Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis

Is Quickdraw a Scam?

DRAW

Ethereum

Not verified

This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →

Last checked Oct 23, 2026 · 1 audit on recordNew Launch · 5h old

Chart

78/ 100

High RiskHow is this score calculated?

How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest

Technical6/10 Governance1/10 Upgrades6/10 Checks passed3 of 7 Findings1 High · 2 Medium · 5 Info8

SummaryAI Copilot

The QuickdrawToken contract implements a custom ERC-20 token with tight integration to an external game contract.

Read the full analysis

What raised the score

Owner can change any holder's balance
Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by initializer: Other-Contract
Mint capability UNKNOWN
Ownership status UNKNOWN
Liquidity not locked
Liquidity < $50k
Top-10 concentration > 30%
Contract source not verified — its logic cannot be read

Exact factors

Owner can change any holder's balance (seize or credit tokens); held by game: Other-Contract
Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by initializer: Other-Contract
Mint capability UNKNOWN (implementation ABI unreadable)
Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool) — held by independent providers — market-depth risk
Liquidity < $50k ($20,848 across 3 pairs — thin market)
Top-10 concentration > 30% (99.8% total → 43.0% effective; 5.2% in EOAs, 94.6% in contracts)
Contract source NOT verified — its logic cannot be read

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (5h old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Oct 233 of 7 checks passed

Contract verifiedNot verified

OwnershipUnknown

MintUnknown

Liquidity lockNot locked

UpgradeabilityFixed code

HoneypotNone found

Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Oct 23, 202622 holders

ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply

99.8%of supply sits with the top 10 holders

Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking94.6%
Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell5.2%
Everyone else12 holders0.2%

Effective concentrationwhat the score reads43.0%

How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 23, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Oct 23$20.8K across 3 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$20.8KShare of depth100.0%

Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%

Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Unlocked LP held by

0xa6f3…e168

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High2 Medium5 Info

High

Centralized Control Over User Balances

The game contract has the authority to call gameMove and gameBurn, which allow it to arbitrarily move tokens between addresses or burn tokens from any user's wallet. This effectively removes the concept of user ownership, as the game contract can unilaterally reduce or redistribute any user's balance.CP-02

Issue

Fix

Restrict the game contract's ability to modify balances to only specific, user-initiated actions or implement a multi-signature requirement for balance adjustments.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Centralized Fee Configuration

The initializer address has the power to set the initial state, which influences the transfer fee structure. This allows the initializer to potentially change the economic parameters of the token at the start of the protocol's lifecycle.CP-07

Issue

Fix

Consider using a decentralized governance mechanism or a time-locked contract to manage fee changes rather than a single initializer address.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Liquidity not locked

0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0xa6f3…e168 — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY

Issue

Fix

Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Who holds the supply

The ten largest holders own 99.8% of supply. What remains: 5.2% in wallets, 94.6% in other contracts. 22 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS

Issue

The ten largest holders own 99.8% of supply. What remains: 5.2% in wallets, 94.6% in other contracts. 22 holders in total.

Fix

Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Not listed by any independent source

22 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY

Issue

22 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.

Fix

Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

The market for this token

Liquidity $21K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $59K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET

Issue

Liquidity $21K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $59K (DexScreener, all pools).

Fix

Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Asset class: Project token

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mint capability could not be read. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $21K of DEX liquidity across 3 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE

Issue

Fix

Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Recently launched — less than a day of market history

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT

Issue

Fix

Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.

Status

Acknowledged

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 23

Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The QuickdrawToken contract implements a custom ERC-20 token with tight integration to an external game contract. While the core transfer logic follows standard patterns, the protocol grants the game contract excessive authority over user balances. 7.1 Architecture: Centralized control via a game contract. 7.2 Code Security: Standard ERC-20 implementation with custom hooks. 7.3 Access Control: High centralization risk. 7.4 Economic: Fee manipulation possible. 7.5 Governance: Initializer-based setup. 7.6 External: Heavy dependency on game contract. 7.7 Upgrades: Not applicable. 7.8 Operations: Standard.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The contract utilizes standard ERC-20 logic with integrated hooks for game-specific state updates. The code is clean and follows modern Solidity practices, including the use of custom errors. However, the reliance on external calls to the game contract during every transfer introduces potential reentrancy or failure points if the game contract is not perfectly implemented.

Governance1/10High risk

The economic model is entirely dependent on the game contract's behavior. The initializer has the power to start the token lifecycle, while the game contract acts as a central authority over all user balances. This creates a significant trust requirement for the game contract's security and integrity.

Upgrades6/10Medium risk

The contract does not implement proxy patterns or upgradeability features. The logic is immutable once deployed. This eliminates upgrade-related risks but prevents patching if vulnerabilities are discovered in the game integration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Users should be aware that the game contract holds absolute authority over their token balances, including the ability to move or burn tokens without user consent.

It is recommended to verify the source code and security audits of the bound game contract before interacting with the token. For future iterations, consider implementing a more decentralized governance model or limiting the game contract's ability to modify balances to specific, audited scenarios to reduce the trust requirement on the game contract.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record

TypeQuickdrawToken

NetworkEthereum

Token age5h

Contract0xeb1a…83a3

Deployer0xe43b…4148

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Audit History

Oct 23, 202678High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the DRAW contract address?

The Quickdraw (DRAW) contract on Ethereum is 0xeb1ad60a119a5d239122844e6f64ae1c5fb483a3. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.