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Is Vibestarter Safe?

VIBESBase
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The VibesToken contract is a straightforward ERC-20-like implementation.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Top-10 concentration > 20%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 86.2%
  • 3 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Top-10 concentration > 20% (64.2% total → 28.5% effective; 4.7% in EOAs, 59.5% in contracts — mild)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 86.2% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • 3 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 45 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
59.5%Contracts4.7%Wallets35.8%Everyone else
59.5%Contracts4.7%35.8%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
64.2%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking59.5%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell4.7%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply35.8%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads28.5%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$87.4K across 4 pairs
LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$87.4KShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder41.0%
Top-3 Unlocked86.2%
Unlocked LP held by
0x3dd5…599d0x3662…ba860x1e16…81430xcbbb…5835

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

3 Low1 Info
Low

Centralized Initial Supply Distribution

The entire totalSupply is minted to a single _recipient address in the constructor. This centralizes the initial distribution of tokens, potentially creating a single point of control or failure for the token's initial liquidity and ecosystem development. If this recipient's private key is compromised, the entire supply could be at risk.L-01

Issue

The entire totalSupply is minted to a single _recipient address in the constructor. This centralizes the initial distribution of tokens, potentially creating a single point of control or failure for the token's initial liquidity and ecosystem development. If this recipient's private key is compromised, the entire supply could be at risk.

Fix

For enhanced decentralization and security, consider distributing the initial supply across multiple addresses, a multi-signature wallet, or a vesting contract. This reduces the risk associated with a single point of failure.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Lack of Emergency Pause Mechanism

The contract lacks a mechanism to pause transfers or other critical functions in case of an emergency, such as a major vulnerability discovery, market manipulation, or regulatory requirement. This could leave the protocol vulnerable to rapid exploitation without a way to mitigate damage or halt operations temporarily.L-02

Issue

The contract lacks a mechanism to pause transfers or other critical functions in case of an emergency, such as a major vulnerability discovery, market manipulation, or regulatory requirement. This could leave the protocol vulnerable to rapid exploitation without a way to mitigate damage or halt operations temporarily.

Fix

Evaluate the need for an emergency pause mechanism, typically controlled by a trusted entity (e.g., a multi-signature wallet). While adding centralization, it provides a crucial safety net for unforeseen circumstances. If implemented, ensure the pause mechanism has clear conditions for activation and deactivation.

Status

Unresolved

Low

No Token Burn Functionality

The contract does not include a function to burn tokens, meaning tokens cannot be permanently removed from circulation by users or administrators. While not a direct vulnerability, this limits flexibility for managing token supply, such as reducing total supply, implementing deflationary mechanisms, or allowing users to burn tokens for specific purposes.L-03

Issue

The contract does not include a function to burn tokens, meaning tokens cannot be permanently removed from circulation by users or administrators. While not a direct vulnerability, this limits flexibility for managing token supply, such as reducing total supply, implementing deflationary mechanisms, or allowing users to burn tokens for specific purposes.

Fix

Consider adding a burn function, either for users to burn their own tokens or for an authorized entity to burn tokens from specific addresses. This can provide greater flexibility in tokenomics and supply management.

Status

Unresolved

Info

ERC-20 approve Race Condition

The standard ERC-20 approve function is susceptible to a known front-running attack. If a user approves an amount X to a spender and then wishes to change it to Y, an attacker could front-run the transaction changing X to Y by spending the original X amount. This results in the spender having X + Y allowance instead of just Y.I-01

Issue

The standard ERC-20 approve function is susceptible to a known front-running attack. If a user approves an amount X to a spender and then wishes to change it to Y, an attacker could front-run the transaction changing X to Y by spending the original X amount. This results in the spender having X + Y allowance instead of just Y.

Fix

While this is an inherent design flaw of the ERC-20 standard and not an implementation bug, users should be advised to first set the allowance to zero before approving a new, non-zero amount to mitigate this risk. Alternatively, consider using increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance functions (not implemented in this contract) which are less prone to this specific race condition.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The VibesToken contract is a straightforward ERC-20-like implementation. It utilizes Solidity 0.8.20+, benefiting from automatic overflow/underflow checks. The contract features a fixed total supply and no administrative roles, promoting decentralization. Identified issues are primarily informational or low-severity, relating to common ERC-20 considerations and missing optional features rather than critical vulnerabilities.

Technical10/10Low risk

The contract implements a standard ERC-20-like token with robust internal transfer logic (7.1 Architecture). It leverages Solidity 0.8.20+, which provides automatic overflow/underflow checks, enhancing code security (7.2 Code Security). Access control is decentralized, relying on msg.sender for transfers and approvals, with no privileged roles (7.3 Access Control). However, the inherent ERC-20 approve function is susceptible to a known front-running race condition (7.2 Code Security).

Governance4/10Medium risk

The token features a fixed totalSupply set at deployment, preventing inflation or deflation through minting/burning (7.4 Economic). All initial tokens are minted to a single _recipient address, which represents a point of centralization for initial distribution (7.4 Economic). There are no governance mechanisms or administrative roles implemented, making the token fully decentralized in its operation post-deployment (7.5 Governance).

Upgrades6/10Medium risk

The VibesToken contract is implemented as a standard, non-upgradeable contract (7.7 Upgrades). This design choice eliminates risks associated with upgrade mechanisms, such as proxy misconfigurations or logic bugs introduced during upgrades. However, it also means that the contract's logic cannot be modified or patched after deployment, requiring a new deployment for any changes.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is recommended to inform users about the known ERC-20 approve race condition and advise them to set allowances to zero before increasing them.

Consider the long-term implications of a fixed supply and the absence of emergency controls like a pause mechanism. For future token designs, evaluate the need for features like burning or a multi-signature wallet for initial supply distribution to enhance decentralization and flexibility.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeVibesToken
NetworkBase
Token age2mo
Contract0xeffc…1acb
Deployer0x940a…74ec
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202628Low
  2. Aug 31, 202627Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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