The LaunchToken contract is a standard ERC-20 implementation based on OpenZeppelin contracts. The code is simple, well-structured, and adheres to best practices for token contracts. Key design choices include a fixed total supply minted at deployment and no administrative control or upgradeability. The primary risks identified are related to design choices regarding centralized initial supply distribution and lack of administrative flexibility.

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Stockereum.fun a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The LaunchToken contract is a standard ERC-20 implementation based on OpenZeppelin contracts.
Read the full analysis- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 55.9%
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 95.7%
- Token age < 7 days
- 2 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 55.9% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 74% of DEX liquidity)
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 95.7% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 74% of DEX liquidity)
- Token age < 7 days (early, volatile)
- 2 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 6Holders
as of audit · Sep 6, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking14.4%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell12.6%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply73.0%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 6, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 6- Uniswap v4WETHAnalysed$110.1K74.5%
- Uniswap v4USDC$28.4K19.2%
- Uniswap v4USDC$4.3K2.9%
- Uniswap v2WETH$1.1K0.7%
- Uniswap v4USDC$1.1K0.7%
- Uniswap v4USDC$8370.6%
Show 4 more pairs
The 2 remaining pairs hold $55 between them and are not listed. The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x996d…ad770x7118…ce180x576c…0fa10xc7f8…67150xd7b0…db830x57d6…0accNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
LowLack of Administrative Control
The LaunchToken contract lacks any administrative functions or roles (e.g., owner, roles, pause, upgradeability). While this simplifies the contract and reduces attack surface, it means there is no mechanism to address potential future issues such as critical bugs, emergency pausing of transfers, or token migration without deploying an entirely new token. This design choice limits the project's flexibility and emergency response capabilities (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations).L-01
Issue
The LaunchToken contract lacks any administrative functions or roles (e.g., owner, roles, pause, upgradeability). While this simplifies the contract and reduces attack surface, it means there is no mechanism to address potential future issues such as critical bugs, emergency pausing of transfers, or token migration without deploying an entirely new token. This design choice limits the project's flexibility and emergency response capabilities (7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations).
Fix
Consider implementing a minimal set of administrative controls, such as an Ownable pattern, to allow for emergency pausing of transfers or a controlled burn function if future needs are anticipated. If the intention is for a fully immutable token, ensure this design choice aligns with the project's long-term strategy and risk tolerance.
Status
Unresolved
LowCentralized Initial Supply Distribution
The entire TOTAL_SUPPLY of 1 billion tokens is minted to a single recipient address during the contract's construction. This centralizes control of the initial token supply, making the project highly dependent on the security and integrity of that single address. Any compromise of this address would lead to the loss or unauthorized distribution of all tokens (7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).L-02
Issue
The entire TOTAL_SUPPLY of 1 billion tokens is minted to a single recipient address during the contract's construction. This centralizes control of the initial token supply, making the project highly dependent on the security and integrity of that single address. Any compromise of this address would lead to the loss or unauthorized distribution of all tokens (7.4 Economic, 7.8 Operations).
Fix
To mitigate the risk associated with a single point of failure, consider distributing the initial supply across multiple addresses or a multi-signature wallet. This enhances security by requiring multiple approvals for token movements, reducing the impact of a single private key compromise.
Status
Unresolved
InfoImmutability of metadataUri
The metadataUri variable is set in the constructor and has no setter function, making it immutable after deployment. While this provides certainty and prevents unauthorized changes, it also means the token's metadata URI cannot be updated if the URI becomes invalid, needs to be changed for branding, legal, or technical reasons (e.g., IPFS hash update) (7.1 Architecture).I-01
metadataUriIssue
The metadataUri variable is set in the constructor and has no setter function, making it immutable after deployment. While this provides certainty and prevents unauthorized changes, it also means the token's metadata URI cannot be updated if the URI becomes invalid, needs to be changed for branding, legal, or technical reasons (e.g., IPFS hash update) (7.1 Architecture).
Fix
If there's a potential future need to update the metadata URI, consider adding an owner-restricted function to modify this variable. If immutability is the desired design, ensure the initial URI is robust and points to a highly available and permanent storage solution.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 6The technical implementation of the LaunchToken contract is robust, leveraging battle-tested OpenZeppelin ERC-20 libraries (7.2 Code Security). The contract adheres to the ERC-20 standard, ensuring compatibility with the broader EVM ecosystem. No reentrancy, integer overflow/underflow, or other critical code-level vulnerabilities were identified. The use of Solidity 0.8.26 and OpenZeppelin's unchecked blocks for arithmetic operations is appropriate for gas efficiency and safety.
The economic model features a fixed total supply of 1 billion tokens, all minted to a single recipient during deployment (7.4 Economic). This design choice centralizes initial token distribution, posing a risk if the recipient address is compromised (7.8 Operations). The contract lacks any on-chain governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance) or administrative controls, which limits flexibility for future adjustments or emergency responses.
The LaunchToken contract is implemented as a standard, non-upgradeable ERC-20 token (7.7 Upgrades). This design choice eliminates upgrade-related risks such as proxy implementation bugs or administrative key compromises for upgrades. However, it also means the contract's logic cannot be modified post-deployment, requiring a new deployment for any future changes.
For projects aiming for long-term sustainability and adaptability, consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for the initial token recipient to mitigate the risk of centralized control.
Evaluate the need for basic administrative functions, such as a pausable mechanism or a controlled burn function, to provide emergency response capabilities. Ensure comprehensive testing of all deployment parameters, especially the recipient address, prior to mainnet launch.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 6, 202626Low
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the STOCKER contract address?
The Stockereum.fun (STOCKER) contract on Ethereum is 0x75e2fc69ff2ac12af65ba7d321bbf4f878c535d2. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Stockereum.fun a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Stockereum.fun is 26/100 (Low risk) as of Sep 6, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is STOCKER liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Sep 6, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $147.8K.
Who holds STOCKER?
As of Sep 6, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 27.0% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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