Is KAITO Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Findings

1 Med1 Low1 Info

Medium

Centralized Initial Token Distribution

M-01The contract's constructor mints the entire `TOTALSUPPLY` (1 billion tokens) to a predefined list of `wallets` and `amounts`. This design choice results in a highly centralized initial distribution, concentrating significant control over the token supply in the hands of a few addresses. This could lead to market manipulation or governance issues if the token were to be used in a decentralized governance system (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance).

IssueThe contract's constructor mints the entire `TOTALSUPPLY` (1 billion tokens) to a predefined list of `wallets` and `amounts`. This design choice results in a highly centralized initial distribution, concentrating significant control over the token supply in the hands of a few addresses. This could lead to market manipulation or governance issues if the token were to be used in a decentralized governance system (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance).

FixWhile this is a design choice, it is crucial to acknowledge and communicate the implications of such a centralized initial distribution. Consider implementing a vesting schedule or a more decentralized distribution mechanism for future token projects to mitigate concentration risk. Ensure transparency regarding the ownership and purpose of the initial recipient wallets.

StatusUnresolved

Low

Absence of Emergency Administrative Controls

L-01The `Kaito` token contract does not implement any administrative functions such as `pause` or `blacklist` (7.3 Access Control). While this design promotes decentralization and immutability, it also means that in the event of a critical vulnerability in an integrated DeFi protocol or a major security incident, there is no mechanism to halt token transfers or freeze malicious accounts. This lack of emergency response capability could exacerbate losses in unforeseen circumstances (7.8 Operations).

IssueThe `Kaito` token contract does not implement any administrative functions such as `pause` or `blacklist` (7.3 Access Control). While this design promotes decentralization and immutability, it also means that in the event of a critical vulnerability in an integrated DeFi protocol or a major security incident, there is no mechanism to halt token transfers or freeze malicious accounts. This lack of emergency response capability could exacerbate losses in unforeseen circumstances (7.8 Operations).

FixAssess the project's risk tolerance and operational needs. If the ability to react to emergencies is deemed critical, consider adding a `Pausable` mechanism (e.g., from OpenZeppelin) controlled by a multi-signature wallet. If decentralization is paramount, ensure all users are aware of the immutable nature and lack of intervention capabilities.

StatusUnresolved

Info

Fixed Total Supply

I-01The `TOTALSUPPLY` is defined as a `constant` and all tokens are minted exclusively during the contract's deployment. There is no function to mint additional tokens after the initial distribution. This design ensures a fixed and immutable total supply of 1 billion tokens (1e9 ether), preventing any future inflation through additional minting (7.4 Economic).

IssueThe `TOTALSUPPLY` is defined as a `constant` and all tokens are minted exclusively during the contract's deployment. There is no function to mint additional tokens after the initial distribution. This design ensures a fixed and immutable total supply of 1 billion tokens (1e9 ether), preventing any future inflation through additional minting (7.4 Economic).

FixThis is a deliberate design choice that should be clearly communicated to all token holders and potential investors. Ensure that all project documentation, whitepapers, and public communications explicitly state that the token supply is fixed and cannot be increased.

StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow8/10

The Kaito contract (7.1 Architecture) is a straightforward ERC20 token, inheriting robust and audited functionalities from OpenZeppelin's ERC20 and ERC20Permit libraries. The code (7.2 Code Security) is minimal, primarily extending standard token behavior with a constructor for initial distribution and a basic burn function. No complex logic or external interactions beyond standard token transfers are present, mitigating common technical vulnerabilities like reentrancy or integer overflows, which are handled by OpenZeppelin's battle-tested implementations.

GovernanceHigh1/10

The contract's economic model (7.4 Economic) establishes a fixed total supply of 1 billion tokens, all minted during deployment. A key design choice is the initial distribution (7.5 Governance), where the entire supply is allocated to a predefined list of wallets. This creates a high degree of centralization at launch, potentially allowing initial holders to exert significant influence. The absence of administrative controls (7.3 Access Control) like pausing or blacklisting means the token is immutable and decentralized in operation, but lacks emergency response capabilities.

UpgradesMedium6/10

The Kaito token contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades). It is a standard, immutable contract deployed directly to the blockchain. This design choice eliminates upgrade-related risks such as proxy implementation vulnerabilities or administrative key compromise for upgrades, ensuring the contract's logic remains fixed post-deployment.

Security Checklist

3/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership Renounced?

No Mint FunctionPass

Liquidity LockedFail

Not a ProxyPass

HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

86.7% in top 10

78.1% in wallets8.6% in contracts

Effective Concentration81.6%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$46.3K across 13 pairs

AerodromeMAMOanalysed$11.9K AerodromeWETH$10.7K Uniswap v3WETH$9.4K Uniswap v3WETH$8.7K PancakeswapUSDC$3.8K Uniswap v4USDC$1.2K

Show 4 more pairsShow less

DeltaswapWETH$213 PancakeswapWETH$166 Hydrex CLAMMWETH$161 SushiswapmooBIFI$97

The 3 remaining pairs hold $25 between them and are not listed.

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder66.8%

Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Key Addresses

4 addresses

Deployer

0xfd0d…a5f6

Unlocked LP Held By

0xb333…1bd00xfe72…626b0x4d06…703c

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

8 factors

Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
Top-10 concentration > 70% (86.7% total → 81.6% effective; 78.1% in EOAs, 8.6% in contracts — extreme)
Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
Liquidity < $50k ($46,350 across 13 pairs — thin market)
LP top1 unlocked holder = 66.8% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 26% of DEX liquidity)
LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 26% of DEX liquidity)
1 Medium finding(s) from audit
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Is KAITO Safe?

Security Findings

Centralized Initial Token Distribution

Absence of Emergency Administrative Controls

Fixed Total Supply

Category Ratings

Security Checklist

Holder Composition

Liquidity Depth

LP Distribution

Key Addresses

What Raised This Score

Related Audits

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