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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Sekuya Safe?

SKYABase
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The SekuyaToken contract is an ERC20 token with burnable and access control features, built upon OpenZeppelin libraries.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Liquidity < $50k
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (46.6% total → 35.9% effective; 28.8% in EOAs, 17.8% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity < $50k ($19,318 across 4 pairs — thin market)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 45 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintMintable
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
17.8%Contracts28.8%Wallets53.4%Everyone else
17.8%28.8%Wallets53.4%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
46.6%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking17.8%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell28.8%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply53.4%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads35.9%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$19.3K across 4 pairs
LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$19.3KShare of depth99.9%
LP Locked52.0% · Null Address, UNCX
Top-1 Unlocked Holder28.2%
Top-3 Unlocked47.9%
Unlocked LP held by
0x8ff5…196f0x264d…3e470xd76a…8baa0xb3b6…73330x8a7f…976f0xead0…2d120x65bb…642a

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium2 Info
High

Centralized Minting Authority

The MINTER_ROLE has the authority to mint new tokens up to the MAX_SUPPLY (1 billion tokens). This centralized control over the token supply introduces a significant economic risk, as the token supply can be increased by a single entity, potentially leading to dilution for existing token holders if not managed transparently and responsibly. This power is granted to the deployer in the constructor.H-01

Issue

The MINTER_ROLE has the authority to mint new tokens up to the MAX_SUPPLY (1 billion tokens). This centralized control over the token supply introduces a significant economic risk, as the token supply can be increased by a single entity, potentially leading to dilution for existing token holders if not managed transparently and responsibly. This power is granted to the deployer in the constructor.

Fix

Implement a multi-signature wallet for the MINTER_ROLE to ensure that minting operations require consensus from multiple trusted parties. Clearly communicate the minting policy and schedule to the community. Consider mechanisms to decentralize or restrict minting power further in the future if appropriate for the project's roadmap.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Single Point of Failure for Administrative Roles

The contract's constructor grants both the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and MINTER_ROLE to the deployer's address (_msgSender()). This design creates a single point of failure for all administrative functions and token minting. If the private key associated with this single address is compromised, an attacker could gain full control over role management (granting/revoking any role) and the ability to mint tokens up to the maximum supply.M-01

Issue

The contract's constructor grants both the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and MINTER_ROLE to the deployer's address (_msgSender()). This design creates a single point of failure for all administrative functions and token minting. If the private key associated with this single address is compromised, an attacker could gain full control over role management (granting/revoking any role) and the ability to mint tokens up to the maximum supply.

Fix

Transfer the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE to a robust multi-signature wallet immediately after deployment. This will distribute control and require multiple approvals for critical administrative actions, significantly reducing the risk associated with a single compromised key.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Non-Upgradeable Contract

The SekuyaToken contract is deployed as a standard implementation contract and does not utilize any proxy patterns (e.g., UUPS, Transparent). This means that the contract's logic is immutable after deployment. Any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or changes to the token's economic model would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating existing token holders, which can be a complex and costly process.I-01

Issue

The SekuyaToken contract is deployed as a standard implementation contract and does not utilize any proxy patterns (e.g., UUPS, Transparent). This means that the contract's logic is immutable after deployment. Any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or changes to the token's economic model would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating existing token holders, which can be a complex and costly process.

Fix

While not a vulnerability, it's important for the project team to be aware of this limitation. For future projects or if flexibility is a high priority, consider implementing an upgradeable proxy pattern (e.g., UUPS) to allow for future contract modifications without requiring a full redeployment and migration.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Hardcoded Maximum Supply

The MAX_SUPPLY for the token is defined as a public constant within the contract. While this provides clarity and prevents accidental changes, it means the maximum possible token supply cannot be adjusted after deployment without deploying a new contract. This rigidity might limit future economic model adjustments if the project's needs evolve.I-02

Issue

The MAX_SUPPLY for the token is defined as a public constant within the contract. While this provides clarity and prevents accidental changes, it means the maximum possible token supply cannot be adjusted after deployment without deploying a new contract. This rigidity might limit future economic model adjustments if the project's needs evolve.

Fix

Ensure that the MAX_SUPPLY value is thoroughly reviewed and aligns with the long-term vision for the token's economics. If future flexibility for supply adjustments is desired, consider making the MAX_SUPPLY a state variable that can be modified by a privileged role (e.g., DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) under strict governance, though this introduces its own set of risks.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The SekuyaToken contract is an ERC20 token with burnable and access control features, built upon OpenZeppelin libraries. The primary risks identified are the centralized control over token minting and the single point of failure for administrative roles, which could lead to economic instability if compromised. The contract is not upgradeable, limiting future flexibility.

Technical7/10Low risk

The contract demonstrates strong technical quality (7.2 Code Security) by leveraging battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20, ERC20Burnable, and AccessControl functionalities. This significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities like reentrancy or integer overflows, as these libraries are extensively audited. The implementation of unchecked blocks in _transfer, _mint, _burn, and decreaseAllowance is correctly guarded by prior require statements, ensuring arithmetic safety. The overall architecture (7.1 Architecture) is simple and follows standard token patterns.

Governance3/10High risk

The economic model (7.4 Economic) of SekuyaToken relies heavily on a centralized MINTER_ROLE, which can mint tokens up to a MAX_SUPPLY. This introduces a significant risk of token dilution if the role is misused or compromised. Furthermore, the contract's governance (7.5 Governance) is entirely centralized through the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, which can grant or revoke any other role, including the minter role. This creates a single point of failure (7.3 Access Control) where a compromise of the initial deployer's address could lead to full control over the token supply and administrative functions.

Upgrades4/10Medium risk

The SekuyaToken contract is deployed as a standard implementation contract and does not utilize any proxy patterns (7.7 Upgrades). This means the contract's logic is immutable after deployment. While this eliminates risks associated with upgrade mechanisms, it also means that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or changes to the token's economic model would require deploying an entirely new contract and migrating existing token holders, which can be a complex and costly process.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to implement a robust multi-signature wallet for managing the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and MINTER_ROLE to mitigate the single point of failure risk.

This would require multiple trusted parties to approve critical operations, enhancing security. Additionally, consider the long-term implications of a non-upgradeable contract; if future flexibility is desired, a proxy pattern should be explored for new deployments.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeSekuyaToken
NetworkBase
Token age2y
Contract0x623c…b6e9
Deployer0x7a15…5a53
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Audit History
  1. Sep 3, 202655Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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