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Is Silencio Safe?

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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical8/10Governance1/10Upgrades6/10Checks passed3 of 5Findings1 High · 1 Medium · 1 Low · 1 Info4
SummaryAI Copilot

The SilencioOFT contract is a LayerZero Omnichain Fungible Token (OFT) implementation, inheriting from LayerZero's OFT library and OpenZeppelin's Ownable.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — owner is an EOA
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 56.9%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 96.0%
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — owner is an EOA (single private key)
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (47.0% total → 30.9% effective; 20.2% in EOAs, 26.8% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 56.9% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 96.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 43 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
26.8%Contracts20.2%Wallets53.0%Everyone else
26.8%Contracts20.2%Wallets53.0%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
47.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking26.8%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell20.2%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply53.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads30.9%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$138.8K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$138.8KShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder56.9%
Top-3 Unlocked96.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0xdb6d…9ab30xfa2b…52bb0x6cbc…ba3f0x5c3b…25af

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium1 Low1 Info
High

Centralized Control by Owner

7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations. The contract inherits Ownable, granting a single external owned account (EOA) or contract significant control over critical LayerZero configurations. The owner can set parameters such as trustedRemote, minDstGas, feeCollector, sendVersion, and receiveVersion in the underlying OFT contract. Misconfiguration of these parameters, whether accidental or malicious, could lead to funds being stuck, lost, or sent to unintended destinations across chains, severely impacting the token's functionality and user trust.H-01

Issue

7.3 Access Control, 7.8 Operations. The contract inherits Ownable, granting a single external owned account (EOA) or contract significant control over critical LayerZero configurations. The owner can set parameters such as trustedRemote, minDstGas, feeCollector, sendVersion, and receiveVersion in the underlying OFT contract. Misconfiguration of these parameters, whether accidental or malicious, could lead to funds being stuck, lost, or sent to unintended destinations across chains, severely impacting the token's functionality and user trust.

Fix

Migrate ownership from a single EOA to a multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) with a sufficient number of signers. This distributes control, requires multiple approvals for critical operations, and significantly reduces the risk of a single point of compromise or human error. Implement robust internal procedures for managing and approving changes to these critical parameters.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Reliance on LayerZero Protocol Security

7.6 External. The core cross-chain functionality of the SilencioOFT token is entirely dependent on the security, liveness, and correct operation of the LayerZero protocol and its associated endpoint. Any vulnerabilities, exploits, or operational disruptions within the LayerZero protocol itself (e.g., issues with relayers, oracles, or the endpoint contract) could directly impact the ability to transfer tokens across chains, potentially leading to frozen assets or loss of funds.M-01

Issue

7.6 External. The core cross-chain functionality of the SilencioOFT token is entirely dependent on the security, liveness, and correct operation of the LayerZero protocol and its associated endpoint. Any vulnerabilities, exploits, or operational disruptions within the LayerZero protocol itself (e.g., issues with relayers, oracles, or the endpoint contract) could directly impact the ability to transfer tokens across chains, potentially leading to frozen assets or loss of funds.

Fix

While direct mitigation within the contract is limited, the project should actively monitor LayerZero's security announcements, audits, and operational status. Develop contingency plans for potential LayerZero disruptions, including communication strategies for users and potential emergency measures if the protocol experiences a severe incident. Consider implementing off-chain monitoring for cross-chain transaction health.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Single Point of Failure for Owner Key

7.8 Operations. The current ownership model relies on a single EOA. If the private key associated with this owner address is compromised, lost, or becomes inaccessible, an attacker could gain full control over the contract's critical LayerZero configurations, or the legitimate team could lose the ability to manage the contract. This presents a significant operational risk, even if the contract code itself is secure.L-01

Issue

7.8 Operations. The current ownership model relies on a single EOA. If the private key associated with this owner address is compromised, lost, or becomes inaccessible, an attacker could gain full control over the contract's critical LayerZero configurations, or the legitimate team could lose the ability to manage the contract. This presents a significant operational risk, even if the contract code itself is secure.

Fix

As recommended in H-01, transition ownership to a multi-signature wallet. Additionally, ensure that the private keys for the multi-signature wallet signers are stored securely using industry best practices (e.g., hardware security modules, robust key management policies). Implement strict access controls and operational procedures for all individuals with access to these keys.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Immutability of LayerZero Endpoint

7.1 Architecture. The LayerZero endpoint address (_lzEndpoint) is set during contract deployment in the constructor and cannot be modified thereafter. This design choice makes the contract permanently tied to a specific LayerZero endpoint version or deployment. If the LayerZero protocol were to deprecate or upgrade its endpoint in a non-backward-compatible way, or if the current endpoint were to become compromised or non-functional, the SilencioOFT contract would require redeployment to adapt.I-01

Issue

7.1 Architecture. The LayerZero endpoint address (_lzEndpoint) is set during contract deployment in the constructor and cannot be modified thereafter. This design choice makes the contract permanently tied to a specific LayerZero endpoint version or deployment. If the LayerZero protocol were to deprecate or upgrade its endpoint in a non-backward-compatible way, or if the current endpoint were to become compromised or non-functional, the SilencioOFT contract would require redeployment to adapt.

Fix

Acknowledge this design constraint. While immutability can enhance security by preventing unauthorized changes, it also limits flexibility. If future LayerZero upgrades necessitate a new endpoint, a migration strategy for token holders would be required. Ensure long-term planning accounts for potential LayerZero protocol evolution.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The SilencioOFT contract is a LayerZero Omnichain Fungible Token (OFT) implementation, inheriting from LayerZero's OFT library and OpenZeppelin's Ownable. It enables cross-chain transfers of the Silencio token. The contract's simplicity, relying on well-audited external libraries, contributes to a low technical risk profile. Primary risks stem from the centralized control by the owner and the inherent dependencies on the LayerZero protocol's security and operational integrity.

Technical8/10Low risk

7.1 Architecture, 7.2 Code Security. The contract exhibits a straightforward architecture, inheriting core functionality from battle-tested OpenZeppelin Ownable and LayerZero OFT libraries. This approach minimizes custom code, reducing the surface area for novel vulnerabilities. The use of Solidity ^0.8.24 benefits from built-in overflow/underflow checks. However, the contract's security is directly tied to the robustness of these external dependencies, particularly the LayerZero protocol.

Governance1/10High risk

7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance. The contract implements a centralized access control model via OpenZeppelin's Ownable pattern, where a single owner address (_delegate) manages critical configurations. This owner has the authority to set LayerZero parameters such as trustedRemote and minDstGas, which are crucial for cross-chain functionality and economic integrity. While this provides efficient control, it introduces a single point of failure and requires robust operational security for the owner's key.

Upgrades6/10Medium risk

7.7 Upgrades. The SilencioOFT contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable implementation. This design choice eliminates the complexities and potential risks associated with proxy upgrade patterns, such as storage collisions or upgrade path vulnerabilities. Any future modifications or enhancements to the contract's logic would necessitate a new deployment and a migration strategy for token holders.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is recommended to enhance the operational security surrounding the contract owner's private key, ideally by migrating ownership to a robust multi-signature wallet solution.

This would distribute control and significantly reduce the risk associated with a single point of failure. Additionally, a comprehensive monitoring strategy for LayerZero endpoint configurations and cross-chain transaction health should be implemented to quickly detect and respond to potential issues. The team should also establish clear emergency procedures for potential LayerZero protocol disruptions or misconfigurations, including communication plans for users. Regular reviews of LayerZero documentation and best practices are advised to ensure optimal and secure cross-chain operations.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeSolidity 0.8.24
NetworkBase
Token age1y
Contract0x6bd8…b5d2
Deployer0x7b6c…2ae6
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202658Medium
  2. Aug 5, 202648Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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