are no upgrade-related risks such as proxy implementation vulnerabilities or storage collisions. However, it also implies that the contract's logic cannot be modified post-deployment without a full redeployment and migration.

Security Checklist

2/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedFail
No Mint FunctionFail
Liquidity LockedFail
Not a ProxyPass
HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

95.0% in top 10
9.7% in wallets85.3% in contracts
Effective Concentration43.8%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$65.85M across 18 pairs
Curve stblFRAXanalysed$34.04M51.7%Uniswap v4USDT$22.66M34.4%Uniswap v4USDT$2.88M4.4%Uniswap v3USDC$2.30M3.5%Uniswap v4USDC$1.13M1.7%Curve stblUSDT$949.6K1.4%
Show 4 more pairsShow less
Uniswap v3USDT$506.4K0.8%Curve stblUSDC$498.4K0.8%Curve stblcrvUSD$319.1K0.5%Uniswap v4USDT$281.2K0.4%

The 8 remaining pairs hold $284.0K between them and are not listed.

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder59.1%
Top-3 Unlocked88.0%

Key Addresses

11 addresses
Deployer
0x8de5…8fae
Unlocked LP Held By
0x107e…25bc0x5d37…4bac0x4c34…96fc0x5013…208c0x03e0…a09f0xd033…13da0xe256…f01d0xc9d6…657d0xb88e…c9180xdc32…36ad

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

9 factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — Timelock 24h delay
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (95.0% total → 43.8% effective; 9.7% in EOAs, 85.3% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 59.1% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 52% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 88.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 52% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Related Audits

6 more on the record
Ethena (ENA)High RiskEigenCloud (prev. EigenLayer) (EIGEN)High RiskYield Basis (YB)High RiskOlympus (OHM)High RiskFabric Protocol (ROBO)High RiskVirtuals Protocol (VIRTUAL)High Risk

Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of USDe?

Our AI-powered scanner gives you a deeper, real-time smart contract analysis — free, with every scoring factor shown.

Get Detailed Audit