The TRX contract is a standard ERC-20 token with meta-transaction capabilities and role-based access control. The architecture is robust and follows established OpenZeppelin patterns, though it contains a centralized minting function and a lack of withdrawal mechanisms for accidentally sent ETH. 7.1 Architecture: Standard ERC-20 with AccessControl. 7.2 Code Security: Clean implementation of standard libraries. 7.3 Access Control: Role-based permissions are correctly implemented. 7.4 Economic: Centralized minting poses dilution risk. 7.5 Governance: Admin roles are centralized. 7.6 External: Meta-transaction support is standard. 7.7 Upgrades: Not applicable (non-proxy). 7.8 Operations: ETH stuck in contract is a minor operational risk.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is TRON Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The TRX contract is a standard ERC-20 token with meta-transaction capabilities and role-based access control.
Read the full analysis- Issuer controls retained
- Code: Locked ETH in Contract
Exact factors
- Issuer controls retained (mint) — counterparty risk on a known issuer, not a rug vector
- Code: Locked ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 28Holders
as of audit · Oct 28, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking2.2%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell0.4%
- Burnedout of circulation93.8%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.4%
- Everyone else24,194 holders3.2%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 28, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 28- Uniswap v2HTX$3.64M81.5%
- Uniswap v2USDCAnalysed$744.9K16.7%
- Uniswap v3USDT$39.7K0.9%
- Uniswap v3WETH$34.7K0.8%
- Uniswap v4ZIK$3.0K0.1%
- Uniswap v2ZIK$3800.0%
Show 2 more pairs
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0xb755…a1cc0xb3ac…68a00x0000…8a90No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumLocked ETH in Contract
The contract supports meta-transactions and may inadvertently receive ETH. There is no function to withdraw these funds, meaning any ETH sent to the contract address will be permanently locked.CD-01
Issue
The contract supports meta-transactions and may inadvertently receive ETH. There is no function to withdraw these funds, meaning any ETH sent to the contract address will be permanently locked.
Fix
Implement a 'withdrawETH' function restricted to an admin role to allow for the recovery of accidentally sent funds.
Status
Unresolved
InfoCentralized Minting Authority
The mint(address,uint256) function allows any address with the PREDICATE_ROLE to create new tokens. This centralizes control over the total supply and allows for the dilution of existing token holders.CP-01
Issue
The mint(address,uint256) function allows any address with the PREDICATE_ROLE to create new tokens. This centralizes control over the total supply and allows for the dilution of existing token holders.
Fix
Restrict the minting authority to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to prevent single-point-of-failure risks.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 96.8% of supply. Of that, 93.8% burned, 0.4% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.4% in wallets, 2.2% in other contracts. 24,204 holders in total. For a verified reference asset the largest holders are custodians, exchanges and bridges; concentration is reported, not scored.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 96.8% of supply. Of that, 93.8% burned, 0.4% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.4% in wallets, 2.2% in other contracts. 24,204 holders in total. For a verified reference asset the largest holders are custodians, exchanges and bridges; concentration is reported, not scored.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoIdentity verified by independent sources
Listed on CoinGecko as Wrapped Tron (WTRX), market cap $1.4B. 24,204 holders. Verified by: CoinGecko.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
Listed on CoinGecko as Wrapped Tron (WTRX), market cap $1.4B. 24,204 holders. Verified by: CoinGecko.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $4.5M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $40.1M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $94K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $4.5M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $40.1M (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $94K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Wrapped or bridged asset
A token representing another asset's units 1:1, backed by a wrapping contract, a custodian or a bridge. Scored as an established reference asset: its identity is verified, so the issuer's or protocol's controls (listed as findings) are real and are priced once as counterparty risk, and LP locks and holder concentration are not scored — its pools belong to market makers and its largest holders are exchanges, bridges and custody. Basis: CoinGecko category: Wrapped-Tokens. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $4.5M of DEX liquidity across 10 pools. Launch: 1244 days of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token representing another asset's units 1:1, backed by a wrapping contract, a custodian or a bridge. Scored as an established reference asset: its identity is verified, so the issuer's or protocol's controls (listed as findings) are real and are priced once as counterparty risk, and LP locks and holder concentration are not scored — its pools belong to market makers and its largest holders are exchanges, bridges and custody. Basis: CoinGecko category: Wrapped-Tokens. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $4.5M of DEX liquidity across 10 pools. Launch: 1244 days of market history.
Fix
The backing is the risk: check who holds the underlying asset and how redemption works.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 28The contract utilizes well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC-20 and AccessControl. The code is modular and follows standard patterns for meta-transactions. No reentrancy or overflow issues were identified in the core transfer logic.
The protocol relies on a centralized PREDICATE_ROLE for minting, which allows for supply inflation. Governance is currently limited to role-based administration without time-locks. Users should be aware that the supply is not fixed.
The contract is not a proxy and does not support upgrades. The logic is immutable once deployed. This eliminates risks associated with malicious implementation updates.
The protocol should consider implementing a multi-signature wallet or a DAO-based governance structure for the PREDICATE_ROLE to mitigate the risk of unauthorized minting.
Additionally, adding a function to withdraw accidentally sent ETH would improve the contract's operational safety. Users should monitor the total supply of the token, as the minting capability allows for potential dilution of existing holdings. No immediate critical vulnerabilities were found in the current implementation.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 28, 202622Low
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the TRX contract address?
The TRON (TRX) contract on Ethereum is 0x50327c6c5a14dcade707abad2e27eb517df87ab5. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is TRON a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for TRON is 22/100 (Low risk) as of Oct 28, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is TRX liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Oct 28, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $4.46M.
Who holds TRX?
As of Oct 28, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 96.8% of the supply across 24,204 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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