Is Aave Token (AAVE) Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Checklist

2/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership RenouncedUnknown

No Mint FunctionFail

Liquidity LockedFail

Not a ProxyPass

Audit History

2 audits on record

Jul 2333Jul 2342

Every audit run adds a dated snapshot — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Audit Summary

The OptimismMintableERC20 contract serves as a standard ERC20 token with minting and burning capabilities controlled by a designated bridge. The audit found the contract to be well-structured, adhering to best practices and OpenZeppelin standards. No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities were identified. The primary security consideration is the inherent reliance on the external bridge's security for token supply management.

Final Recommendation: The OptimismMintableERC20 contract is well-implemented and secure for its intended purpose. The primary recommendation is to ensure the utmost security and rigorous auditing of the `BRIDGE` contract that controls the minting and burning of these tokens, as its compromise would directly impact the token's integrity. Additionally, maintain consistent development practices, including thorough testing and adherence to established security patterns, for any future modifications or related contracts.

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow

8/10

The technical implementation of the OptimismMintableERC20 contract is robust, leveraging OpenZeppelin's battle-tested ERC20 library. Key security features include the use of `immutable` variables for critical addresses like `BRIDGE` and `REMOTE_TOKEN` (7.2 Code Security). Access control for `mi

GovernanceHigh

2/10

The economic model of the OptimismMintableERC20 token is straightforward, with its supply directly managed by a designated `BRIDGE` contract (7.4 Economic). This design is intentional for cross-chain functionality, meaning the token's integrity is inherently tied to the security of the external

UpgradesHigh

3/10

The OptimismMintableERC20 contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy, nor does it contain any self-upgrade mechanisms (7.7 Upgrades). This eliminates upgrade-related risks such as proxy storage collisions or logic errors during upgrades. The contract's `version` constant is for off-chain

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder99.4%

Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

What Raised This Score

6 factors

Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
Top-10 concentration > 30% (58.9% total → 31.3% effective; 12.9% in EOAs, 45.9% in contracts — moderate)
Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.4% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 73% of DEX liquidity)
LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 73% of DEX liquidity)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Findings

4 total

4 Info

I-01InformationalUnresolved

Reliance on External Bridge Security

The `mint` and `burn` functions, which control the token's supply, are exclusively callable by the `BRIDGE` address. This design is fundamental for a cross-chain mintable token, but it means the security and integrity of the token's supply are entirely dependent on the security of the external `BRIDGE` contract. A compromise of the `BRIDGE` would allow arbitrary minting or burning of tokens, directly impacting the token's value and trust.

Recommendation: Ensure the `BRIDGE` contract is thoroughly audited, robustly secured, and follows best practices for access control, operational security, and incident response. Implement multi-signature control or time-locks for critical operations within the bridge if applicable.

I-02InformationalUnresolved

Immutable Critical Parameters

The `REMOTE_TOKEN`, `BRIDGE`, and `DECIMALS` variables are declared as `immutable` and are set only once during contract construction. This prevents any post-deployment modification of these critical parameters, enhancing the contract's security, predictability, and immutability of its core configuration.

Recommendation: Continue to utilize `immutable` variables for critical parameters that should not change after deployment, as this is a strong security practice.

I-03InformationalUnresolved

Adherence to ERC Standards and Backward Compatibility

The contract correctly implements the ERC20 standard for token functionality and the ERC165 standard for interface introspection. It also includes legacy interfaces (`ILegacyMintableERC20`) and corresponding getter functions for backward compatibility within the Optimism ecosystem, ensuring broad interoperability without compromising current standards.

Recommendation: Maintain strict adherence to relevant ERC standards and ensure backward compatibility where necessary, as demonstrated, to support ecosystem evolution and integration.

I-04InformationalUnresolved

Absence of Reentrancy and Arithmetic Vulnerabilities

The contract does not perform external calls to untrusted addresses after state changes, effectively mitigating reentrancy risks. Furthermore, by inheriting from OpenZeppelin's `ERC20` library and operating in Solidity 0.8.15, the contract benefits from built-in overflow/underflow checks, preventing common arithmetic vulnerabilities in token operations.

Recommendation: Continue to leverage secure and audited libraries like OpenZeppelin and Solidity's native safety features to prevent common vulnerabilities.

Is Aave Token Safe? AAVE