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Is Dot Safe?

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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The provided contract code implements a standard ERC-20 token using OpenZeppelin's well-audited libraries.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Top-10 concentration > 20%
  • Liquidity not locked
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 72.3%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 97.2%
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Top-10 concentration > 20% (34.7% total → 27.6% effective; 22.8% in EOAs, 12.0% in contracts — mild)
  • Liquidity NOT locked (owner can withdraw — rug-pull risk)
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 72.3% (exit-liquidity risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 97.2% (exit-liquidity risk)
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 43 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
12.0%Contracts22.8%Wallets65.3%Everyone else
12.0%22.8%Wallets65.3%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
34.7%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking12.0%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell22.8%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply65.3%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads27.6%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$254.2K across 2 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$254.2KShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder72.3%
Top-3 Unlocked97.2%
Unlocked LP held by
0xd2be…98800xfa03…fd7a0x73e3…93d50x3945…6e360x4a4c…34eb

A privileged address — the deployer, the owner, or the token contract itself — is among these holders, so that party can withdraw liquidity.

Security Findings

2 Low2 Info
Low

Multiple Pragma Directives

The source code contains multiple pragma solidity directives (e.g., >=0.4.16, >=0.6.2, ^0.8.20, >=0.8.4). While the compiler will use the most restrictive one for the relevant code blocks, having multiple pragmas can sometimes lead to confusion or potential compatibility issues if not consistently managed across the codebase, especially with different compiler versions.L-01

Issue

The source code contains multiple pragma solidity directives (e.g., >=0.4.16, >=0.6.2, ^0.8.20, >=0.8.4). While the compiler will use the most restrictive one for the relevant code blocks, having multiple pragmas can sometimes lead to confusion or potential compatibility issues if not consistently managed across the codebase, especially with different compiler versions.

Fix

Consolidate pragma solidity directives to a single, most restrictive version (e.g., pragma solidity ^0.8.20;) at the top of each file, or ensure consistent use if different versions are intentionally required for specific interfaces/libraries.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Missing Access Control for _mint and _burn (Contextual)

The _mint and _burn functions are internal to the ERC20 abstract contract. If a concrete token contract inherits from ERC20 and exposes these functions externally without proper access control (e.g., only callable by an owner, minter role, or specific governance mechanism), it could allow unauthorized manipulation of the token supply, leading to severe economic consequences.L-02

Issue

The _mint and _burn functions are internal to the ERC20 abstract contract. If a concrete token contract inherits from ERC20 and exposes these functions externally without proper access control (e.g., only callable by an owner, minter role, or specific governance mechanism), it could allow unauthorized manipulation of the token supply, leading to severe economic consequences.

Fix

For any concrete token implementation, ensure that if _mint or _burn functionalities are exposed externally, they are protected by robust access control mechanisms (e.g., OpenZeppelin's Ownable or AccessControl contracts) to restrict their execution to authorized entities only.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Abstract ERC20 Implementation

The provided code defines an abstract ERC20 contract, which serves as a base for concrete token implementations. It is not directly deployable as a token. A concrete contract inheriting from ERC20 would be required for deployment and would define the initial supply and any custom logic.I-01

Issue

The provided code defines an abstract ERC20 contract, which serves as a base for concrete token implementations. It is not directly deployable as a token. A concrete contract inheriting from ERC20 would be required for deployment and would define the initial supply and any custom logic.

Fix

This is an observation of the contract's structure. Ensure that the concrete token contract inheriting from this abstract base is fully reviewed for its specific implementation details, including constructor logic and any added functionalities.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Standard OpenZeppelin Components

The ERC20 and ECDSA implementations appear to be standard, well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries. These libraries are widely used and have undergone extensive security reviews, significantly reducing the likelihood of undiscovered vulnerabilities within these core components.I-02

Issue

The ERC20 and ECDSA implementations appear to be standard, well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries. These libraries are widely used and have undergone extensive security reviews, significantly reducing the likelihood of undiscovered vulnerabilities within these core components.

Fix

Continue to rely on well-established and audited libraries like OpenZeppelin. Ensure that any modifications or custom additions to these standard components are thoroughly tested and reviewed.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The provided contract code implements a standard ERC-20 token using OpenZeppelin's well-audited libraries. The code appears robust and follows modern Solidity best practices. Due to the truncated nature of the provided source, a full analysis of any custom logic or deployment-specific configurations could not be performed.

Technical8/10Low risk

The technical architecture is based on OpenZeppelin's battle-tested ERC-20 standard, ensuring a robust foundation (7.1 Architecture). Code security is high, utilizing modern Solidity features like custom errors and unchecked blocks where appropriate, which enhances safety and gas efficiency (7.2 Code Security). The core ERC-20 logic is well-implemented, preventing common vulnerabilities like integer overflows/underflows in critical paths. However, the provided code is an abstract contract, and any custom logic in a concrete implementation would require further review.

Governance1/10High risk

As a standard ERC-20 token, the contract does not inherently include complex economic models or governance mechanisms (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance). The economic stability relies on external market factors and the project's overall design. Access control (7.3 Access Control) for core token functions is standard, relying on msg.sender for transfers and approvals. If _mint or _burn are exposed in a concrete implementation, their access control would be critical.

Upgrades5/10Medium risk

The provided contract is not designed with upgradeability patterns (7.7 Upgrades) such as proxies. This means the contract's logic is immutable once deployed. For a simple token, this is often an acceptable design choice, ensuring predictability and reducing the attack surface associated with upgrade mechanisms. Any future changes would require a new deployment and migration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Ensure that any concrete implementation inheriting from this abstract ERC-20 contract properly implements access control for sensitive functions like _mint or _burn if they are exposed externally.

Thoroughly review any additional custom logic added to the token contract for potential vulnerabilities. Consider the implications of immutability for the project's long-term strategy, as any future feature additions or bug fixes would necessitate a new token deployment.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBase
Token age2mo
Contract0x23a2…fe51
Deployer0xd2be…9880
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Audit History
  1. Aug 13, 202655Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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