Quantum Audit Logo
Launch App

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is The Innovation Game Safe?

TIGBase
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical7/10Governance4/10Upgrades4/10Checks passed2 of 5Findings1 High · 1 Medium · 1 Low · 1 Info4
SummaryAI Copilot

The TIGToken contract is a standard ERC20 token with burnable and owner-mintable features, built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — Multisig
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 20%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — Multisig (2-of-3)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 20% (64.0% total → 27.7% effective; 3.6% in EOAs, 60.4% in contracts — mild)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 60% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 60% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 42 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
60.4%Contracts3.6%36.0%Everyone else
60.4%Contracts36.0%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
64.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking60.4%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell3.6%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply36.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads27.7%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.14M across 4 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$683.3KShare of depth60.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0x7a14…17950xe7f2…270a0x73e3…93d50xae8a…d7bd

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium1 Low1 Info
High

Centralized Minting Authority

The mint function is restricted to the contract owner, allowing them to create an arbitrary amount of new tokens. This introduces a significant centralization risk and potential for supply inflation, impacting token value and trust. If the owner's intent is to maintain a controlled supply, this mechanism grants them unilateral power.H-01

Issue

The mint function is restricted to the contract owner, allowing them to create an arbitrary amount of new tokens. This introduces a significant centralization risk and potential for supply inflation, impacting token value and trust. If the owner's intent is to maintain a controlled supply, this mechanism grants them unilateral power.

Fix

Clearly communicate the minting policy and the role of the owner in the token's documentation. For future iterations, consider implementing a hard cap on the total supply or transitioning minting authority to a decentralized governance mechanism or a timelock contract.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Owner Key Compromise Risk

Critical functions such as mint and transferOwnership are controlled by a single owner address. While the pre-filled data indicates the owner is a multisig, a compromise of this multisig's keys (e.g., a majority of signers) would grant an attacker full control over token supply and ownership, leading to severe economic damage.M-01

Issue

Critical functions such as mint and transferOwnership are controlled by a single owner address. While the pre-filled data indicates the owner is a multisig, a compromise of this multisig's keys (e.g., a majority of signers) would grant an attacker full control over token supply and ownership, leading to severe economic damage.

Fix

Ensure the multisig setup for the owner address follows best practices, including strong key management, geographically distributed signers, and robust operational security procedures. Regularly review and update multisig signers as needed.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Lack of Programmatic Supply Cap

The token contract does not implement a hard cap on the total supply. While the mint function is owner-controlled, the absence of a programmatic limit means the owner can continuously mint tokens without a protocol-enforced upper bound. This is a design choice but should be transparent to token holders.L-01

Issue

The token contract does not implement a hard cap on the total supply. While the mint function is owner-controlled, the absence of a programmatic limit means the owner can continuously mint tokens without a protocol-enforced upper bound. This is a design choice but should be transparent to token holders.

Fix

If a fixed supply is desired, implement a maxSupply variable and enforce it within the _mint function. If an uncapped supply is intentional, ensure this is clearly communicated in all project documentation to manage community expectations.

Status

Unresolved

Info

No Pause/Emergency Stop Mechanism

The contract lacks a mechanism to pause critical operations (e.g., transfers, minting) in case of an emergency, such as a detected vulnerability or a major market disruption. While not strictly necessary for a simple ERC20, it's a common security feature in more complex systems to mitigate unforeseen risks.I-01

Issue

The contract lacks a mechanism to pause critical operations (e.g., transfers, minting) in case of an emergency, such as a detected vulnerability or a major market disruption. While not strictly necessary for a simple ERC20, it's a common security feature in more complex systems to mitigate unforeseen risks.

Fix

Consider adding a Pausable mechanism (e.g., from OpenZeppelin) to allow the owner to temporarily halt operations in an emergency. This should be paired with clear documentation on the conditions under which pausing would occur and how it would be unpaused.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The TIGToken contract is a standard ERC20 token with burnable and owner-mintable features, built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries. The technical implementation is robust, showing no critical code-level vulnerabilities. However, the centralized control over token minting by the contract owner introduces significant economic and governance risks, as the owner can arbitrarily increase the token supply. The owner being a multisig (as per pre-filled data) provides some operational mitigation against a single point of failure.

Technical7/10Low risk

The contract leverages battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20, ERC20Burnable, and Ownable functionalities, ensuring a robust and standard implementation (7.2 Code Security). Standard ERC20 operations like transfer and approve are correctly implemented, including checks for zero addresses and sufficient balances. The use of unchecked blocks for subtractions is safe due to preceding require statements, preventing underflow vulnerabilities.

Governance4/10Medium risk

The primary economic and governance risk stems from the onlyOwner controlled mint function, allowing the owner to arbitrarily increase the token supply (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance). This centralization grants significant power to the owner, potentially impacting token value. The pre-filled information indicates the owner is a multisig, which partially mitigates the single point of failure for the owner address (7.8 Operations).

Upgrades4/10Medium risk

The contract is not designed with an upgradeability pattern (e.g., proxy contracts), meaning its logic cannot be modified post-deployment (7.7 Upgrades). This eliminates risks associated with upgrade mechanisms, such as proxy misconfigurations or malicious upgrade paths. Any future changes would require a new deployment and migration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is crucial to ensure the security of the owner's private keys or multisig setup, as the owner has significant control over the token supply.

Consider implementing a timelock for critical owner actions like mint to provide a window for community review and reaction. For long-term decentralization, explore mechanisms to cap the total supply or transition minting authority to a decentralized governance model.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeTIGToken
NetworkBase
Token age1y
Contract0x0c03…9f7b
Deployer0xc30e…79be
Badge for your website
The Innovation Game security record badge

Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.

Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202648Medium
  2. Aug 11, 202650Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the TIG contract address?

The The Innovation Game (TIG) contract on Base is 0x0c03ce270b4826ec62e7dd007f0b716068639f7b. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.

Is The Innovation Game a scam?

Quantum Audit's risk score for The Innovation Game is 48/100 (Medium risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Retained; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.

Is TIG liquidity locked?

Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $1.14M.

Who holds TIG?

As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 64.0% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.

Related Audits

6 more on the recordAll audits
Coinbase Wrapped Staked ETHCBETH · Base48MediumBasemateBase48MediumCAPACITRBase48MediumKAITOBase48MediumiPodBase48MediumA Society For AI Agents1F916 · Base48Medium

Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of The Innovation Game?

Our AI-powered scanner gives you a deeper, real-time smart contract analysis — free, with every scoring factor shown.

Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page