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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Roll Safe?

ROLLBase
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The RollToken contract is a standard ERC20 token with permit functionality, inheriting from OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 93.8%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (95.2% total → 39.1% effective; 1.7% in EOAs, 93.5% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 93.8% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 99% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 99% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 45 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
93.5%Contracts1.7%4.8%
93.5%Contracts4.8%
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
95.2%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking93.5%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell1.7%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply4.8%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads39.1%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.65M across 5 pairs
LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$1.63MShare of depth99.1%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder93.8%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0xf949…02980xd860…84800x4835…1de10x4e5b…9a240x5a01…a692

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Low2 Info
High

Centralized Control of Total Supply

The RollToken contract's constructor mints the entire MAX_SUPPLY (1 billion tokens) to a single treasury address. This design centralizes control over the entire token supply to one entity (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic). If the treasury address is compromised, the entire token supply is at risk of theft or misuse, leading to a complete loss of value for the token holders.H-01

Issue

The RollToken contract's constructor mints the entire MAX_SUPPLY (1 billion tokens) to a single treasury address. This design centralizes control over the entire token supply to one entity (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic). If the treasury address is compromised, the entire token supply is at risk of theft or misuse, leading to a complete loss of value for the token holders.

Fix

Implement robust security measures for the treasury address. A multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) with a diverse set of trusted signers is highly recommended to distribute control and reduce the single point of failure risk. Consider a phased distribution or vesting schedule for the tokens to further decentralize control over time.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Lack of Emergency Pause Mechanism

The RollToken contract does not include any mechanism to pause token transfers or other critical functions (7.8 Operations). While a simple ERC20 token may not always require this, in the event of a critical vulnerability discovered in the token itself or a dependent protocol, the inability to pause operations could prevent mitigation of further damage or loss of funds.L-01

Issue

The RollToken contract does not include any mechanism to pause token transfers or other critical functions (7.8 Operations). While a simple ERC20 token may not always require this, in the event of a critical vulnerability discovered in the token itself or a dependent protocol, the inability to pause operations could prevent mitigation of further damage or loss of funds.

Fix

Consider implementing a pausable mechanism (e.g., inheriting from OpenZeppelin's Pausable contract) controlled by a trusted entity (like the multi-sig treasury). This would provide an emergency stop-gap in unforeseen circumstances, allowing time to address critical issues. Clearly define the conditions under which the pause can be activated and deactivated.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Permit Function Front-Running Risk

The ERC20Permit functionality allows for gasless approvals via signed messages. However, if a user's signed permit message is broadcast publicly (e.g., on a public mempool), a malicious actor could front-run the legitimate transaction by submitting their own transaction with the same signed message, potentially approving themselves as the spender before the intended spender (7.2 Code Security, 7.6 External). This is an inherent characteristic of the permit design and not a flaw in the implementation.I-01

Issue

The ERC20Permit functionality allows for gasless approvals via signed messages. However, if a user's signed permit message is broadcast publicly (e.g., on a public mempool), a malicious actor could front-run the legitimate transaction by submitting their own transaction with the same signed message, potentially approving themselves as the spender before the intended spender (7.2 Code Security, 7.6 External). This is an inherent characteristic of the permit design and not a flaw in the implementation.

Fix

Educate users on the risks associated with public permit message broadcasting. Recommend using private transaction relays or services that offer front-running protection when interacting with permit functions. Users should be cautious about sharing signed messages in public channels.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Fixed Token Supply

The RollToken contract has a MAX_SUPPLY that is entirely minted during deployment, and no further minting or burning capabilities are exposed (7.4 Economic). This results in a fixed and immutable total supply. While this provides predictability, it limits the protocol's flexibility for future economic models, such as introducing inflation/deflation mechanisms, ecosystem incentives, or adjusting supply based on demand.I-02

Issue

The RollToken contract has a MAX_SUPPLY that is entirely minted during deployment, and no further minting or burning capabilities are exposed (7.4 Economic). This results in a fixed and immutable total supply. While this provides predictability, it limits the protocol's flexibility for future economic models, such as introducing inflation/deflation mechanisms, ecosystem incentives, or adjusting supply based on demand.

Fix

This is a design choice. If future flexibility is desired, consider adding controlled minting/burning functionalities, possibly governed by a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO). If a fixed supply is the intended design, ensure this is clearly communicated to the community.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The RollToken contract is a standard ERC20 token with permit functionality, inheriting from OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries. The primary risk identified is the complete centralization of the token's initial supply to a single treasury address, posing a significant single point of failure. The technical implementation is robust due to the use of audited libraries.

Technical8/10Low risk

The RollToken contract is a straightforward ERC20 implementation, leveraging OpenZeppelin's robust ERC20 and ERC20Permit libraries (7.1 Architecture). This approach significantly reduces the likelihood of common technical vulnerabilities such as reentrancy or integer overflows (7.2 Code Security). The code is minimal and well-structured, demonstrating good practices. No complex custom logic was introduced beyond the initial minting, contributing to its technical simplicity and security.

Governance1/10High risk

The economic model of the RollToken involves minting the entire MAX_SUPPLY to a single treasury address during deployment (7.4 Economic). This design choice centralizes control over the token's initial distribution and liquidity, creating a significant single point of failure. While simple, it introduces a high dependency on the security of the treasury address, as its compromise would jeopardize the entire token supply. There are no governance mechanisms implemented within this contract (7.5 Governance).

Upgrades6/10Medium risk

The RollToken contract is implemented as a standard, non-upgradeable ERC20 token. This design choice eliminates the complexities and potential risks associated with upgrade mechanisms, such as proxy pattern vulnerabilities or storage collisions (7.7 Upgrades). The immutability of the contract ensures that its logic cannot be altered post-deployment, providing a predictable and stable environment for users.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to implement robust security measures for the treasury address, such as a multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) with a diverse set of signers, to mitigate the high centralization risk associated with holding the entire token supply.

Consider the long-term implications of a fixed supply and the absence of a pause mechanism for future operational flexibility. For permit functionality, educate users on best practices to avoid front-running, such as using private transaction relays.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeRollToken
NetworkBase
Token age7mo
Contract0xab63…d021
Deployer0xbfd7…0c51
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202638Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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