Is WorldMobileToken (WMTX) Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Findings

1 High1 Med1 Info

High

Centralized Control of Critical Roles

H-01The constructor of the WorldMobileToken contract grants the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, `MINTER_ROLE`, and `BURNER_ROLE` to the deployer address (`_msgSender()`). This design centralizes complete control over token supply management (minting up to the cap, burning tokens) and the ability to assign/revoke other roles to a single external owned account (EOA). A compromise of this single EOA's private key would allow an attacker to mint new tokens (up to the cap), burn existing tokens, and arbitrarily reassign roles, leading to significant economic damage and loss of trust. (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations)

IssueThe constructor of the WorldMobileToken contract grants the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, `MINTER_ROLE`, and `BURNER_ROLE` to the deployer address (`_msgSender()`). This design centralizes complete control over token supply management (minting up to the cap, burning tokens) and the ability to assign/revoke other roles to a single external owned account (EOA). A compromise of this single EOA's private key would allow an attacker to mint new tokens (up to the cap), burn existing tokens, and arbitrarily reassign roles, leading to significant economic damage and loss of trust. (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations)

FixTransfer the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` to a multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) immediately after deployment. This will require multiple trusted parties to approve any administrative actions, significantly reducing the risk of a single point of failure or malicious activity. Consider also assigning the `MINTER_ROLE` and `BURNER_ROLE` to separate, controlled addresses or multi-sigs if their operations are distinct.

StatusUnresolved

Medium

Economic Impact of Minting/Burning Authority

M-01The `MINTER_ROLE` and `BURNER_ROLE` provide the capability to dynamically increase or decrease the token supply within the defined cap. While the cap limits the maximum supply, the discretion to mint new tokens or burn existing ones can have a significant impact on the token's economic value and stability if not managed transparently and predictably. Without clear governance policies, the exercise of these powers could lead to unexpected inflation or deflation, potentially harming token holders. (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance)

IssueThe `MINTER_ROLE` and `BURNER_ROLE` provide the capability to dynamically increase or decrease the token supply within the defined cap. While the cap limits the maximum supply, the discretion to mint new tokens or burn existing ones can have a significant impact on the token's economic value and stability if not managed transparently and predictably. Without clear governance policies, the exercise of these powers could lead to unexpected inflation or deflation, potentially harming token holders. (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance)

FixEstablish and publicly communicate a clear policy for when and how minting and burning operations will be conducted. Consider implementing additional governance mechanisms, such as time-locks for large mints/burns or requiring community proposals for significant supply adjustments, to enhance transparency and predictability. This will help mitigate the risk of economic manipulation and build community confidence.

StatusUnresolved

Info

Non-Upgradeable Contract Design

I-01The WorldMobileToken contract is deployed directly without utilizing an upgradeable proxy pattern. This means that the contract's logic is immutable and cannot be modified or updated after deployment. While this eliminates risks associated with upgrade mechanisms (e.g., proxy vulnerabilities, improper upgrade paths), it also means that any future bug fixes, security patches, or feature enhancements would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating all token holders. (7.7 Upgrades, 7.1 Architecture)

IssueThe WorldMobileToken contract is deployed directly without utilizing an upgradeable proxy pattern. This means that the contract's logic is immutable and cannot be modified or updated after deployment. While this eliminates risks associated with upgrade mechanisms (e.g., proxy vulnerabilities, improper upgrade paths), it also means that any future bug fixes, security patches, or feature enhancements would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating all token holders. (7.7 Upgrades, 7.1 Architecture)

FixThis is a design choice. Ensure that the current implementation has undergone thorough testing and auditing to minimize the likelihood of needing future changes. If future flexibility is desired, consider a migration plan to an upgradeable contract in the long term, or accept the immutability as a feature that guarantees unchanging contract behavior.

StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalMedium6/10

The contract demonstrates strong technical foundations by inheriting from battle-tested OpenZeppelin contracts for ERC20, capping, permit functionality, and access control (7.2 Code Security). The override of the `decimals()` function is correctly implemented, ensuring the cap calculation is accurate. No complex custom logic is present, which reduces the attack surface and potential for novel vulnerabilities (7.1 Architecture). The use of Solidity 0.8.19 inherently mitigates common integer overflow/underflow issues.

GovernanceHigh1/10

The token incorporates a fixed supply cap of 2 billion tokens (with 6 decimals), providing predictability for token holders (7.4 Economic). However, the `MINTER_ROLE` and `BURNER_ROLE` grant significant power to adjust the token supply within this cap. Initially, the deployer holds `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`, `MINTER_ROLE`, and `BURNER_ROLE`, centralizing control over these critical economic levers (7.5 Governance). This single point of failure introduces a substantial risk if the controlling address is compromised or misused (7.8 Operations).

UpgradesHigh3/10

The WorldMobileToken contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable implementation (7.7 Upgrades). This design choice eliminates the complexities and potential risks associated with upgrade mechanisms, such as proxy pattern vulnerabilities or improper upgrade paths. While it ensures immutability and predictability, it also means that no future bug fixes or feature enhancements can be implemented without a new contract deployment and token migration.

Security Checklist

2/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership Renounced?

No Mint FunctionFail

Liquidity LockedFail

Not a ProxyPass

HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

71.1% in top 10

27.0% in wallets44.1% in contracts

Effective Concentration44.6%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$409.2K across 4 pairs

Hydrex CLAMMWETHanalysed$397.1K AerodromeWETH$12.0K Uniswap v4USDC$89 Uniswap v3WETH$80

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder50.5%

Top-3 Unlocked97.2%

Key Addresses

5 addresses

Deployer

0xf4e5…c161

Unlocked LP Held By

0x73e5…91ad0xfa2b…52bb0x3662…ba860xf867…b511

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

8 factors

Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
Top-10 concentration > 30% (71.1% total → 44.6% effective; 27.0% in EOAs, 44.1% in contracts — moderate)
Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
LP top1 unlocked holder = 50.5% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 97% of DEX liquidity)
LP top3 unlocked holders = 97.2% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 97% of DEX liquidity)
1 High finding(s) from audit
1 Medium finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Final Recommendation

AI Copilot

To enhance the security posture of the WorldMobileToken, it is strongly recommended to decentralize control over critical administrative roles.…

Read the verdictHide

Specifically, the `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` should be transferred to a robust multi-signature wallet or a well-governed DAO. This will prevent a single point of failure and require multiple approvals for sensitive operations like granting/revoking minter or burner roles. Furthermore, establish and publicly document clear policies and procedures for the exercise of minting and burning capabilities. This transparency will build trust and provide predictability for token holders regarding potential supply adjustments. Consider implementing time-locks or community governance for any significant changes to the token supply.

Contract

TypeWorldMobileToken

Audit History

1 audit on record

Sep 2565

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Not Signed In

Is WorldMobileToken Safe?

Security Findings

Centralized Control of Critical Roles

Economic Impact of Minting/Burning Authority

Non-Upgradeable Contract Design

Category Ratings

Security Checklist

Holder Composition

Liquidity Depth

LP Distribution

Key Addresses

What Raised This Score

Related Audits

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