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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Smart Solve Token Safe?

SSTBNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Low RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical8/10Governance8/10Upgrades9/10Checks passed5 of 5Findings1 Critical · 2 Low · 3 Info6
SummaryAI Copilot

The provided source code for the SmartSolveToken contract is incomplete, significantly hindering a comprehensive security assessment.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (99.9% total → 40.0% effective; 0.0% in EOAs, 99.9% in contracts — moderate)
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 45 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
99.9%Contracts
99.9%Contracts
ContractsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
99.9%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking99.9%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply0.1%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads40.0%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.34M

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$1.34MShare of depth100.0%
LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address

Security Findings

1 Critical2 Low3 Info
Critical

Incomplete Source Code Provided

The provided Solidity source code for the SmartSolveToken contract is truncated, specifically at the constructor declaration and potentially other custom functions. This prevents a complete and accurate security assessment of the contract's unique logic, initialization, and any custom tokenomics or external interactions. Critical vulnerabilities could exist in the missing code that cannot be identified or verified.C-01

Issue

The provided Solidity source code for the SmartSolveToken contract is truncated, specifically at the constructor declaration and potentially other custom functions. This prevents a complete and accurate security assessment of the contract's unique logic, initialization, and any custom tokenomics or external interactions. Critical vulnerabilities could exist in the missing code that cannot be identified or verified.

Fix

Provide the complete and deployable source code for the SmartSolveToken contract, including all custom functions, constructor logic, and any other relevant contract files. A full audit cannot be performed without this information.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Centralized Control by Owner

The contract inherits Ownable, granting a single address (the owner) exclusive control over critical functions, such as renounceOwnership and transferOwnership. While standard for many tokens, this introduces a single point of failure. If the owner's private key is compromised, malicious actions could be performed.L-01

Issue

The contract inherits Ownable, granting a single address (the owner) exclusive control over critical functions, such as renounceOwnership and transferOwnership. While standard for many tokens, this introduces a single point of failure. If the owner's private key is compromised, malicious actions could be performed.

Fix

Consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for ownership to distribute control and reduce the risk associated with a single point of failure. Alternatively, ensure robust security practices for the owner's private key.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Potential for Oracle Manipulation or Staleness (athPrice)

The contract declares a public athPrice variable and interacts with IPancakePair. Without the full code, it's unclear how athPrice is set or updated. If it relies on a single, unaudited oracle, manual input, or a simple DEX price feed without proper safeguards (e.g., TWAP, sanity checks), it could be susceptible to manipulation or become stale, impacting any dependent logic.L-02

Issue

The contract declares a public athPrice variable and interacts with IPancakePair. Without the full code, it's unclear how athPrice is set or updated. If it relies on a single, unaudited oracle, manual input, or a simple DEX price feed without proper safeguards (e.g., TWAP, sanity checks), it could be susceptible to manipulation or become stale, impacting any dependent logic.

Fix

If athPrice is used for critical operations, ensure its value is derived from a robust, decentralized oracle solution (e.g., Chainlink) or a time-weighted average price (TWAP) from a reliable DEX, with appropriate deviation checks and circuit breakers. Document the oracle mechanism clearly.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Use of Unchecked Blocks in ERC20 Operations

The _update function within the ERC20 base contract uses unchecked blocks for _balances and _totalSupply arithmetic. This is a standard optimization in OpenZeppelin contracts, relying on prior checks (e.g., fromBalance < value for insufficient balance) to prevent underflows and overflows.I-01

Issue

The _update function within the ERC20 base contract uses unchecked blocks for _balances and _totalSupply arithmetic. This is a standard optimization in OpenZeppelin contracts, relying on prior checks (e.g., fromBalance < value for insufficient balance) to prevent underflows and overflows.

Fix

This is standard and generally safe due to preceding checks. No direct action is required for the OpenZeppelin implementation. However, any custom logic interacting with these _update calls or performing similar arithmetic should ensure robust checks are in place before unchecked blocks are used.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Complex Tokenomics Indicated by Variables

The contract includes variables such as liquidityProvider, stakingContract, pancakePair, and taxPhase. These suggest the implementation of complex tokenomics, potentially involving transaction taxes, liquidity provision, and staking mechanisms. Such features often introduce intricate logic that requires careful design and auditing.I-02

Issue

The contract includes variables such as liquidityProvider, stakingContract, pancakePair, and taxPhase. These suggest the implementation of complex tokenomics, potentially involving transaction taxes, liquidity provision, and staking mechanisms. Such features often introduce intricate logic that requires careful design and auditing.

Fix

Once the complete code is available, thoroughly review all custom logic related to these variables. Pay close attention to tax calculations, fee distribution, interactions with external protocols (like PancakeSwap), and potential edge cases that could lead to unexpected behavior or economic exploits.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Typo in Constructor Declaration

The provided code snippet shows construct instead of constructor for the contract's initialization function. This is a syntax error that would prevent compilation.I-03

Issue

The provided code snippet shows construct instead of constructor for the contract's initialization function. This is a syntax error that would prevent compilation.

Fix

Correct the typo from construct to constructor to ensure the contract compiles successfully.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The provided source code for the SmartSolveToken contract is incomplete, significantly hindering a comprehensive security assessment. While the contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin ERC20, ERC20Burnable, and Ownable implementations, the custom logic, including the constructor and any unique tokenomics, is truncated. This prevents a thorough analysis of potential vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, access control flaws in custom functions, or economic exploits related to the token's specific mechanisms. A full audit requires the complete and deployable source code.

Technical8/10Low risk

The contract leverages well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20, ERC20Burnable, and Ownable functionalities (7.2 Code Security). These provide a strong foundation for standard token operations. However, the custom implementation details, including the constructor and any unique transfer logic, are missing from the provided source code. This critical omission prevents a thorough assessment of potential technical vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, integer overflows in custom calculations, or logic errors (7.1 Architecture).

Governance8/10Low risk

The contract uses the Ownable pattern, granting significant control to a single owner address (7.3 Access Control). This is a common design choice but introduces centralization risk. Variables like athPrice and taxPhase suggest complex tokenomics and potential interactions with external protocols like PancakeSwap (7.4 Economic, 7.6 External). Without the full implementation, the economic stability, potential for oracle manipulation, or specific tax mechanisms cannot be fully evaluated (7.5 Governance).

Upgrades9/10Low risk

The SmartSolveToken contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades). This simplifies the architecture by removing upgrade-related complexities and risks. However, it means that any discovered vulnerabilities or desired feature changes would necessitate a new contract deployment and migration of assets, which can be a complex and costly process (7.8 Operations).

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

A comprehensive security audit requires the complete and deployable source code.

The current incomplete state prevents a thorough assessment of the contract's custom logic and potential vulnerabilities. It is strongly recommended to provide the full source code for all contracts involved in the protocol. Once the complete code is available, a detailed review should focus on custom transfer logic, the implementation of taxPhase and athPrice, and any interactions with external protocols like PancakeSwap to ensure robust security and economic stability.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeSmartSolveToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age1mo
Contract0x8db2…2469
Deployer0x0abb…ff2b
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Audit History
  1. Aug 11, 20265Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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