The TRX contract is a standard ERC-20 implementation with meta-transaction support and role-based access control. The architecture is robust for standard token operations, but the presence of an unrestricted minting capability and trapped ETH in the meta-transaction handler presents moderate risks to token holders.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is TRON Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The TRX contract is a standard ERC-20 implementation with meta-transaction support and role-based access control.
Read the full analysis- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity not locked
- Code: Trapped ETH in Contract
Exact factors
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool; this pool is 7% of DEX liquidity) — who holds it cannot be verified
- Code: Trapped ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 30Holders
as of audit · Oct 30, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking2.7%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell2.9%
- Burnedout of circulation85.1%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.1%
- Everyone else109,319 holders9.2%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 30, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 30- Pancakeswap v2HTX$3.84M83.2%
- Pancakeswap v2USDTAnalysed$304.0K6.6%
- Pancakeswap v3WBNB$267.9K5.8%
- Uniswap比特币$56.5K1.2%
- Pancakeswap v3USDT$50.7K1.1%
- Pancakeswap v3WBNB$46.0K1.0%
Show 4 more pairs
The 20 remaining pairs hold $13.1K between them and are not listed. The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0xb81d…185c0x7557…f7ab0xbf6d…16010x3a70…02fa0xde10…21a90xe07b…3e1e0x2be2…0afa0x7ae4…6ee30x2ace…c77a0x1f97…20acSecurity Findings
MediumTrapped ETH in Contract
The contract includes meta-transaction functionality which may lead users to send ETH to the contract address. There is no mechanism to withdraw these funds, resulting in permanent loss of any ETH sent to the contract.CD-01
Issue
The contract includes meta-transaction functionality which may lead users to send ETH to the contract address. There is no mechanism to withdraw these funds, resulting in permanent loss of any ETH sent to the contract.
Fix
Add a function to allow the contract owner to withdraw any accidentally sent ETH or native tokens from the contract balance.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The mint(address,uint256) function allows any address with the PREDICATE_ROLE to create new tokens at will. This can lead to significant supply inflation and dilution of existing token holder value if the role is compromised or misused.CP-01
Issue
The mint(address,uint256) function allows any address with the PREDICATE_ROLE to create new tokens at will. This can lead to significant supply inflation and dilution of existing token holder value if the role is compromised or misused.
Fix
Restrict the minting capability to a multi-signature wallet or a governance contract with a timelock to ensure transparency and prevent unilateral supply changes.
Status
Unresolved
MediumLiquidity not locked
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.5% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0xb81d…185c — holds 68.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them. This assessment covers the main pool, which holds 7% of the token's DEX liquidity; the other pools were not assessed.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.5% is held, unlocked, by 10 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a contract, 0xb81d…185c — holds 68.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them. This assessment covers the main pool, which holds 7% of the token's DEX liquidity; the other pools were not assessed.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 90.8% of supply. Of that, 85.1% burned, 0.1% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 2.9% in wallets, 2.7% in other contracts. 109,329 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 90.8% of supply. Of that, 85.1% burned, 0.1% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 2.9% in wallets, 2.7% in other contracts. 109,329 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoIdentity verified by independent sources
Listed on CoinGecko as TRON (BSC) (TRX). Traded on Binance. 109,329 holders. Verified by: exchange listings.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
Listed on CoinGecko as TRON (BSC) (TRX). Traded on Binance. 109,329 holders. Verified by: exchange listings.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $4.6M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $189K (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $1.3M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $4.6M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $189K (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $1.3M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $4.6M of DEX liquidity across 30 pools. Launch: 1655 days of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $4.6M of DEX liquidity across 30 pools. Launch: 1655 days of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 30The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC-20 and AccessControl, ensuring 7.1 Architecture and 7.2 Code Security standards are met. 7.3 Access Control is correctly implemented via roles, though 7.6 External interactions via meta-transactions lack a withdrawal mechanism for trapped funds. 7.8 Operations are stable, but the lack of a sweep function for ETH is a minor operational oversight.
7.4 Economic risks are present due to the minting function, which allows for supply inflation. 7.5 Governance is centralized under the PREDICATE_ROLE, which can unilaterally alter the token supply. This centralization is typical for bridge-minted tokens but requires high trust in the operator.
7.7 Upgrades are not applicable as the contract is not a proxy. The logic is immutable, providing certainty to users regarding the token's behavior. No upgrade path exists, which eliminates risks associated with malicious logic changes.
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to the owner to recover any ETH accidentally sent to the contract.
Additionally, consider implementing a timelock or a multi-signature wallet for the PREDICATE_ROLE to mitigate the risk of unauthorized or excessive token minting.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 30, 202632Low
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of TRON?
Our AI-powered scanner gives you a deeper, real-time smart contract analysis — free, with every scoring factor shown.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Add your links and get it Verified