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Is Safe Token Safe?

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Safe Token SAFE
0x5afe…eeee
Ethereum Not verifiedLast checked 3d ago 2 audits on record
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → High Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The SafeToken contract is an ERC20 token with Pausable and Ownable functionalities, inheriting from OpenZeppelin standards. It includes a TokenRescuer mechanism. The contract is not upgradeable. The primary risks identified relate to the significant centralized control held by the contract owner over token operations and supply, although the owner is a multisig.

1 High1 Medium1 Low2 Informational
Volume 24h
$56.3K
Liquidity
$260.7K
Price
$0.09507
Token Age
2y
Top 10 Holders
80.0%

Security Findings

1 High1 Med1 Low2 Info
High

Significant Centralized Control by Owner

H-01The `Ownable` pattern grants extensive power to a single address (or multisig) designated as the owner. The owner can pause/unpause all token transfers, bypass the pause mechanism for their own transfers, and rescue any ERC20 tokens accidentally sent to the contract. While the owner is a multisig, which mitigates a single point of failure, this still represents a highly centralized control point. A compromise of the multisig or malicious actions by its signers could lead to severe consequences, including freezing user funds or unauthorized token movements.
IssueThe `Ownable` pattern grants extensive power to a single address (or multisig) designated as the owner. The owner can pause/unpause all token transfers, bypass the pause mechanism for their own transfers, and rescue any ERC20 tokens accidentally sent to the contract. While the owner is a multisig, which mitigates a single point of failure, this still represents a highly centralized control point. A compromise of the multisig or malicious actions by its signers could lead to severe consequences, including freezing user funds or unauthorized token movements.
FixImplement a time-lock mechanism for critical owner-controlled functions (e.g., `unpause`, `transferOwnership`, `rescueToken`). This would introduce a delay before actions take effect, allowing for community oversight and potential intervention. Additionally, consider exploring decentralized governance models for future iterations to distribute control and reduce reliance on a single entity.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Owner Can Bypass Pause for Transfers

M-01The `_beforeTokenTransfer` function includes a condition `owner() == _msgSender()` which allows the contract owner to perform token transfers even when the contract is in a paused state. While this might be an intended emergency feature, it means the owner is not subject to the same restrictions as other users during a pause. This could lead to perceived unfairness, potential market manipulation, or allow the owner to move tokens while other users are restricted.
IssueThe `_beforeTokenTransfer` function includes a condition `owner() == _msgSender()` which allows the contract owner to perform token transfers even when the contract is in a paused state. While this might be an intended emergency feature, it means the owner is not subject to the same restrictions as other users during a pause. This could lead to perceived unfairness, potential market manipulation, or allow the owner to move tokens while other users are restricted.
FixClearly document the intended use cases and operational procedures for the owner's ability to bypass the pause. If this functionality is not strictly necessary for emergency operations, consider removing the `owner() == _msgSender()` condition from the `_beforeTokenTransfer` function to ensure all users, including the owner, are subject to the same pause restrictions. If kept, ensure robust internal controls for the multisig are in place to prevent misuse.
StatusUnresolved
Low

Initial Large Token Mint to Owner

L-01The contract's constructor mints 1,000,000,000 tokens (with 18 decimals) directly to the deployer/owner address. This means 100% of the initial token supply is held by a single entity. While this is a common pattern for initial token deployments, it grants immense control over the token's initial distribution, liquidity, and potential market impact to the owner. Any subsequent distribution relies entirely on the owner's actions.
IssueThe contract's constructor mints 1,000,000,000 tokens (with 18 decimals) directly to the deployer/owner address. This means 100% of the initial token supply is held by a single entity. While this is a common pattern for initial token deployments, it grants immense control over the token's initial distribution, liquidity, and potential market impact to the owner. Any subsequent distribution relies entirely on the owner's actions.
FixEnsure that the distribution plan for these tokens is transparent and clearly communicated to the community. Consider vesting schedules or multi-signature controlled distribution mechanisms to manage the release of these tokens over time, reducing the immediate concentration of power and potential for market shocks.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Non-Upgradeable Contract Design

I-01The `SafeToken` contract is deployed as a standard implementation contract and does not utilize any proxy patterns (e.g., UUPS, Transparent). This design choice means the contract's logic cannot be modified or upgraded after deployment. While this provides immutability and reduces complexity associated with upgrade mechanisms, it also implies that any bugs discovered post-deployment cannot be fixed, and new features cannot be added without a complete redeployment and user migration, which can be a costly and disruptive process.
IssueThe `SafeToken` contract is deployed as a standard implementation contract and does not utilize any proxy patterns (e.g., UUPS, Transparent). This design choice means the contract's logic cannot be modified or upgraded after deployment. While this provides immutability and reduces complexity associated with upgrade mechanisms, it also implies that any bugs discovered post-deployment cannot be fixed, and new features cannot be added without a complete redeployment and user migration, which can be a costly and disruptive process.
FixAcknowledge the implications of non-upgradeability. If future flexibility for bug fixes or feature enhancements is desired, consider implementing an upgradeable proxy pattern in future contract deployments. If immutability is the explicit goal, ensure thorough testing and auditing are conducted pre-deployment to minimize the risk of unfixable issues.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Redundant Pause Check in `unpause()`

I-02The `unpause()` function explicitly includes `require(paused(), "SafeToken: token is not paused");`. However, the internal `_unpause()` function, which `unpause()` calls, is already protected by the `whenPaused` modifier. This modifier performs the exact same check, making the explicit `require` statement in `unpause()` redundant.
IssueThe `unpause()` function explicitly includes `require(paused(), "SafeToken: token is not paused");`. However, the internal `_unpause()` function, which `unpause()` calls, is already protected by the `whenPaused` modifier. This modifier performs the exact same check, making the explicit `require` statement in `unpause()` redundant.
FixRemove the redundant `require(paused(), "SafeToken: token is not paused");` statement from the `unpause()` function. The `whenPaused` modifier on `_unpause()` already ensures the contract is paused before attempting to unpause, simplifying the code without affecting functionality.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow8/10

The technical architecture is straightforward, leveraging battle-tested OpenZeppelin contracts for ERC20, Ownable, and Pausable functionalities (7.1 Architecture). The code quality is high, with clear logic and adherence to Solidity best practices (7.2 Code Security). For instance, the `_beforeTokenTransfer` hook prevents transfers to the token contract itself, enhancing safety. A minor informational finding notes a redundant check in the `unpause()` function (I-02).

GovernanceHigh3/10

The contract exhibits a high degree of centralized control, with the owner possessing the ability to pause/unpause transfers, bypass pause restrictions for their own transfers, and rescue any ERC20 tokens held by the contract (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic). The constructor mints the entire initial supply of 1 billion tokens to the owner, granting significant economic influence (L-01). While the owner is noted to be a multisig, mitigating single-point-of-failure, the inherent power remains centralized (7.5 Governance).

UpgradesLow7/10

The `SafeToken` contract is deployed as a non-upgradeable implementation (7.7 Upgrades). This design choice provides immutability, ensuring the contract's logic remains constant post-deployment. However, it also means that no future bug fixes or feature enhancements can be implemented without a complete redeployment and user migration, which could be a significant operational undertaking (I-01).

Security Checklist

3/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedFail
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedFail
Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

80.0% in top 10
4.0% in wallets76.0% in contracts
Effective Concentration34.4%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$264.5K across 3 pairs
Uniswap v3WETHanalysed$260.7K98.6%Uniswap v3WETH$3.0K1.1%Uniswap v4TrumpBucks$8120.3%

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder97.4%
Top-3 Unlocked98.4%

Key Addresses

11 addresses
Deployer
0xd7df…ca26
Unlocked LP Held By
0x2d93…dada0xa090…151a0x3378…81e20xad0a…4a970x8026…90f10x97b2…d1fc0x7a37…28700x3fda…7af40x6101…3cc60xc790…5678

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

8 factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — strong Multisig (3-of-5)
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (80.0% total → 34.4% effective; 4.0% in EOAs, 76.0% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 97.4% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 99% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 98.4% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 99% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Safe Token a scam?

Based on automated analysis, Safe Token scores 63/100 (High Risk) on our risk scale. No honeypot was detected, but always verify independently before investing.

Is Safe Token safe to buy?

Our scanner flagged a risk score of 63/100. Ownership has not been renounced, which is a risk factor. DYOR before purchasing any token.

Has Safe Token been audited?

The contract has not been verified on-chain. Verification is not the same as a full security audit. Use Quantum Audit's free tool to run a deeper analysis of the contract code.

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