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Is Tether Safe?

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Tether USDT
0xdac1…1ec7
Ethereum
VerifiedContinuously re-verified. The owner opted in to deep verification and ongoing security monitoring, so the on-chain facts behind this score are re-checked and the record is kept current.
Live monitored 1 audit on record
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The TetherToken contract is an ERC-20 compatible token with significant centralized control. The owner has extensive privileges, including the ability to mint new tokens, burn existing tokens from any address, pause transfers, blacklist individual users, and redirect token logic to a new contract. Additionally, the contract's ERC-20 `transfer`, `transferFrom`, and `approve` functions do not return boolean values as per the standard, which may cause compatibility issues.

1 Low11 Informational
Volume 24h
$113.7800
Liquidity
$1.2K
Price
$0.9991
Token Age
5y
Top 10 Holders
49.9%

Security Findings

Low

Token transfer functions do not return values as expected by the ERC-20 standard.

CE-01The `transfer`, `transferFrom`, and `approve` functions in this contract do not return a boolean value, which is required by the ERC-20 standard. While the functions may still work, this non-compliance can cause issues with some wallets, exchanges, or DeFi protocols that expect a return value.
IssueThe `transfer`, `transferFrom`, and `approve` functions in this contract do not return a boolean value, which is required by the ERC-20 standard. While the functions may still work, this non-compliance can cause issues with some wallets, exchanges, or DeFi protocols that expect a return value.
FixUsers and integrators should be aware of this non-standard behavior and use safe interaction patterns or wrappers when interacting with these functions to avoid potential compatibility problems.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Owner can create new tokens, diluting existing holders.

CP-01The contract owner can call the `issue(uint256)` function to create new tokens and add them to the owner's balance. This increases the total supply of tokens, which can dilute the value of tokens held by other users.
IssueThe contract owner can call the `issue(uint256)` function to create new tokens and add them to the owner's balance. This increases the total supply of tokens, which can dilute the value of tokens held by other users.
FixToken holders should be aware that the supply of tokens is not fixed and can be increased by the owner at any time.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Owner can burn tokens from any blacklisted address.

CP-02The contract owner can call the `destroyBlackFunds(address)` function, which allows them to remove tokens from any address that has been added to the blacklist. This means the owner can effectively seize and burn tokens belonging to specific users.
IssueThe contract owner can call the `destroyBlackFunds(address)` function, which allows them to remove tokens from any address that has been added to the blacklist. This means the owner can effectively seize and burn tokens belonging to specific users.
FixToken holders should understand that their tokens can be permanently removed from their address if the owner blacklists them and uses this function.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Owner can redirect all token transfers to a new contract.

CP-03The contract owner can call the `deprecate(address)` function to set a new `upgradedAddress`. Once deprecated, all future `transfer` and `transferFrom` operations will be redirected to this new contract, meaning the owner can unilaterally change the underlying logic and destination of token movements.
IssueThe contract owner can call the `deprecate(address)` function to set a new `upgradedAddress`. Once deprecated, all future `transfer` and `transferFrom` operations will be redirected to this new contract, meaning the owner can unilaterally change the underlying logic and destination of token movements.
FixToken holders should be aware that the owner has the power to migrate the token's functionality to an entirely different contract, which could alter how transfers work or introduce new rules.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Owner can stop all token transfers.

CP-04The contract owner can call the `pause()` function to temporarily halt all token transfers. While paused, no one, including the owner, can move tokens. The owner can later call `unpause()` to resume transfers.
IssueThe contract owner can call the `pause()` function to temporarily halt all token transfers. While paused, no one, including the owner, can move tokens. The owner can later call `unpause()` to resume transfers.
FixToken holders should know that the owner can prevent them from moving or selling their tokens at any time, which could impact liquidity and access to funds.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Owner can prevent specific users from transferring tokens.

CP-06The contract owner can use the `addBlackList(address)` function to prevent specific addresses from performing transfers. Conversely, `removeBlackList(address)` can unblock them. This allows the owner to selectively freeze or unfreeze individual user accounts.
IssueThe contract owner can use the `addBlackList(address)` function to prevent specific addresses from performing transfers. Conversely, `removeBlackList(address)` can unblock them. This allows the owner to selectively freeze or unfreeze individual user accounts.
FixToken holders should be aware that the owner has the power to block their address, preventing them from moving or selling their tokens.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Owner can change fees applied to token transfers.

CP-07The contract owner can call the `setParams(uint256,uint256)` function to adjust the `basisPointsRate` (percentage fee) and `maximumFee` applied to token transfers. This means the owner can unilaterally increase or decrease the cost of transacting with the token.
IssueThe contract owner can call the `setParams(uint256,uint256)` function to adjust the `basisPointsRate` (percentage fee) and `maximumFee` applied to token transfers. This means the owner can unilaterally increase or decrease the cost of transacting with the token.
FixToken holders should understand that the fees associated with transferring tokens are subject to change by the owner.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Who holds the supply

QA-HOLDERSThe ten largest holders own 49.9% of supply. What remains: 43.9% in wallets, 6.0% in other contracts. 15,588,396 holders in total. For a verified reference asset the largest holders are custodians, exchanges and bridges; concentration is reported, not scored.
IssueThe ten largest holders own 49.9% of supply. What remains: 43.9% in wallets, 6.0% in other contracts. 15,588,396 holders in total. For a verified reference asset the largest holders are custodians, exchanges and bridges; concentration is reported, not scored.
FixWatch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

Identity verified by independent sources

QA-IDENTITYListed on CoinGecko as Tether (USDT), market cap $184.1B, rank #3. On GoPlus's list of trusted tokens. Traded on Binance, Coinbase. 15,588,396 holders. Verified by: CoinGecko, GoPlus, exchange listings.
IssueListed on CoinGecko as Tether (USDT), market cap $184.1B, rank #3. On GoPlus's list of trusted tokens. Traded on Binance, Coinbase. 15,588,396 holders. Verified by: CoinGecko, GoPlus, exchange listings.
FixMatch the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

The market for this token

QA-MARKETLiquidity $66.0M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $79.9B (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $117.3M (DexScreener, all pools).
IssueLiquidity $66.0M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $79.9B (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $117.3M (DexScreener, all pools).
FixSize any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

Asset class: Stablecoin — issuer-backed (fiat reserves)

QA-PROFILEA token designed to hold a fixed value (usually $1). Its safety rests on what backs it and on who can mint, freeze or pause it. Scored as an established reference asset: its identity is verified, so the issuer's or protocol's controls (listed as findings) are real and are priced once as counterparty risk, and LP locks and holder concentration are not scored — its pools belong to market makers and its largest holders are exchanges, bridges and custody. Basis: CoinGecko category: Fiat-backed Stablecoin. Tokenomics — Supply: issued and redeemed by the issuer against its backing. Control: a contract. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $66.0M of DEX liquidity across 30 pools. Launch: 1962 days of market history.
IssueA token designed to hold a fixed value (usually $1). Its safety rests on what backs it and on who can mint, freeze or pause it. Scored as an established reference asset: its identity is verified, so the issuer's or protocol's controls (listed as findings) are real and are priced once as counterparty risk, and LP locks and holder concentration are not scored — its pools belong to market makers and its largest holders are exchanges, bridges and custody. Basis: CoinGecko category: Fiat-backed Stablecoin. Tokenomics — Supply: issued and redeemed by the issuer against its backing. Control: a contract. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $66.0M of DEX liquidity across 30 pools. Launch: 1962 days of market history.
FixCheck what backs the peg and who controls supply: reserve attestations for an issuer-backed coin, collateral and governance for a protocol coin.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

A test sale went through

QA-TRADEWe bought 0.01 ETH worth of the token through Uniswap V2 and sold it straight back, inside a simulation of the current block — nothing was signed or sent. Buy tax measured: 0%. Sell tax measured: 0%.
IssueWe bought 0.01 ETH worth of the token through Uniswap V2 and sold it straight back, inside a simulation of the current block — nothing was signed or sent. Buy tax measured: 0%. Sell tax measured: 0%.
FixThis is the state at the time of the audit; an owner who can change taxes or pause trading can change it later.
StatusAcknowledged

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow10/10

The TetherToken contract implements a highly centralized architecture where a single owner address holds extensive control over critical token functionalities (7.1 Architecture, 7.3 Access Control). This includes the ability to `addBlackList` or `removeBlackList` addresses, effectively freezing or unfreezing their funds, and to `pause` or `unpause` all token transfers. A significant security concern (7.2 Code Security) is the `destroyBlackFunds` function, which allows the owner to burn tokens from any blacklisted address, directly manipulating user balances. Furthermore, the `transfer`, `transferFrom`, and `approve` functions do not adhere to the ERC-20 standard by omitting return values, potentially leading to integration issues.

GovernanceLow9/10

The economic model of the TetherToken is entirely controlled by the owner (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance). The owner can `issue` new tokens, increasing the total supply and diluting existing holders, or `redeem` tokens, decreasing supply. The `setParams` function allows the owner to unilaterally change the `basisPointsRate` and `maximumFee` for transfers, directly impacting transaction costs for users. The ability to `destroyBlackFunds` from any blacklisted address represents a direct economic risk to individual token holders, as their assets can be seized and burned by the owner.

UpgradesLow10/10

The contract includes a `deprecate` function (7.7 Upgrades), which allows the owner to redirect all future `transfer` and `transferFrom` calls to an `upgradedAddress`. This mechanism provides a way to migrate token functionality to a new contract, effectively acting as an upgrade or migration path. While offering flexibility, this also means the owner can unilaterally change the underlying logic of token transfers to an entirely new contract.

Security Checklist

Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedFail
No Mint FunctionFail
Liquidity LockedFail
Not a ProxyPass
HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

43.9% in wallets6.0% in contracts
Effective Concentration46.3%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

Show 4 more pairsShow less

The 20 remaining pairs hold $3.34M between them and are not listed.

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

Key Addresses

Deployer
0x3692…7d57

What Raised This Score

  • Issuer controls retained (admin key, mint, seize balances, freeze, pause) — counterparty risk on a known issuer, not a rug vector
  • Code: Token transfer functions do not return values as expected by the ERC-20 standard. (Low, static analysis)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

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